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Foreword
Six months on since Asian Development Outlook 2013 was published in 
April, developing Asia continues to consolidate its growth as the region’s 
two leading economies decelerate somewhat. Growth moderation in 
the People’s Republic of China reflects the authorities’ efforts to forge 
a more balanced and sustainable growth path than the familiar one 
led by exports and investment. In India, poor infrastructure and a lack 
of structural reforms continue to weigh on industry and investment, 
hampering growth. Regionally, developing Asia’s pace of growth is 
expected to ease from 6.1% in 2012 to 6.0% in 2013, before picking up to 
6.2% in 2014. Excluding the two regional giants, the rest of developing 
Asia can expect growth this year equal to the 4.0% recorded in 2012.
Generally strong macroeconomic positions provide some breathing 
space, as many regional economies run current account surpluses and 
hold large foreign exchange reserves. The region is well positioned 
to weather the financial storm expected when Washington begins 
winding back its quantitative easing program in the coming months. 
Although the prospect of an end to quantitative easing in the United 
States has disturbed financial markets in emerging economies, including 
developing Asia, fears of a meltdown like the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
are misplaced. Many countries in Asia learned the hard lessons of 1997 
and have rightly strengthened macroeconomic management, financial 
regulation, and corporate governance. 
A more economically stable Asia will benefit from a gradual revival 
in developed markets. Although this is not a time of great optimism, the 
feeling is palpable that the mature economies have turned the corner. The 
United States economy is expected to pick up in the coming months, the 
euro area is showing signs of stabilizing, and Japan is benefiting from the 
introduction of Abenomics earlier this year. Nevertheless, recovery in the 
advanced world has yet to translate into revived orders for exports from 
developing Asia. This lull should be used to further enhance intraregional 
trade and promote domestic consumption in middle-income developing 
Asia.
The challenge for the region is to maintain and further consolidate its 
financial stability while continuing along its solid growth trajectory. The 
recent turbulence in financial markets underscores the need for continued 
structural reform to maintain stable growth momentum. Priority 
areas include financial sector development, industrial diversification, 
infrastructure and human capital improvement, fiscal consolidation, and 
social protection. 
Foreword  v
Strengthening governance is key among reform priorities. The 
development community has long stressed that open, transparent, 
and accountable government is critical for sound and sustainable 
development—a stance supported by countless empirical studies. The 
global evidence shows that better governance correlates with more reliable 
growth, higher investment, and accelerated poverty reduction. And Asia 
is no exception. Yet the region is closing its income gap with advanced 
economies much more quickly than its governance gap. 
Most Asians’ impressions of governance come from their experience 
with public services. Improving public service delivery is therefore an 
effective entry point toward wider governance reform. Because public 
services are particularly important to the poor, ensuring their effective 
delivery is critical to making growth inclusive. As demonstrated by the 
increase in anticorruption initiatives in recent years, developing Asia’s 
leaders recognize this need and are stepping up efforts. The journey is 
long, and the tasks ahead are challenging, but the payoffs to development 
will be substantial.
TAKEHIKO NAKAO 
President 
Asian Development Bank
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Definitions
The economies discussed in the Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update 
(ADO 2013 Update) are classified by major analytic or geographic group. 
For purposes of this publication, the following apply:
? Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) comprises Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
and Viet Nam.
? Developing Asia refers to the 45 developing member countries of the 
Asian Development Bank. 
? Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. 
? East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China.
? South Asia comprises Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the 
Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
? Southeast Asia comprises Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic,  Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
? The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall 
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, 
Palau, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Vanuatu.
? Unless otherwise specified, the symbol “$” and the word “dollar” refer 
to US dollars. 
ADO 2013 Update is generally based on data available up to 6 September 2013.
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ADO 2013 Update—Highlights
Developing Asia is challenged to sustain its growth momentum as the pace in its 
two largest economies moderates. Regional growth is expected to slide marginally 
from 6.1% in 2012 to 6.0% in 2013, before picking up to 6.2% in 2014.
 
Prospective tapering of quantitative easing in the United States destabilized 
emerging economy financial markets, including in developing Asia. However, 
fears of a repeat of the 1997 Asian financial crisis are unwarranted. The region is 
now in a stronger position to weather the storm, with many economies running 
current account surpluses and holding large foreign reserve stockpiles. The 
reforms instituted since 1997 strengthened macroeconomic management, financial 
regulation, and corporate governance.
Still, developing Asia faces the twin challenges of maintaining financial stability 
and sustaining growth. The recent financial turmoil has demonstrated all the more 
clearly the need for structural reform to support growth. 
Governance reform is needed to sustain development momentum and ensure that 
the benefits of growth are widely shared. Improving public service delivery is an 
effective entry point toward wider governance reform.
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Key messages
 ? Growth in developing Asia is forecast to decline marginally to 6.0% this year 
from 6.1% in 2012, before picking up to 6.2% in 2014. This Update revises 
down the Asian Development Outlook 2013 (ADO 2013) forecasts for 2013 by 
0.6 percentage points and for 2014 by 0.5 percentage points, as growth 
moderates in the region’s two largest economies: the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) and India. 
 ? Resurgence in the United States (US) economy is expected to pick up in the 
coming months. Signs are emerging that the euro area is turning the corner, 
and Japan is benefiting from the introduction of Abenomics early this year. 
Nevertheless, recovery in the advanced economies has yet to translate into 
revived orders for exports from developing Asia.
 ? In the PRC, growth is expected to moderate to 7.6% in 2013 from 7.7% last 
year. The authorities there are engineering a medium-term transition to a 
more sustainable growth path than one led by exports and investment. The 
shift is evident in recent efforts to tackle a burgeoning shadow banking 
system. This will affect growth prospects in Asia, especially East and 
Southeast Asia. 
 ? India’s growth is forecast to slow to 4.7% in FY2013 (ending 31 March 2014) 
from 5.0% in FY2012. Persistent supply-side bottlenecks such as poor 
infrastructure and long delays in structural reform keep industry and 
investment lagging. Fiscal and current account deficits also dent business 
confidence. 
 ? Slower growth in Asia’s two giants hampers but does not hobble growth 
across Asia. With positive signs from advanced economies supporting 
regional prospects, developing Asia excluding the PRC and India is expected 
to match its 4.0% growth performance last year.
 ? Inflation in developing Asia is projected dipping to 3.6% this year from 3.7% 
in 2012 as weaker growth and tepid commodity prices keep price pressures in 
check. Next year, inflation is expected to return to 3.7%. 
 ? Prospective tapering of US quantitative easing has destabilized financial 
markets in developing Asia and other emerging economies, in particular 
India and Indonesia. Widening current account deficits have made the two 
economies vulnerable, but their foreign exchange reserves at the end of 
August remain sufficient to cover imports for 7 months in India and 5 months 
in Indonesia.
 ? In any case, fears of a crisis recalling 1997 are unwarranted. Many developing 
Asian economies now have current account surpluses and large foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition, reforms since 1997 have strengthened 
macroeconomic management, financial regulation, and corporate 
governance. 
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 ? Developing Asia faces the twin challenges of maintaining financial stability 
and sustaining growth. As Asia transitions toward a more sustainable growth 
path, governments must watch out for volatile capital flows and financial 
market disruption. They must also continue to pursue sound macroeconomic 
policies that include building up fiscal space during good times.
 ? The recent turbulence in financial markets underscores the need for 
structural reform to sustain growth. Priority areas include foreign direct 
investment, industrial diversification, infrastructure and human capital, fiscal 
consolidation, and social protection. 
 ? Governance is another key area for reform. Asia must make headway toward 
catching up with the advanced economies and matching their quality of 
governance. A focus on strengthening public service delivery can provide 
immediate benefits to make growth more inclusive and create momentum 
for wider governance reforms.
Time for vigilance and reform
Developing Asia’s outlook
 ? Growth will be slower than forecast in April in ADO 2013 before 
picking up in 2014. Despite improving growth prospects for the advanced 
economies, GDP in developing Asia will grow at 6.0% in 2013, marginally 
down from 6.1% in 2012. Growth in 2014 is now forecast at 6.2%. 
 » This Update revises down GDP growth projections in ADO 2013. The 
forecast for 2013 growth is now 0.6 percentage points lower than the 
6.6% in ADO 2013, and for 2014 now 0.5 percentage points below the 6.7% 
forecast in April. Growth across the region is somewhat stymied by the 
moderation of growth in the two regional giants—the PRC and India—
and by instability in financial markets buffeted by volatile capital flows. 
 » Nascent recovery in advanced economies has yet to lift emerging 
markets. Acceleration in the US economy is expected to gather 
momentum in the months ahead, and recession in the euro area seems 
to be coming to an end. Japan began 2013 quite strongly following 
the introduction of Abenomics. However, recovery in the advanced 
economies has yet to translate into revived orders for exports from 
developing Asia.
 ? Developing Asia’s slowdown is most manifest in its two giants. Growth 
this year in India is forecast to decelerate to 4.7% from 5.0% last year and 
in the PRC to 7.6% from 7.7%. Such growth is much more tepid than the 
enviable rates both countries enjoyed over the past decade, when India 
averaged 7.9% growth and the PRC 10.5%. 
 » Slower growth in the PRC is the price of structural reform for the 
long term. The authorities in the PRC seek to engineer a strategic shift 
away from growth led by exports and investment toward more balanced 
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growth. The shift is most evident in the government’s recent efforts 
to wrestle down credit bubbles and come to grips with a burgeoning 
shadow banking system. From this perspective, moderated growth in the 
PRC over the medium term signals a healthy and welcome transition to a 
more sustainable growth path.
 » Deceleration in India tracks persistent slumps in industry and 
investment. Setting aside weak foreign demand, frail industry and 
investment in India reflect persistent supply-side bottlenecks such as poor 
infrastructure and delayed structural reform to ease these constraints. 
India’s current account deficits and volatile capital flows further dent 
business confidence. 
 » Slower growth in the giants hampers but does not hobble growth 
across Asia. East and Southeast Asia have especially strong links with 
the PRC in “factory Asia.” The PRC’s influence on economic performance 
in these subregions has grown in the past decade along with its share of 
developing Asia’s exports, which rose from 14% to 21%. Even with growth 
slowing in the PRC and India, projected growth this year in developing 
Asia excluding these two giants equals the 4.0% recorded in 2012.
 ? Constrained growth and commodity prices hold price pressures in check. 
Average inflation in developing Asia is expected to moderate to 3.6% in 2013, 
improving from 3.7% last year. Inflation in 2014 is forecast to pick up to 3.7%. 
These figures mask great variation country by country. Inflation in India will 
reach 6.5% in 2013. In Indonesia, inflation is expected to worsen sharply from 
4.3% in 2012 to 7.2% in 2013 as the government scales back fuel subsidies. 
 ? Asia’s shrinking current account surplus puts a premium on domestic 
demand. Developing Asia’s long-standing current account surplus is 
expected to narrow from 1.8% of GDP in 2012 to 1.6% in both 2013 and 2014.
Volatile capital flows and financial market vulnerability
 ? Regional financial markets are rocked by talk of tapering quantitative 
easing. The sharp reactions of financial markets in emerging economies, not 
least in Asia, to key signals from the US Federal Reserve on 22 May and 19 
September provide firm evidence of their vulnerability to monetary policy 
shifts in advanced countries. 
 » Capital flows reverse as investors pivot away from emerging markets. 
This has weighed down currency values and stock prices and pushed up 
long-term bond yields and risk premiums. Stock markets in several Asian 
economies suffered double-digit declines from May to the end of August: 
Indonesia by 21.1%, Thailand by 20.3%, the Philippines by 18.4%, and India 
by 11.7%.
 » Recently spiraling asset prices in Asia start to unwind. Market turmoil 
has reversed asset price increases that were fuelled by large capital 
inflows from advanced countries when they responded to the global 
financial crisis with expansionary monetary policies.
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 ? India and Indonesia in particular have felt recent financial market 
turmoil. From May to the end of August, the Indian rupee fell by 16.2% 
against the US dollar, and the Indonesian rupiah by 13.2%. Widening current 
account deficits have long made both economies more susceptible to shifts 
in market sentiment, as have fiscal deficits in India. Fortunately, both have 
sufficient foreign exchange reserves, enough as of August to cover imports 
to India for 7 months and to Indonesia for 5 months. 
 ? Turbulence in Asia does not at this moment warrant fear of a crisis 
recalling 1997. Developing Asia is now in a much stronger position to 
weather the storm. Compared with 1997, most regional economies now 
have robust current account surpluses and much higher foreign reserves 
relative to their modest amounts of short-term external debt. In addition, 
countries in the region have since 1997 significantly strengthened their 
macroeconomic management, financial regulation and supervision, and 
corporate governance.
The twin challenges of financial stability and sustainable growth 
 ? Asia needs to safeguard financial stability now and sustain growth in 
the medium term. Highly volatile capital flows that compound the risk of 
financial instability are occurring at a time when the PRC’s transition to a 
more moderate growth path may dampen the region’s growth generally.
 ? Confidence rests on the authorities continuing to pursue sound 
macroeconomic policies. Recent global financial crises, from the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis to the ongoing euro area sovereign debt crisis, offer valuable 
lessons for developing Asia in its quest for financial stability.
 » Crisis response cannot rely solely on easier monetary policy. There 
are limits to monetary policy’s countercyclical support, particularly where 
interest rates are low or inflation is a chronic problem. Unlike economies 
whose currencies enjoy international reserve status, emerging market 
central banks cannot pursue quantitative easing without accelerating 
inflation. 
 » Exchange rates should be flexible, balancing inflation and corporate 
external debt. Flexible exchange rates help governments to ensure that 
they hold sufficient reserves that are commensurate with the demands 
posed by greater volatility in capital flows. Defending unrealistic exchange 
rates risks depleting foreign exchange reserves.
 » Periods of relative calm are times to firm government fiscal positions. 
Governments need to build up fiscal space when they can, to finance 
sustainable development and poverty elimination and, in times of 
economic crisis, countercyclical stimulus. 
 ? Generally sound banking sector indicators should not invite complacency. 
Capital adequacy and nonperforming loan ratios have improved in developing 
Asia despite the global financial crisis. But policy makers need to be vigilant to 
secure the quality of financial data and monitor the rapid growth of shadow 
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banking. Prudential regulation must be strengthened and, where appropriate, 
include macroprudential measures.
 ? Current financial turmoil is a timely reminder of the need for structural 
reform. Adversity impresses on India, Indonesia, and others in developing 
Asia the urgency of structural reform to keep them on a strong and 
sustainable growth path. High priorities are reforms to encourage foreign 
direct investment, diversify the industrial base, close infrastructure and 
human capital gaps, consolidate fiscal positions by cutting inefficient 
subsidies, strengthen social protection, and overcome other constraints on 
long-term growth.
 ? One important area of structural reform is governance. While developing 
Asia has outperformed the rest of the world economically over the last few 
decades, its governance lags. To close the gap with the advanced countries, the 
region needs to strengthen governance, an issue analyzed in the theme chapter 
of this Update. Focusing on strengthening public service delivery can provide 
immediate benefits to make growth more inclusive and create momentum for 
wider governance reform.
Outlook by subregion
 ? Developing Asia is challenged to sustain its growth momentum. Despite 
a better outlook for the advanced economies, growth in developing Asia is 
slowing, mainly on account of weaker prospects for its two giants. Subdued 
economic activity cuts across most subregions.
 ? East Asia sees growth softer than expected. Growth in East Asia is 
projected at 6.6% in both 2013 and 2014, below the 7.1% forecast in April 
for both years. Rather than accelerate, growth is now expected to slow 
in the PRC to 7.6% in 2013 and 7.4% in 2014, owing to weaker domestic 
demand. Growth rates in the rest of the subregion are now expected to be 
generally below April projections because of weaker external demand and, 
in Mongolia, moderating investment in mining. However, the Republic of 
Korea growth forecast for 2013 is maintained at 2.8%, as fiscal stimulus has 
cushioned the impact of weaker external demand. East Asia’s inflation rate 
is projected at 2.4% in 2013 and 2.7% in 2014, lower than April forecasts, with 
Mongolia as the outlier recording high inflation at 9.5% in 2013 and 10.0% in 
2014. 
 ? South Asia is downgraded mainly because of a slowdown in India. The 
subregional growth forecast is lowered by 1 percentage point, to 4.7% from 
5.7% in 2013, and by less in 2014, to 5.5% from 6.2%. Rapid growth in India 
has steadily slowed over the past 2 years as the county grappled with fiscal 
imbalances, high inflation, and various impediments to new investment. 
While substantial progress has been made on the fiscal and inflation 
fronts, capital outflows from emerging markets added to uncertainty over 
India’s outlook because of its large current account deficit. Growth in other 
countries is largely on track to meet forecasts, with growth slightly higher in 
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal and slightly lower in Bhutan. Pakistan 
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has adopted major reforms that should stabilize its economy. The average 
subregional inflation forecast for 2013 is revised down to 6.7% from 7.4%, and 
for 2014 to 7.0% from 7.1%. 
 ? Southeast Asia is crimped by weakness in its three biggest economies. 
Lackluster export markets and moderated investment have weighed on 
growth in Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. By contrast, the Philippines 
is performing strongly, and its growth result will be higher than expected 
in April. The subregional growth forecast for this year is lowered by half a 
percentage point to 4.9%. In 2014, growth will quicken to 5.3% as investment 
recovers and exports benefit from improved global trade and recent currency 
depreciation in several economies. While inflation is more subdued in 
Southeast Asia generally, it has accelerated sharply in Indonesia since June, 
when the government raised administered fuel prices. That prompts an 
upward revision in the subregional inflation forecasts to 4.7% from 4.2% this 
year and to 4.3% from 4.1% in 2014. 
 ? Central Asia will grow marginally more slowly in 2013 before recovering 
in 2014. Growth is now projected to decelerate to 5.4% in 2013, a bit below 
the 5.5% forecast in ADO 2013, because slower growth in Kazakhstan and 
Georgia outweighs more optimistic forecasts for Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, and Tajikistan. The April forecast that growth will reach 6.0% in 2014 
still stands. Sluggish performance in industry, agriculture, and construction 
trims the 2013 growth forecast for Kazakhstan from 5.2% to 4.8%. In Georgia, 
a sharp slowdown in the first 7 months—reflecting investor caution linked 
to the political transition, delays in public infrastructure projects, and weak 
domestic demand—lowers the growth projection for 2013 from 5.5% to 3.0%. 
The Update maintains its subregional inflation projection for 2013 at 6.7% but 
revises it for 2014 with an uptick to 6.8%. 
 ? Pacific economies as a whole are expected to achieve ADO 2013 growth 
forecasts. The growth forecasts for the Pacific subregion remain unchanged 
at 5.2% in 2013 and 5.5% in 2014. Higher growth expectations for the Cook 
Islands and Fiji in 2013 are offset by lower projections for Kiribati, Nauru, 
Solomon Islands, and Timor-Leste. Improving consumption and investment 
indicators in Fiji and unexpectedly large increases in tourism arrivals in the 
Cook Islands prompt upgrades in their growth forecasts. Downward revisions 
are led by a modest decline in the 2013 growth forecast for Timor-Leste, 
where public expenditure is lower than budgeted, and a more significant 
downgrade in the forecast for Solomon Islands, where production in gold 
mining, logging, and agriculture are falling short of expectations. The 
forecast for inflation in 2013 is revised down to 5.7% from 6.1% and in 2014 to 
6.0% from 6.3%.
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Special theme: Governance and public service delivery
Asia’s governance gap
 ? Developing Asia’s phenomenal growth is closing the income gap with 
advanced economies. Regional residents’ earnings were less than 6% of 
those of their counterparts in the developed world in 1980 but today are 
over 18%. Consequently, some 700 million people have risen out of extreme 
poverty (defined as living on $1.25 or less per day), near universal primary 
education has been achieved for both girls (89%) and boys (91%), and almost 
86% of households now have access to safe drinking water.
 ? But governance in the region has lagged its economic achievements. 
The concept of good governance is difficult to measure in its many facets, 
which include political stability and absence of violence (political stability for 
convenience), controlling corruption, and voice and accountability (voice). 
But disparate measures agree that developing Asia’s progress has been slow. 
 » The region has seen less progress in narrowing the governance gap 
with advanced economies. The region’s performance on International 
Country Risk Guide indicators shows modest gains since 1993 in the rule 
of law and bureaucratic quality ratings relative to those of advanced 
countries. Relative ratings on controlling corruption declined sharply in 
developing Asia around the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis and have not 
fully regained their early 1990s level. 
 » Developing Asia also trails its developing economy peers. Looking 
at the 2011 World Governance Index indicators, Asia on average scored 
below Latin America in all areas covered: controlling corruption, 
government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule 
of law, and voice. Factoring in income differences improves developing 
Asia’s global ranking but still leaves the region lagging Latin America in 
voice, regulatory quality, and controlling corruption. 
 » Governance performance within the region is quite diverse. 
Compared with expected governance ratings for its per capita GDP, East 
Asia shows strong government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and 
rule of law but lags in voice. In contrast, political stability and regulatory 
quality are the key issues in South Asia, which is stronger in voice. 
 ? In light of its experience, what is the role of governance in Asia’s 
development story? The concept of governance covers a broad range of 
issues, often without uniform benchmarks to guide policy makers. Moreover, 
different elements of governance may come into play at different stages of 
development. These disparate elements must be disentangled to clarify the 
governance–development nexus.
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How governance and development connect 
 ? The accumulated global evidence makes it clear: Governance matters for 
development. Cross-country empirical studies show that better governance 
correlates with faster growth, higher investment, and more rapid poverty 
reduction. And Asia is no exception.
 ? The relationship with development varies across dimensions of 
governance. In general, government effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory 
quality, and controlling corruption are found to be more closely and 
positively related to development performance than are voice or political 
stability. In developing Asia, government effectiveness and regulatory quality 
are even more strongly associated with growth than the global average.
 ? A country’s stage of development determines the essential elements 
of governance. Some elements of governance such as voice become more 
important later to support growth and social indicators like poverty, income 
equality, education, and health.
Public services as the frontline of governance
 ? People judge the quality of governance by their experience with public 
services. Governance is broad, and narrowing the focus to an actionable 
area can create momentum for broader reform to improve development 
outcomes. As the quality of social services and infrastructure is a popular 
yardstick for the general state of governance, improving public service 
delivery is an effective entry point toward wider governance reform. Because 
public services are particularly important to the poor, ensuring their effective 
delivery is critical for making growth inclusive.
 ? Public service shortfalls mirror developing Asia’s lagging governance. 
Despite significant improvements, essential services in many countries in 
developing Asia lag in quantity and quality. Shortfalls in public services 
undermine development outcomes and can, for example, leave primary and 
secondary students with reading, math, and science skills below par. Large 
infrastructure deficits plague the region.
 ? Weak governance in turn undermines public service quality. Corruption 
and the lack of transparency in service delivery are among the more obvious 
elements of weak governance. For example, corruption is cited as the 
main cause of poor public services, and social outcomes suffer as chronic 
absenteeism in many countries deprives health clinics and public schools of 
their doctors and teachers.
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Mechanisms to improve public service delivery
 ? A multipronged strategy is needed for better public services. Case 
studies and experimental evidence show that service quality improves where 
recipients have the means to demand it. Complementary mechanisms for 
improving public services are the “three Es”: Empowering citizens, Engaging 
local governments and the private sector, and Expanding the use of 
information and communication technology (ICT).
 ? Empowering citizens generates dynamism for greater accountability. 
Rights-based approaches, such as India’s “right to employment” and “right 
to information,” establish legal rights to entitlements (though policy makers 
need to be mindful of budget impacts). Participatory monitoring and 
evaluation tools—such as citizen report cards, community score cards, 
social audits, and grievance redress systems—can make governments more 
responsive. Directly involving communities in delivering public services gives 
beneficiaries more information and greater say in how funds are used. One 
program in Indonesia allowed villagers to prioritize local needs, develop 
project proposals, and decide which projects to fund.
 ? Engaging local governments and the private sector can expand public 
services. Experience shows that devolving powers to local authorities who 
are able to take on more responsibility improves public service performance. 
Giving local authorities in Bangladesh and the PRC greater taxing and 
spending autonomy strengthened incentives to generate revenue and 
invest more in social infrastructure and poverty programs. Teaming up with 
non-state providers can expand services to difficult-to-reach areas and 
conserve limited public funds. Cambodia has experimented successfully with 
contracting nongovernment organizations to provide public health services.
 ? Expanding use of ICT augments the impact of empowerment and 
partnerships. ICT can catalyze citizen empowerment by facilitating 
participation in local governance and enabling fast access to information. It 
can also create the feedback channel needed to push for services of better 
quality, such as through an official blog site where citizens can actively 
communicate with the executives of government agencies by posting policy 
comments and questions. Making local government administration more 
transparent can squelch opportunities for corruption and so address a key 
governance weakness that goes beyond public services.
Moving forward on governance reform
 ? A tailored approach to governance reform is needed to maximize 
development impact. As development goals in themselves, all dimensions 
of governance should be pursued. But the governance–development nexus 
is complex. Policy makers need to focus their efforts on the particular 
governance deficiencies that hold their country back from its next stage of 
development. 
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 » Growth-supporting aspects of governance take center stage for 
low-income economies. Strengthening government effectiveness, 
improving regulatory quality and the rule of law, and scaling up 
anticorruption efforts provide entry points to wider governance reform. 
 » Middle-income economies must look to advanced economy 
experience. At this stage, maintaining an environment supportive 
of growth is important, but policy must also respond to the rising 
aspirations of the populace. As their incomes improve and access to 
technology expands, citizens demand greater say in national affairs. 
Moving to even higher income entails improving governance quality with 
respect to participation and accountability.
 » All countries should also pursue actionable governance reforms 
with benefits up front. Among the “three Es”—Empowering citizens, 
Engaging local governments and the private sector, and Expanding the 
use of ICT—expanding ICT should be a priority because it complements 
the other two mechanisms. ICT not only provides an effective service 
delivery channel, it can mitigate any unintended consequences of 
empowerment and decentralization by improving information flow, 
making transactions more transparent, and thus establishing the means 
to hold service providers accountable.
 ? Governance reform cannot be delayed. Good governance is needed to 
sustain development and ensure that the benefits of growth are widely 
shared. As demonstrated by the increase in anticorruption initiatives in 
recent years, developing Asia’s leaders recognize this need and are stepping 
up their efforts. The journey is long and the tasks ahead are challenging, but 
the development payoffs will be large.
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Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
Subregion/Economy
2012 2013 2014
ADO 2013 Update ADO 2013 Update
Central Asia 5.6 5.5 5.4 6.0 6.0
Azerbaijan 2.1 3.1 4.0 4.8 4.8
Kazakhstan 5.0 5.2 4.8 5.6 5.6
East Asia 6.5 7.1 6.6 7.1 6.6
China, People’s Rep. of 7.7 8.2 7.6 8.0 7.4
Hong Kong, China 1.5 3.5 3.2 3.8 3.8
Korea, Rep. of 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.7 3.5
Taipei,China 1.3 3.5 2.3 3.9 3.3
South Asia 5.1 5.7 4.7 6.2 5.5
Bangladesh 6.2 5.7 6.0 6.0 5.8
India 5.0 6.0 4.7 6.5 5.7
Pakistan 4.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.0
Sri Lanka 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.2
Southeast Asia 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.7 5.3
Indonesia 6.2 6.4 5.7 6.6 6.0
Malaysia 5.6 5.3 4.3 5.5 5.0
Philippines 6.8 6.0 7.0 5.9 6.1
Singapore 1.3 2.6 2.6 3.7 3.5
Thailand 6.5 4.9 3.8 5.0 4.9
Viet Nam 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.5
The Pacific 7.5 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.5
Fiji 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.4
Papua New Guinea 9.8 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.0
Developing Asia 6.1 6.6 6.0 6.7 6.2
Notes: Developing Asia refers to the 45 developing member countries of the Asian Development 
Bank. Central Asia comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. East Asia comprises the People’s Republic of China; Hong 
Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Mongolia; and Taipei,China. South Asia comprises Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia comprises 
Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. The Pacific comprises the Cook Islands, Fiji,
(continued on the next page)
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Inflation (% per year)
Subregion/Economy
2012 2013 2014
ADO 2013 Update ADO 2013 Update
Central Asia 5.1 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8
Azerbaijan 1.1 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0
Kazakhstan 5.1 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5
East Asia 2.6 3.1 2.4 3.3 2.7
China, People’s Rep. of 2.6 3.2 2.5 3.5 2.7
Hong Kong, China 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.0
Korea, Rep. of 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.8 2.6
Taipei,China 1.9 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.4
South Asia 7.9 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.0
Bangladesh 10.6 7.8 7.7 7.0 7.5
India 7.4 7.2 6.5 6.8 6.8
Pakistan 11.0 9.0 7.4 9.5 8.0
Sri Lanka 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.5
Southeast Asia 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.1 4.3
Indonesia 4.3 5.2 7.2 4.7 5.5
Malaysia 1.7 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0
Philippines 3.2 3.6 3.0 3.8 3.5
Singapore 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.0 3.0
Thailand 3.0 3.2 2.6 3.1 2.9
Viet Nam 9.2 7.5 6.5 8.2 7.2
The Pacific 4.3 6.1 5.7 6.3 6.0
Fiji 4.3 4.5 2.7 4.0 2.5
Papua New Guinea 2.2 6.5 6.0 7.5 7.5
Developing Asia 3.7 4.0 3.6 4.2 3.7
(continued from the previous page)
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Palau, 
Samoa, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu.
Data for Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are recorded on a fiscal-year basis. For India, the fiscal year 
spans the current year’s April through the next year’s March. For Bangladesh and Pakistan, the fiscal 
year spans the previous year’s July through the current year’s June. 
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Time for 
vigilance
and reform

Despite improving economic conditions in the advanced economies, 
developing Asia is now projected to grow at a slower pace than forecast 
in Asian Development Outlook 2013 (ADO 2013). The slowdown is most 
manifest in the region’s two giants. Growth this year in the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) is forecast to decelerate to 7.6% from 7.7% and, 
in India, to 4.7% from 5.0%. Such growth is much more tepid than the 
enviable rates of the past decade, when the PRC averaged 10.5% growth 
and India 7.9%. Slower growth in the PRC accommodates 
structural reform for the long term, while deceleration in 
India tracks persistent slumps in industry and investment. 
The slowdown in the giants hampers but does not hobble 
growth in the rest of Asia, where the projected growth rate is 
4.0%, unchanged from last year (Figure 1.1.1).
Complicating policy makers’ responses to moderating 
regional growth prospects are financial markets rocked by 
talk of tapering quantitative easing (QE). The sharp reactions 
of financial markets in emerging economies, not least in 
Asia, to signals from the United States (US) Federal Reserve 
on 22 May and 18 September—the first hinting at tapering 
and the second putting it off—provide firm evidence of their 
vulnerability to monetary policy shifts in advanced countries. 
India and Indonesia in particular have seen their currency 
values and stock prices gyrate in response to the Fed’s moves 
since May. The evolution of QE is likely to have a similarly 
visible impact on other Asian markets. More generally, 
volatile capital flows arising from QE and its unwinding pose 
risks to the region’s financial stability.
In short, the twin challenges currently confronting 
developing Asia are financial market vulnerability in the short term and 
moderating growth prospects over the medium term. The region must 
exercise utmost vigilance to safeguard its financial stability and boldly 
pursue structural reform to sustain growth. The two efforts reinforce 
each other, as financial stability will firm up the foundation for growth, 
and commitment to reform will restore confidence in financial markets. 
Time for vigilance  
and reform
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1.1.1  GDP growth in developing Asia versus growth 
without PRC and India
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Developing Asia’s growth– 
slower than expected
Developing Asia is now projected to grow by 6.0% in 2013, 
revised down from the ADO 2013 forecast in April of 6.6% 
(Figure 1.1.2). The region’s growth projections for 2014 have also 
been downgraded, from 6.7% to 6.2%. These results reflect mostly 
slowdowns in the two regional giants: the PRC and India. 
For the PRC, this Update now forecasts 7.6% growth in 
2013, revised down from 8.2% in April. For 2014, the forecast 
is revised from 8.0% to 7.4%. The PRC’s slowdown is partly 
structural and partly caused by policy adjustments such as 
efforts to rein in excessive credit growth (see Regional impact 
of moderating PRC growth). Both augur well for healthy 
adjustment to a more sustainable growth path. In India, by 
contrast, growth is sharply decelerating as a slump in industry 
and investment continues. A delay in structural reform that 
would ease long-standing supply-side bottlenecks is deterring 
private investment, including foreign direct investment. Fiscal 
and current account deficits, and volatile capital flows further 
dent business confidence. This Update revises down the 
ADO 2013 forecast from 6.0% to 4.7% for 2013 and from 6.5% to 
5.7% for 2014. 
Interestingly, the downgrade is coming as the advanced 
economies are finally showing signs of recovery. The US 
economy is expected to experience gradual growth, and the 
euro area recession seems to be ending. Japan began 2013 quite 
strongly after the introduction of its new economic policy: 
Abenomics (see global scenario box 1.1.1). However, nascent 
recovery in the advanced economies has yet to trickle down 
to the region in the form of renewed orders for exports. This 
Update downgrades most ADO 2013 forecasts for Asia, which 
still suffers subdued demand from the advanced countries 
and weaker demand from the PRC. Some countries buck the 
regional trend of downward revisions. As the Philippines has 
grown more quickly than forecast (Figure 1.1.3), its growth 
projection for 2013 as a whole is upgraded from 6.0% to 7.0%. 
Central Asia and the Pacific are relatively immune to the 
region-wide downturn. The forecasts for Central Asia are 
marginally lower for 2013 and unchanged for 2014; both ADO 
2013 forecasts for the Pacific are maintained (Figure 1.1.4).
Lackluster exports continue to hold back growth in 
developing Asia. Much of the weakness can be explained 
by demand from advanced economies remaining subdued 
despite signs of incipient recovery. The biggest drag is still 
from Europe. Although exports to the US have picked up 
recently, they are still falling in year-on-year terms. Similarly, 
1.1.2  Revised GDP growth forecasts, 2013 and 2014
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1.1.3  GDP growth in the ADO 2013 forecast versus the 
year to date
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Note: Data for India refer to GDP at factor cost. Latest data for India are Q1 FY2013.
Sources: Asian Development Outlook database; CEIC Data Company (accessed 
11 September 2013).
1.1.4  Revised GDP growth forecasts by subregion
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1.1.1 Industrial economies stir
Slow but steady economic recovery in the major industrial 
economies supports a GDP growth forecast of 0.9% 
in 2013 and 1.8% in 2014 (box table). Comprehensive 
revisions to how the US calculates its national accounts 
renders moot any comparison with ADO 2013 forecasts, 
but the story of gradual US growth is unchanged. 
As envisaged, 2013 is turning out to be a year of 
consolidation, with the euro area gaining some strength 
and Japan’s economy riding on optimism over Abenomics. 
Moderate expansion in the US economy in the first half 
of 2013 took place as fixed capital investment, inventories, 
and exports picked up. Private consumption also remained 
strong despite the payroll tax increase and government 
spending cuts. A steady rise in industrial production and 
retail sales reflects increasing optimism among consumers 
in the first 6 months of 2013. Unemployment, while still 
relatively high, has been on the downtrend, and inflation has 
remained under 2%, allowing monetary policy to remain 
accommodative. The Federal Reserve has put off tapering 
quantitative easing until perhaps late in 2013. However, 
contentious partisan debates on fiscal policy and stopgap 
measures to avoid a government shutdown by October 2013 
are unnerving. Growth momentum thus far is in line with 
ADO 2013 assumptions, but the comprehensive revisions 
to the US national account series requires adjustments 
to forecast figures. Forecasts for US GDP growth in this 
Update are adjusted to 1.7% in 2013 and 2.4% in 2014.
The euro area emerged from recession in the second 
quarter of 2013, with France and Germany leading the 
recovery and contraction in Italy and Spain easing. Growth 
in the second quarter was broad-based, with consumption, 
investment, and net exports leading the way. Positive 
growth trajectories for retail sales and the composite 
purchasing managers’ index augur well for the euro area. 
However, industrial production dipped sharply in July, 
and unemployment remains high. Although the European 
Central Bank has eased monetary policy further, the 
low interest rate is still having little impact and loans to 
nonfinancial corporations continued to contract. Looking 
ahead, mixed signals from various leading indicators 
temper expectations for further pickup in economic 
activity in the second half of 2013. In light of the weaker-
than-expected first quarter, the forecast for annual euro 
area GDP growth in 2013 is revised to –0.5%. The euro 
area is expected to strengthen in 2014 and achieve the 
ADO 2013 forecast of 1.2%.
The package of monetary and fiscal reforms in Japan 
has boosted the economy, which has now achieved 3 
consecutive quarters of growth. With consumers vigorously 
buying durable and semi-durable goods ahead of the hike 
in the value-added tax in April 2014, private consumption 
accounted for half of GDP growth in January–June 2013. 
Hefty increases were also observed in public and private 
investment, as well as in government consumption. Exports 
benefited from a weak yen. Since April 2013, consumer 
prices have crept up, indicating a gradual exit from 
deflation. The expansionary monetary policy is expected to 
sustain growth momentum to the first quarter of 2014. After 
an anticipated dip in the following quarter caused by the 
scheduled value-added tax increase, it is hoped that fiscal 
stimulus will buttress consumption demand while business 
investment maintains its momentum. Industrial production 
and the purchasing managers’ index have been expanding 
since February 2013 along with business confidence. Riding 
on the impact of Abenomics, Japan’s economy will expand 
by 1.9% in 2013 before moderating to 1.4% next year.
Baseline assumptions on GDP growth, 2013–2014 (%)
2011 2012 2013 2014
Area Actual
ADO 
2013 Update
ADO 
2013 Update
Major industrial economies  1.3  1.5 –  0.9  – 1.8
 United States  1.8  2.8 –  1.7  – 2.4
 Euro area  1.5 –0.6 –0.3 –0.5 1.2 1.2
 Japan –0.6  2.0  1.2  1.9  1.4 1.4
Notes: Average growth rates are weighed by gross national income, Atlas 
method. Comprehensive revisions in the US national accounts have rendered 
ADO 2013 forecasts incomparable with those in this Update. More details in 
Annex table A1.1. 
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://
www.bea.gov; Eurostat, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and 
Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri.cao.go.jp; (all accessed 
16 September 2013); ADB estimates.
Japan’s recovery has not yet fueled a palpable uptick in the region’s 
exports to that market. 
The growth slowdown of the PRC looms as another major negative 
factor. Although exports are softening as a regional trend, there is 
nevertheless some variation in export performance (Figure 1.1.5). 
Viet Nam in particular has performed well. On the other hand, the 
region’s main commodity exporters such as Indonesia and Malaysia stand 
to suffer from the PRC’s waning investment growth and the consequent 
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decline in global commodity prices. The contribution of 
net exports to growth varies across the region, but domestic 
demand plays a bigger role in most countries (Figure 1.1.6). The 
contribution of net exports has been negative in Hong Kong, 
China; Malaysia; the Philippines; and Singapore. In Indonesia 
and Thailand as well, domestic demand has played the 
dominant role. Only in the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China 
have net exports compared with domestic demand as a 
contributor to growth, however subdued.
Developing Asia has recently experienced financial 
turbulence arising from hints of a return to normal monetary 
policy in the advanced economies. In emerging economies 
across the world, ranging from Brazil to South Africa, volatility 
has intensified in response to the prospective unwinding 
of quantitative easing after a speech by US Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke on 22 May 2013 (Table 1.1.1). Asia 
is no exception, and Asian financial markets have come 
under pressure, with stock markets falling and currencies 
depreciating, most notably in India and Indonesia (see 
Volatile capital flows and financial market vulnerabilities). 
It also reflects reversals of earlier asset price increases and 
currency appreciation that resulted partly from large capital 
inflows following expansionary monetary policy in the 
US and Europe in response to the global financial crisis. 
The ongoing improvement of economic conditions in the 
advanced economies will further bolster the case for monetary 
normalization in the near future, worsening the risk of 
disruptive capital flow reversals in developing Asia.
However, global financial turbulence affected countries in the 
region to starkly different degrees. India and Indonesia were hit 
particularly hard. Rising current account deficits and, especially 
in India, fiscal deficits made them vulnerable to changes in 
market sentiment. That said, these problems have been around 
for some time, and India and Indonesia both have sufficient 
foreign exchange reserves, enough to cover 7 months of imports 
in India and 5 months of imports in Indonesia, as of August.
Inflation in most economies in developing Asia is below 
ADO 2013 forecasts because global commodity prices have 
fallen and other core price pressures are soft. For the region 
as a whole, 2013 inflation is now projected to be 3.6%, revised 
down from the April forecast of 4.0% and improving on the 
3.7% recorded last year (Figure 1.1.7). The inflation forecast for 
2014 is similarly revised down, from 4.2% to 3.7%. The main 
driver has been lower commodity price inflation globally, 
notably for oil and food. Unexpectedly slow growth is also 
contributing to the benign inflation environment. The average 
inflation figure masks, however, substantial regional variation 
(Figure 1.1.8). Inflation in South Asia remains near 7% in 2013. 
In Indonesia, the inflation projection for 2013 is revised up 
from 5.2% to 7.2% to accommodate the government’s decision 
to scale back fuel subsidies, which sharply increased fuel prices.
1.1.5  Change in export value
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1.1.6  Contributions to growth by demand component, 
first half-2013
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1.1.7  Revised inflation forecasts for developing Asia, 
2013 and 2014
0
2
4
6
2014 
Update
2014
ADO 2013
2013 
Update
2013
ADO 2013
201220112010
%
Forecast
4.4
5.9
3.7 4.0 3.6
4.2
3.7
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
Time for vigilance and reform  7
1.1.1 Exchange rates and main stock indexes before and after 22 May 2013
Item Brazil Russian Federation India PRC South Africa Indonesia
Local currency unit/$
Week around May 22a 2.05 31.3 55.5 6.13 9.5 9,766.6
Aug 26–30 2.37 33.2 66.3 6.12 10.3 11,252.4
Appreciation (+)/Depreciation (–) –13.6 –5.7 –16.2 0.2 –7.8 –13.2
Main stock index
Week around May 22a 56,230.3 1,411.2 6,079.1 2,294.3 41,317.1 5,177.6
Aug 26–30 50,264.3 1,373.5 5,370.7 2,099.4 42,668.4 4,082.7
Change (%) –10.6 –2.7 –11.7 –8.5 3.3 –21.1
PRC = People’s Republic of China.
a May 20–24.
Source: Bloomberg (accessed 25 September 2013).
Forecasts for developing Asia’s current account surplus 
are more or less unchanged from April. The forecast for 2013 
is 1.6% of GDP, revised marginally down from 1.9% in April. 
The 2014 forecast is nudged down slightly, from 1.8% to 1.6% 
of GDP (Figure 1.1.9). Slower growth regionally holds down 
imports in the short term but also exports to other Asian 
countries. The longer view shows relatively modest surpluses as 
a continuation of a clear trend since the global financial crisis 
of 2008–2009 toward a smaller regional surplus, which declined 
from 6.5% of GDP in 2007 to 1.8% in 2012. The PRC accounts 
for a large share of the region’s surplus—around two-thirds in 
2012—so the decline in the PRC surplus is a major driver of 
the narrowing of the regional surplus. While the decline may 
be viewed as evidence of the PRC’s rebalancing, an important 
question is whether this trend will continue (Box 1.1.2). 
Risks to developing Asia’s outlook remain tilted to the 
downside in light of significant risks to short-term stability and 
medium-term growth. Improving conditions in the US, euro 
area, and Japan brighten the region’s prospects as a more benign 
external environment will benefit the region’s exports and 
growth. However, developing Asia is at a difficult crossroads. 
The region has to face two salient macroeconomic challenges 
at once. Volatile capital flows pose a threat to its financial 
stability in the short term. In the medium term, the PRC’s 
transition to a more moderate growth path may dampen the 
region’s growth generally, which suggests that the region can no 
longer take sustained rapid growth for granted. 
Developing Asia can make the transition smoothly if 
it exercises vigilance to shore up its financial stability and 
pursues bold structural reform to unleash productivity. Sound 
macroeconomic and financial policies can—if complemented 
with structural policies that improve the business 
environment—promote short-term stability and medium-term 
growth. The two sets of policies are interrelated, with financial 
stability reinforcing economic growth and vice versa. 
1.1.8  Revised inflation forecasts by subregion
0
2
4
6
8
BABABABABA
%
Central Asia East Asia South Asia Southeast Asia The Pacific
2014
2013
A = ADO 2013 forecast, B = ADO 2013 Update forecast.
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
1.1.9  Revised current account balance forecasts, 2013 and 2014
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1.1.2 Can rebalancing continue in the PRC?
The current account surplus of the PRC rose from 1.7% 
of GDP in 2000 to a peak of 10.1% in 2007. However, in 
the post-crisis period, its surplus has declined dramatically 
to 4.9% of GDP in 2009 and 2.3% in 2012 (box figure). 
The question is whether the smaller surplus—a sign of 
rebalancing—can be sustained.
Rising investment has been a key factor in the decline 
of the PRC’s external surplus. Investment increased to 
an average of 47.5% of GDP in 2008–2012 from 40.1% 
in 2000–2007. The surge in investment emanated from 
the macroeconomic stimulus measures pursued in 
response to the global crisis. Consistent with this view, 
Ahuja et al. (2012) found that accelerated investment 
accounted for from one-quarter to one-third of the decline 
in the PRC’s surplus in recent years. However, other 
factors—worsening terms of trade, weakening external 
demand, and real effective exchange rate appreciation—
also contributed. 
Contributions to GDP growth in the period since 
the crisis indicate a dominant role for investment in 
rebalancing the economy in the PRC. In 2008–2012, 
the average contribution of net exports to PRC growth 
turned negative while that of domestic demand held up 
well, primarily owing to stepped up investment. The 
contribution of investment to growth was 5.5 percentage 
points in 2008–2012, up from 5.1 percentage points in 
2000–2007. Meanwhile, the increase in the contribution of 
private consumption was an insignificant 0.1 percentage 
points. This shows that strong domestic demand since the 
crisis has largely come from higher investment. 
Given the limited role of consumption in the PRC’s 
rebalancing so far, more robust growth in consumption 
would make rebalancing more sustainable. The 
government can pursue a wide range of policies to 
promote consumption. For example, the government can 
encourage a lower savings rate by mitigating the risks 
that households face by further expanding public social 
spending and safety nets. 
Reference
Ahuja, A.; N. Chalk; M. Nabar; P. N’Diaye; and N. Porter. 2012. 
An End to China’s Imbalances? IMF Working Paper WP/12/100. 
Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
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Regional impact of 
moderating PRC growth
The maturing of the PRC as a middle-income economy means moderation 
is natural and inevitable as the experience of Asia’s high income economies 
shows. Yet the rise of the PRC as a destination for the rest of developing 
Asia’s products means deceleration in the PRC has regional implications. 
As long as the economy lands softly on a somewhat lower but more 
sustainable growth path, the change will herald a healthy transition. 
However, the transition poses a number of internal and external challenges 
that requires policy makers to pay close attention to financial stability. 
Given the credit-fueled, investment-driven nature of PRC growth in recent 
years, the transition may harm corporate balance sheets and loan quality. 
For other Asian economies, the PRC slowdown will have negative spillovers 
on exports and growth. The question is how big the spillovers will be.
Challenges to medium-term growth in the PRC
Economic data point to controlled deceleration in the PRC from double-
digit growth rates in the past decade. Unlike export growth, which slowed 
because of weak global recovery, GDP growth moderation is largely 
structural. 
More fundamentally, the slowdown is part of a clear pattern 
toward slower growth since the global crisis, and it reflects longer-term 
structural forces (Figure 1.2.1). The economy is in the midst of structural 
transformation from credit-fueled, state-directed growth based on exports 
and investment to more sustainable, market-oriented growth based more 
on domestic consumption. Such rebalancing is inevitably long term. 
Lower growth is also partly the consequence of government policies 
to wrestle down credit growth and rein in the shadow banking system 
that are part of a broader strategic policy shift toward more 
sustainable and inclusive growth. Medium-term moderation of 
growth is not in itself cause for concern but instead a healthy, 
welcome trend. The burning issue facing the PRC now is 
not so much whether its economy will slow but rather how 
suddenly and how much? 
Rapid credit growth fueled high investment rates in the 
PRC after the global financial crisis, helping to support the 
growth momentum in a less-benign external environment. 
The PRC’s traditionally high investment rate has accelerated 
even more since the global crisis (Figure 1.2.2). An integral 
part of the PRC’s growth paradigm has been the financial 
system’s channeling of large amounts of capital to state-owned 
firms. This led to the rapid growth of the shadow banking 
system, which tends to distort risk prices and lies outside the 
regulatory framework (Box 1.2.1). Shadow bank lending can 
stoke asset bubbles and thus threaten financial stability.
1.2.1  GDP growth in the People’s Republic of China, 2005–2014
0
3
6
9
12
15
2014201320122011201020092008200720062005
%
Forecast
11.3
7.47.67.7
9.3
10.4
9.29.6
14.2
12.7
Source: Asian Development Outlook database.
10  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
Recently, the authorities in the PRC have demonstrated 
their commitment to foregoing some growth in the short 
run for the sake of medium-term stability. The central 
bank’s refusal to inject liquidity into the financial markets 
on 20 June, for example, triggered a credit crunch that saw 
interbank lending rates spike to record highs. The overnight 
repo rate soared 380 basis points to a record 12.06%, while 
the 7-day repo rate surged 598 basis points to 13.85% on that 
day. The refusal served as a powerful signal to lenders to rein 
in reckless loan expansion. In another clear sign of reform 
toward a more market-oriented economy, the central bank 
completely freed up lending rates, eliminating the floor set at 
70% of the central bank’s benchmark rate. 
Notwithstanding such progress, formidable challenges still 
stand in the way of financial reform, which is fundamental 
1.2.2  Investment rate in the People’s Republic of China, 
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1.2.1 Shadow banking in the PRC
Shadow banking can be defined broadly as credit 
intermediation involving entities and activities outside 
the regular banking system. Quantifying shadow banking 
in the PRC is complicated by the lack of consensus 
about definitions or which activities to include, as 
well as by limited data of uneven quality that can cause 
underestimation or else double-counting. As a result, 
estimates of shadow banking credit as a percentage 
of GDP varied from 20% to 70% at the end of 2012, 
equivalent to 10%–35% of banking sector assets (i.e., assets 
of commercial, foreign, and rural cooperative banks). By 
some definition, shadow banking grew by an astonishing 
70% in nominal terms in 2011–2012, and some activities 
grew at much higher rates. 
Shadow banking provides services that are in demand 
but not available from banks, sometimes because of 
regulations. It can be partly seen as diversification of the 
still largely bank-dominated financial sector in the PRC. 
However, strong growth has raised concerns regarding 
leverage, maturity mismatches, underwriting standards, 
and credit quality—all the more so because shadow 
banking is not properly regulated compared with credit 
from banks. Shadow banking is frequently associated 
with lending to the booming real estate sector and to 
infrastructure through the off-budget financing vehicles 
of local governments, many of which are believed to 
have accumulated high debt. The perception exists that 
monetary tightening after the credit boom in 2009–2010 
has driven subprime borrowers, stymied by limited access 
to bank credit, to turn to shadow banking. 
Not all activities associated with shadow banking are 
problematic. Bankers’ acceptances, which are promises 
of future payment issued by banks to facilitate trade, are 
partly secured, short term, and guaranteed by banks. 
They equaled 14.1% of GDP in 2012. On the other 
hand, many shadow banking activities do pose risks to 
financial stability for lack of regulation or transparency. 
These activities include informal lending between 
companies, entrusted loans, and loans made by trust 
companies and financial guarantee companies (box table). 
Informal lending between companies is probably the least 
transparent type of shadow banking. Entrusted loans 
are those between enterprises that use banks and other 
financial institutions as payment agents. Trust loans made 
by PRC’s 67 trust companies and loans from financial 
guarantee companies together equaled 10.2% of GDP at 
the end of 2012. They are sometimes seen as risky as they 
are not as well regulated or transparent as loans from 
banks. Entrusted loans and trust loans are important 
sources of funding for the off-budget expenditures of local 
governments, whose debts have tripled as a share of GDP 
from 8.0% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2010.
Wealth management products provided by securities 
firms (or provided off-balance by banks) have also raised 
concerns because of their strong growth over recent years. 
These products offer higher rates to investors than do 
bank deposits (box figure) and frequently invest in trust 
loans or entrusted loans, which offer higher returns than 
bank credits. Wealth management products equaled 7.7% 
of GDP at the end of 2012. The figure excludes trust and 
entrusted loans on an underlying asset to avoid double-
counting. Together, these potentially more problematic 
shadow banking activities equal 38.1% of GDP, or 18.7% 
of banking assets. Other quantitatively less important 
activities that are sometimes associated with shadow 
banking in the PRC are financial leasing loans, loans by 
microcredit companies and pawn shops, and asset-backed 
bonds.
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While these percentages are not excessive, they are 
high enough to justify investors’ concerns and trigger 
policy action. The authorities have already started 
tightening regulation on various shadow banking 
activities. In March 2013, the China Banking Regulatory 
Commission required banks to link wealth management 
products with specific assets and limited the proportion 
of assets invested in debt outside the bond market. These 
limits are no more than 35% of a bank’s total wealth 
management products or 4% of its total assets, whichever 
is lower. Such measures and monetary tightening since 
May 2013 have apparently started to slow the growth of 
shadow banking. The growth rate of trust loans, entrusted 
loans, and bankers’ acceptances, for instance, slowed from 
193.7% year on year in the first quarter of 2013 to 14.7% 
in the second quarter.
Rate of return on bank deposits versus 
wealth management products
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That the PRC’s shadow banking system is not yet a 
clear and present danger to the economy is no excuse for 
complacency. It is important for the authorities to further 
strengthen their regulation and supervision of selected 
shadow banking activities, improve their transparency, 
and close loopholes in banking sector regulation. 
A gradual approach would give creditors and borrowers 
time to address maturity mismatches and avoid sharp 
deleveraging that might trigger broader financial stress. 
Further progress in liberalizing interest rates—a strategic 
objective of the government—would make an important 
contribution to attracting investors and borrowers back to 
the banking system and its better-regulated standards.
Selected shadow banking activities in the PRC, end-2012
Amount
(CNY trillion)
Value against 
GDP (%)
Change since 
2010 (%)
Entrusted loans  6.5 12.5 51.2
Informal lending  3.4  6.5 17.2
Trust loans  3.0  5.8 87.5
Wealth management 
products from banks
 2.8  5.4 154.5
Credit from financial 
guaranty companies
 2.3  4.4 109.1
Wealth management 
products from 
securities companies
 1.2  2.3 1,100.0
Financial leasing loans  0.6  1.2 100.0
Total 19.8 38.1  73.7
Sources: Moody’s; ADB estimates.
to a shift away from credit-fueled, investment-driven growth. Reform 
priorities are to liberalize interest rates more fully, including interest rates 
on deposits; reinforce prudential regulation and supervision; remove 
implicit guarantees on loans; set up a strong, credible framework for 
dealing with bad debts and distressed lenders; and use interest rates as 
the main lever of monetary policy. The PRC’s large and growing shadow 
banking system illustrates the complexity of these challenges.
The regional impact of the PRC’s 
slower growth trend
The prospect of deceleration in the PRC matters to the rest of 
developing Asia. The impact will be felt in some parts of the region more 
than in others. In particular, East and Southeast Asia have extensive 
12  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
economic links with the PRC, while South Asia’s links are 
much more limited. Following sustained fast growth over 
the past 3 decades, the PRC has emerged as a potential 
engine of growth for the region. There is plenty of anecdotal 
evidence and some econometric evidence that a robust 
PRC helped to cushion the blow of a weakened global 
environment (Park and Shin 2009). 
The PRC’s rise as a global economic heavyweight closely 
parallels its rise as a global trading power. It is increasingly 
important in developing Asia’s trading system, not only as an 
exporter but also as an importer. In particular, since joining 
the World Trade Organization in 2001, the PRC has emerged 
as an important destination for exports from other Asian 
economies, especially those in East and Southeast Asia. 
The share of exports to the PRC in developing Asia’s total 
exports rose from 14% in 2002 to 21% in 2012 (Figure 1.2.3). 
As a share of GDP, exports to the PRC increased from 6% 
to 10% in the same period (Figure 1.2.4). The four newly 
industrialized economies—Hong Kong, China; the Republic 
of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China—are the most 
vulnerable to any shocks emanating from the PRC, as they 
are all major exporters of capital goods that enjoy very close 
trade links with the PRC. However, commodity exporters 
such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Turkmenistan will also 
likely be affected. While it is still true that a sizable portion 
of the PRC’s imports from its neighbors are parts and 
components for assembly and re-export to the US and other 
world markets, a large and growing share of the PRC’s imports 
from Asia are final goods (Park and Shin 2010). This means 
that a slowdown in the PRC will have a more direct impact on 
imports from the region.
Econometric analysis also confirms a significant 
effect from the PRC on the rest of developing Asia via the 
trade channel. How GDP growth in the PRC spills over to 
affect trade is examined by a panel data analysis using the 
methodology in Ahuja and Nabar (2012). Spillover from the 
PRC on one of its trading partners is measured as the product 
of the partner’s exports to the PRC as a share of its GDP and 
of the PRC’s GDP growth rate. The trading partner’s terms of 
trade growth rate, its lagged GDP growth rate, and an index 
for macroeconomic volatility are included in the analysis to 
control for changes in trade prices and to capture dynamic 
macroeconomic instability in the period since the onset of the 
global financial crisis: 2007–2012.
The estimated spillover impact of PRC’s slowdown on the 
rest of developing Asia is clearly significant, and the intensity 
of its impact became more substantial after the global crisis. 
When growth in the PRC slowed by 1 percentage point during 
2002–2012, growth in the rest of developing Asia slowed by 
0.13 percentage points on average. By way of comparison, a 
1 percentage point deceleration in US growth slows growth 
1.2.3  Developing Asia’s exports to the People’s Republic 
of China, 2002 and 2012 ( of all exports)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Tonga
Azerbaijan
Sri Lanka
Georgia
Bangladesh
Fiji
Armenia
Cambodia
Brunei Darussalam
Nepal
Papua New Guinea
India
Kyrgyz Republic
Singapore
Pakistan
Viet Nam
Indonesia
Thailand
Philippines
Malaysia
Kazakhstan
Rep. of Korea
Taipei,China
Solomon Islands
Hong Kong, China
Turkmenistan
Mongolia
% of total exports
2012
2002
Sources: CEIC Data Company (accessed 20 August 2013); International Monetary 
Fund. Direction of Trade Statistics online database (accessed 29 August 2013); 
World Bank. World Development Indicators online database (accessed 
13 September 2013).
1.2.4  Developing Asia’s exports to the People’s Republic 
of China, 2002 and 2012 ( of GDP)
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in developing Asia, including the PRC, by 0.31 percentage 
points. However, the PRC’s impact becomes considerably 
more influential in the post-crisis period, with the 
magnitude of the reduction in the rest of developing Asia’s 
growth increasing to 0.25 percentage points (Figure 1.2.5). 
This finding conforms with the observation that the 
healthy growth of intraregional trade in developing Asia, 
underpinned by a robust PRC, helped the region cope with 
the advanced economies’ slowdown (Figure 1.2.6). However, 
these same growing intraregional trade links can inflate 
adverse impacts when shocks originate within the region, 
especially in the PRC.
While significant for developing Asia as a whole, 
spillover effects from the PRC vary across subregions 
(Figure 1.2.5). The effects are biggest in East and Southeast 
Asia. In the post-crisis period, a 1 percentage point reduction 
in PRC growth pulls down the weighted average growth 
rates of East, Southeast, and Central Asia by 0.63, 0.17, and 
0.14 percentage points, respectively.1 The effect is more 
limited in the Pacific, and more limited still in South Asia. 
The results are consistent with common understanding of 
economic integration. East and Southeast Asia have much 
closer economic links with the PRC than does South Asia.
Trade may be the primary transmission channel of a PRC 
slowdown to the rest of the region, but it is not the only one. 
In line with its growing economic power, the PRC has emerged 
as a globally significant exporter of capital and source of 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Developing Asia is a major 
recipient of FDI from the PRC, whose direct investments into 
developing Asia amounted to $44 billion in 2011 (Figure 1.2.7). 
Developing Asia’s share of FDI from the PRC peaked at 77% 
in 2008 and moderated to 59% by 2011. FDI from the PRC 
into Hong Kong, China reached $39 billion in 2011, or 88% 
of all FDI from the PRC into developing Asia. Singapore is 
a distant second with $3 billion. A decline in FDI from the 
PRC caused by growth deceleration would adversely affect 
developing Asia, with Hong Kong, China and then Singapore 
particularly affected. 
The evidence confirms the significant impact of slowing 
PRC growth on the rest of Asia. The effect will be far from 
uniform, with East and Southeast Asia likely to be hit harder 
than other subregions. The magnitude of the negative spillovers 
on Asia will depend on the depth and speed of the slowdown. 
This makes it all the more imperative for the authorities in the 
PRC to engineer a soft landing through vigilance in the short 
term and reform over the medium term.
1.2.5  Impact of growth slowing by 1 percentage point in the 
People’s Republic of China on the rest of developing 
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Volatile capital flows and 
financial market vulnerabilities
Financial market volatility in emerging economies 
intensified after the remark on 22 May from the chairman 
of the US Federal Reserve suggesting the possible tapering 
of quantitative easing (QE) later this year. The change in 
investor sentiment reversed capital flows away from emerging 
markets. In developing Asia as in other emerging markets, 
this pushed down stock prices, pushed up long-term bond 
yields and risk premiums, and weakened currencies against 
the US dollar.
The 22 May “signal” triggered a global stock market 
correction (Figure 1.3.1). Markets bottomed out initally in 
the last week of June (“trough”), and the weeks that followed 
saw an uneven recovery as the statement was clarified. The 
drop in stock prices was much larger in emerging markets 
than in the US, with Latin American markets suffering more 
than those in developing Asia. The subsequent recovery in 
developing Asia’s markets only partially returned the indices 
to their pre-signal levels, and Latin American markets have 
barely budged after the drop. Looking within developing Asia 
(Figure 1.3.2), stock markets in several economies experienced 
double-digit declines from the week of the signal to the week 
of 30 August. Indonesia was down 21.1%, Thailand 20.3%, the 
Philippines 18.4%, and India 11.7%.
As market participants reevaluated the risk environment, 
risk premiums rose globally, with emerging markets much 
more adversely affected. Developing Asia’s stock markets had 
been rising prior to the Fed’s signal, and long-term sovereign 
bond markets had been stable. However, after the May signal, 
the price of developing Asia’s sovereign bonds dropped, which 
means yields jumped and have generally remained elevated 
(Figure 1.3.3). In contrast with the equity market, the increase 
in bond yields in developing Asia was much larger than in 
Latin America. This increase in risk premiums is particularly 
evident in the widening of credit default swap premiums, 
which is somewhat greater in developing Asia than in Latin 
America, despite Latin America’s more open financial 
markets (Figure 1.3.4). This implies that developing Asia is 
more vulnerable in the current environment. Indonesia in 
particular has seen its risk premium rise by about 140 basis 
points since the signal. 
Asian currencies depreciated sharply against the US 
dollar, with the Indian rupee falling the most, suggesting 
interplay between QE tapering and some domestic 
weaknesses (Figure 1.3.5). The Indian rupee depreciated 
1.3.1 Changes in global stock market indexes
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by 16.2% between the May signal and the week of 30 
August—despite some central bank intervention—pushing 
it to a record low against the dollar. The weakening of the 
Indonesian rupiah by 13.2% was nearly as sharp, and other 
currencies such as the Malaysian ringgit, Thai baht, and 
Philippine peso also depreciated substantially.
The sharp depreciation of Asian currencies and decline 
in stock prices can be partly explained as reversals of earlier 
asset price increases and currency appreciation that resulted 
from large capital inflows. In response to the global financial 
crisis, advanced economies relied heavily on expansionary 
monetary and fiscal policy to counter falling private demand 
and stabilize financial markets. When policy interest rates 
neared zero in nominal terms, central banks in advanced 
economies expanded their balance sheets with direct 
purchases of assets that were less liquid than their traditional 
holdings, and this so-called quantitative easing sharply 
increased global liquidity. Regarding the impact of QE on 
developing Asia, ADO 2013 reported the following:
?? QE seems to have induced capital flows that 
significantly raised liquidity in developing Asia, 
especially the first round, QE1, in late November 2008.2 
At the depth of the crisis in 2008–2009, capital inflows 
to 10 large regional economies—the PRC; Hong 
Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic 
of Korea; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
and Thailand—collapsed to 1.7% of GDP from 8.4% 
in 2005–2007. They quickly rebounded to 7.8% in 
2010–2012.
?? The wild fluctuation of capital inflows around 
the global financial crisis was mainly in portfolio 
investment, while FDI flows remained robust. The 
economies with relatively open and developed 
capital markets experienced larger swings in 
portfolio investment.
?? The impacts were relatively mute from QE2, beginning 
in November 2010, and QE3, beginning in September 
2012, but QE1 had pronounced effects by lowering 
domestic interest rates, containing sovereign risk 
premiums, and appreciating local currencies in Asia.
?? Housing prices have been sharply rising in some Asian 
markets with exchange rates that are rigid or have 
been stable. This tradeoff between exchange rates 
and housing prices suggests that monetary easing 
in advanced economies has affected Asian economies through 
either currency appreciation or asset price inflation.
1.3.3 Change in emerging market bond indexes
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1.3.4  Change in credit default swaps spreads in emerging 
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Recent financial market trends in developing Asia 
provide further evidence of their vulnerability to monetary 
policy shifts in the advanced economies. On the heels of the 
US Fed’s surprise 18 September decision to continue QE at its 
current pace, the region’s currencies and stocks rose sharply. 
For example, the stock markets in India and Indonesia rose 
by 3.6% and 4.6%, respectively on that day. As QE evolves, it 
will likely move Asian markets in similarly significant ways.
Capital inflows to Asia have remained high—and highly 
volatile—in recent years. As a percentage of GDP, Asia’s 
capital inflows have been comparable to those of Latin 
America and other emerging economies (Figure 1.3.6). 
However, the volatility of capital flows has been greater in 
Asia than in other regions. In fact, capital flow volatility in 
Asia increased considerably after the Asian financial crisis 
back in 1997. Heightened volatility primarily reflects greater 
fluctuation in short-term capital flows to Asia. Recent 
data suggest that the fluctuation of net capital flows to the 
region—categorized as direct, portfolio, or other—is notable 
for the rise and fall of net portfolio and other investment 
flows. Bank-led flows dominate movements in the other 
category (Figure 1.3.7). This change makes developing Asia 
highly vulnerable to external developments that affect 
external investors’ sentiment, as demonstrated by the plunge 
in the region’s equity and bond markets at the news of the 
potential QE tapering in the US.
The substantial risks to financial stability in developing 
Asia warrant taking a closer look at the region’s external 
and financial vulnerabilities. Table 1.3.1 assesses the external 
vulnerabilities of regional economies. Current account balance 
as percent of GDP shows the amount of foreign capital inflow 
needed; external debt to GDP ratio, the foreign indebtedness 
of the economy; short-term external debt to reserves ratio, 
the extent to which foreign reserves are available to cover 
short-term external debt; import cover, the number of months 
of imports that foreign reserves cover; and broad money to 
foreign reserves ratio, the size of banking system deposits 
relative to foreign reserves. Foreign liabilities as percent of 
foreign assets is another indicator of net external indebtedness.
While there is no cause for alarm, external vulnerabilities 
have recently worsened somewhat relative to their 2000–2012 
average. The ratio of foreign liabilities to foreign assets and 
the ratio of broad money to foreign reserves are rising in most 
developing Asian economies. Current account positions have weakened 
in general, and external debt is rising in six economies. Given the size of 
recent capital inflows, potential outflows may be disruptive. Rising foreign 
participation in the region’s local currency bond markets means that bond 
yields will shoot up when foreign investors flee to safe havens at a sign 
of trouble. Rising exposure to short-term external debt poses a threat to 
emerging Asian economies. The region’s ratio of short-term debt to total 
external debt is almost 65%, much higher than other emerging regions, 
1.3.5 Selected developing Asian nominal exchange rates
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average for the week of 26–30 August. 
Source: ADB estimates using data from Bloomberg (accessed 13 September 2013).
1.3.6 Capital inflows and volatility 
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1.3.1 Assessment of External Vulnerabilities
Current Account/ 
GDP 
External 
Debt/GDP 
(2012)
Short-Term 
External Debt/
Reserves  
(4Q 2012)
Broad Money/
Foreign Reserves
Import Cover 
(months)
Foreign Liabilities/
Foreign Assets
Bangladesh   1.9 (FY2013)  19.0 37.6  5.5 (May 2013)  5.2 (Jun 2013)  84.0 (May 2013)
Brunei Darussalam  47.0 (2012)  10.7 46.1  3.3 (Apr 2013)  5.7 (Apr 2013)   1.9 (May 2013)
Cambodia  –11.6 (2012)  22.0 19.7  1.7 (Apr 2013)  3.4 (Apr 2013)  74.1 (May 2013)
China, People’s Republic of   2.3 (2Q 2013)   7.5 12.4  4.9 (Jun 2013) 22.1 (Jun 2013)  46.3 (May 2013)
Hong Kong, China  –0.3 (1Q 2013) 239.7 65.3  3.9 (Jun 2013)  6.9 (Jul 2013)  72.1 (Apr 2013)
India  –3.6 (1Q 2013)  19.4 54.0  1.3 (Jun 2013)  6.8 (Aug 2013)   …  
Indonesia  –2.4 (1Q 2013)  18.4 49.0  3.6 (Jun 2013)  5.2 (Aug 2013) 180.5 (Jun 2013)
Kazakhstan   4.1 (1Q 2013)  13.9 16.8  3.6 (Jun 2013)  4.8 (Jun 2013)   …  
Korea, Republic of   6.7 (2Q 2013)   3.7 44.1  5.1 (Jun 2013)  7.7 (Jul 2013) 182.7 (Jan 2013)
Lao PDR –22.6 (2012)  27.1 20.8  4.6 (Jun 2012)  1.6 (Jul 2012)  75.3 (Dec 2010)
Malaysia   1.1 (2Q 2013)  29.3 25.5  3.3 (Jun 2013)  7.7 (Jul 2013)  92.6 (May 2013)
Myanmar  –4.4 (2012)   3.0  3.2  …    7.9 (Jan 2013)   …  
Pakistan  –1.6 (2012)  18.1 65.8 11.9 (Jun 2013)  1.8 (Jun 2013)  43.6 (May 2013)
Philippines   5.3 (1Q 2013)  35.2 21.2  1.8 (Jun 2013) 14.5 (Jun 2013) 121.3 (Jun 2013)
Singapore  20.0 (2Q 2013) 237.2 75.1  1.5 (Jun 2013)  8.3 (Jun 2013) 104.8 (May 2013)
Sri Lanka  –7.2 (4Q 2012)  32.2 49.5  3.8 (May 2013)  3.8 (May 2013) 350.2 (May 2013)
Taipei,China  11.9 (2Q 2013)  20.7 12.1  2.8 (Jul 2013) 18.0 (Jun 2013)  55.3 (Jun 2013)
Thailand  –5.1 (2Q 2013)  19.5 15.8  3.0 (Jun 2013)  7.6 (Jun 2013) 159.2 (May 2013)
Viet Nam   4.6 (4Q 2012)  31.7 56.3  6.0 (Feb 2013)  2.3 (May 2013) 105.3 (Feb 2013)
… = data not available, FY = fiscal year, GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Q = quarter. 
Note: The latest figure is compared to the indicator’s long-run average in 2000–2012. Green font indicates a decline in vulnerability, red worsening vulnerability.
Sources: ARIC website http://aric.adb.org/publications/rci-infopack (accessed 16 September 2013); Asian Development Outlook database.
1.3.7 Net capital flows  
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Source: ADB estimates using data from CEIC Data Company (accessed August 2013).
where the corresponding figure is generally below 50%. Short-
term debt is typically pulled first when crisis hits—as it was in 
2008—making it a major source of vulnerability.
Table 1.3.2 assesses developing Asia’s financial 
vulnerabilities. Inflation can indicate overheating in an 
economy. Fiscal balance/GDP and public sector/GDP show the 
state of public finances. Loans/deposits shows the degree that 
banks rely on deposits to fund their lending, with high ratios 
suggesting that banks rely heavily on short-term interbank 
borrowing. High growth in bank lending may indicate 
excessive credit expansion that could fuel asset price bubbles. 
The current state of financial vulnerabilities poses some 
grounds for concern, but not for alarm. Fiscal balances are 
deteriorating and governments are borrowing more. Credit 
growth has accelerated, while, in some economies, banking 
sector leverage has reached record highs. The latest data show 
high domestic credit growth in most economies, ranging 
from 12% in Viet Nam to 19% in Indonesia. Banking sector 
leverage in the region is on the rise and has reached high 
levels. This renders banks vulnerable to financial shocks, 
given their high reliance on wholesale funding. 
In developing Asia, the recent financial market turmoil 
has been felt most in India and Indonesia. Rising current 
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1.3.2 Assessment of Financial Vulnerabilities
Inflation Rate
(latest available)
Fiscal Balance/GDPa
(2012)
Public Sector 
Debt/GDP
(2012)
Loans/Deposits of Banksb
(latest available)
Bank Lending Growth
(y-o-y, latest available)
Bangladesh 7.8 (Jul 2013) –4.1 10.2 79.7 (May 2013) 15.4 (May 2013)
Brunei Darussalam 0.8 (May 2013) 17.5 … 51.0 (May 2013) …  
Cambodia 2.9 (Jun 2013) –5.2 … 92.5 (May 2013) …  
China, People’s Rep. of 2.6 (Aug 2013) –1.6 22.0 76.2 (May 2013) 14.3 (Jul 2013)
Hong Kong, China 6.9 (Jul 2013) 3.2 4.4 59.3 (Apr 2013) 15.1 (Jul 2013)
India 9.6 (Jul 2013) –7.5 40.5 78.3 (Jan 2013) 15.4 (Mar 2013)
Indonesia 8.8 (Aug 2013) –1.8 23.5 93.4 (Apr 2013) 19.4 (Jun 2013)
Kazakhstan 5.8 (Aug 2013) –3.0 12.2 …   …  
Korea, Republic of 1.3 (Aug 2013) –2.9 38.4 115.2 (Jan 2013) 3.9 (Jun 2013)
Lao PDR 7.4 (Jul 2013) –7.9 53.4 71.1 (Dec 2010) …  
Malaysia 2.0 (Jul 2013) –4.5 51.7 92.5 (May 2013) 9.2 (Jul 2013)
Myanmar 5.7 (May 2013) –5.4 … 40.8 (Apr 2013) …  
Pakistan 8.3 (Jul 2013) –8.5 55.8 53.8 (May 2013) 17.1 (Apr 2013)
Philippines 2.5 (Jul 2013) –2.3 54.4 70.8 (Apr 2013) 12.3 (Jun 2013)
Singapore 1.9 (Jul 2013) 1.1 110.2 93.9 (May 2013) 17.1 (Jul 2013)
Sri Lanka 6.3 (Aug 2013) –6.2 72.4 83.3 (May 2013) 15.5 (Apr 2013)
Taipei,China 0.1 (Jul 2013) –1.6 34.0 63.1 (May 2013) 3.2 (Jul 2013)
Thailand 1.6 (Aug 2013) –4.1 43.5 99.9 (May 2013) 13.0 (Jul 2013)
Viet Nam 7.5 (Aug 2013) –6.9 48.4 94.1 (Feb 2013) 11.8 (May 2013)
… = unavailable, GDP = gross domestic product, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
a  Data for India refer to central and state governments.
b  Loans to private sector and nonfinancial institutions; and deposits (demand, time, savings, foreign currency, bond, and money market instruments—where 
available) of banking institutions, deposit money banks, and other depository corporations of each economy. 
Note: The latest figure is compared with the indicator’s long-run average from 2000 to 2012. Green font shows a decline in vulnerability, red increased vulnerability. 
Sources: ARIC website http://aric.adb.org/publications/rci-infopack (accessed 16 September 2013); Asian Development Outlook database.
account deficits, and especially in India fiscal deficits, have made them 
more susceptible to changes in market sentiment. These problems have 
existed for some time. Both India and Indonesia were running current 
account deficits prior to the Federal Reserve signal in May. India has a 
current account deficit of 3.6% of GDP, while Indonesia’s deficit is 2.4% 
in Q1 2013. India has had a chronic deficit, and it is one of the few major 
Asian economies to suffer deterioration in its current account balance 
since the global crisis began (Box 1.3.1). Large current account deficits 
coupled with accelerating capital outflows could rapidly destabilize 
financial markets. 
India also suffers internal macroeconomic imbalances, as it has a high 
fiscal deficit and high inflation. Its central and state governments’ fiscal 
deficit remains relatively high at 7.5% of GDP in FY2012 (ended 31 March 
2013). Indonesia has a better fiscal situation than India, but its subsidies 
still stand at 1.8% of GDP after the recent positive step to reduce fuel 
subsidies. The resulting increase in fuel prices has raised other consumer 
prices, driving inflation as high as 8.8% in August. It should be noted, 
however, that India and Indonesia currently have sufficient foreign 
exchange reserves, enough to cover about 6.8 and 5.2 months of imports, 
respectively, in August.3
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1.3.1 India’s current account and tradable sectors
As international trade expands and global production 
links deepen, the external sectors of emerging markets 
are becoming more vulnerable to ever-changing global 
economic and financial conditions. Many Asian countries 
are globally competitive exporters and major destinations 
for foreign capital inflows. Valuable information about 
external vulnerability can be gleaned not only from the 
ratio of current account balance to GDP, but also from the 
ratio of current account balance to domestic consumption 
of tradables. This is because the current account balance 
is roughly equal to the difference between the supply of 
tradables and demand for them. The higher the ratio, the 
more dependent a country is on external financing for its 
consumption of tradables and, hence, the more vulnerable 
it is to fluctuation in foreign capital inflows. Using a 
sample of 110 countries in 1990–2004, Calvo et al. (2008) 
find the ratio to be a key determinant of the probability of 
sudden stops in capital flows.
Consider the periods before and after the global crisis 
years of 2007–2009. The behavior of the ratio of current 
account balance to domestic absorption of tradables differs 
significantly across countries in developing Asia (box 
figure). The numbers below show tradables ratio followed 
in parentheses by the ratio of current account balance to 
GDP. In India, the ratio deteriorates from 0.7% (0.3%) 
before the crisis to –3.8% (–2.1%) during the crisis and 
to –6.0% (–3.2%) after the crisis. Most other countries 
experienced improvement. In Thailand, for example, the 
index rose from 3.6% (1.6%) to 12.7% (4.8%) and further 
to 9.3% (3.6%). The evidence suggests that India is one of 
the few Asian economies to suffer a steady deterioration of 
its external vulnerability in recent years.
Reference
Calvo, G. A., A. Izquierdo, and L. F. Mejía. 2008. Systemic Sudden 
Stops: the Relevance of Balance-Sheet Effects and Financial 
Integration. NBER Working Paper No. 14026. Washington, DC.
Current account balance as  of domestic consumption 
of tradables
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Source: ADB estimates.
Other Asian economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines have recently seen their stock prices fall steeply, but their 
economic situations differ. As shown in Table 1.3.3, most of the region’s 
emerging economies still enjoy current account surpluses. Malaysia and 
the Philippines are among those that continue to have current account 
surpluses, and both also have high foreign reserves that can comfortably 
cover their short-term external debt and imports. Thailand, on the other 
hand, reported in the second quarter of 2013 a large current account 
deficit of 5.1% of GDP. However, its ratio of short-term external debt to 
reserves is much lower than in India or Indonesia, which suggests that 
the Thai economy is not likely to face an immediate short-term funding 
problem. Relatively low inflation in Thailand could give its central bank 
more policy options. Viet Nam has foreign reserves sufficient to cover 
only 2 months of imports and relatively high short-term external debt. 
However, most of the vulnerabilities in its economy are well known to 
investors and already factored into their assessments. Moreover, Viet Nam 
has been running a current account surplus recently as it restructures. 
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It should be emphasized that, despite the turbulence, fears are 
unwarranted at the moment of a financial crisis in the region recalling 
1997. Developing Asia is now in a much stronger position to weather 
a crisis than it was then, in large part because it restructured and 
reformed in response to that crisis. Most economies have current account 
surpluses, less external debt, and much higher foreign reserves relative 
to their short-term external borrowings (Table 1.3.3). The region has 
also made significant progress since 1997 toward sound macroeconomic 
management and financial regulation and supervision, as well as toward 
establishing good corporate governance. However, substantial risks to 
the region’s financial stability leave no room for complacency. Instead, to 
protect the hard-won fruits of reform since the Asian crisis, authorities 
must vigilantly monitor trends in external and internal financial markets 
and maintain robust prudential supervision and regulation.
Banks were the target of several critical reforms after the Asian crisis, 
which significantly strengthened the banking sector of the region. By 
2012, banks’ capital adequacy ratios had generally improved relative to 
before the global financial crisis. In addition, the ratio of nonperforming 
loans to all loans has fallen markedly (Figure 1.3.8). Banking indicators in 
Asia show the sector on a sound footing, but the authorities in the region 
should remain vigilant. 
Still, these favorable figures provide little scope for complacency. 
The decline in the ratio of nonperforming loans to all loans is, to a great 
extent, a function of the massive increase in bank lending in 2008–2009, 
which was integral to the monetary stimulus implemented by Asian 
governments to counter the global financial crisis. Domestic credit to the 
private sector continued to grow exponentially in recent years in most 
1.3.3 Comparison of vulnerability indicators, 1997 and the latest
Fiscal Balance 
(% GDP)  
Current Account 
(% GDP)  
Import cover
(months)  
Short-Term External 
Debt/Reserves  
Inflation  
(%)
1996 2012   1997Q2b 2013Q2c   Jun-97 Latestd   1997Q2 2012Q4   Jun-97 Lateste
China, People’s 
Republic of 
–1.8 –1.6    0.8  2.3   10.6 22.1    28.8 12.4    2.8 2.6
Hong Kong, China  2.1  3.2    … –0.3   4.0 6.9   280.6 65.3    5.5 6.9
Indiaa –7.0 –7.5   –3.1 –3.6   0.6 6.8     … 54.0   12.2 9.6
Indonesia  1.0 –1.8   –1.8 –2.4   5.7 5.2   191.0 49.0    5.3 8.8
Korea, Republic of  0.2 –2.9   –2.1  6.7   2.6 5.1   232.0 44.1    4.0 1.3
Malaysia  0.7 –4.5   –4.4  1.1   4.0 7.7    69.2 25.5    2.2 2.0
Philippines  0.3 –2.3   –4.2  5.3   3.5 14.5   105.5 21.2    5.6 2.5
Singapore 21.3  1.1   20.0 20.0   7.4 8.3   245.4 75.1    1.7 1.9
Taipei,China –1.4 –1.6    1.5 11.9   9.3 18.0    26.6 12.1    1.8 0.1
Thailand  2.1 –4.1   –7.9 –5.1   5.4 7.6   157.7 15.8    4.4 1.6
Viet Nam –0.9 –6.9   –8.2  4.6   ... 2.3    53.3 56.3    2.3 7.5
… = data not available.
a For India, latest figures are compared with 1991 (annual), not 1997.
b Annual 1996 current account as  of GDP data for the People’s Republic of China; Hong Kong, China; India; Malaysia; Philippines; Thailand; and Viet Nam.
c 2012Q4 data for Viet Nam; 2013Q1 data for Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Malaysia; and Philippines.
d Refers to June 2013 except Viet Nam (May); Hong Kong, China; and Malaysia (July); India; Indonesia; and Taipei,China (August). 
e Refers to August 2013 except Hong Kong, China; India; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; and Taipei,China (July).
Source: ADB calculations using data from ADB Asian Development Outlook, CEIC, Haver Analytics, and national sources.
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economies (Table 1.3.4), most of it from banks. Some of the loans went 
to households and a large chunk into real estate. At this point, these 
loans do not look risky. However, if things turn sour, these loans may go 
bad, reversing the recent trend of improving bank capital adequacy and 
nonperforming loan performance. 
Likewise, recent encouraging trends in soundness indicators may 
mask potential problems ahead. The liquidity boom in Asia during the 
global financial crisis has driven up asset prices in the region, notably 
reflected in steep property price rises in Asia (Table 1.3.4). In line with 
declines in equity and bond markets, property prices in the region have 
1.3.8  Capital adequacy ratio and nonperforming loans to total loans in selected Asian economies
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1.3.4 Growth in private sector credit and property prices in selected Asian economies (%)
Total lending Bank lending Property price index
2005–2007 2008–2012 2005–2007 2008–2012 2005–2007 2008–2012
PRC 58.9 160.4 53.3 131.7 24.3  46.2
Hong Kong, China 25.8  50.0 18.3  45.5 13.8  75.7
India 79.9 66.6 76.2  67.1 36.0 129.1
Korea, Republic of 38.4  53.7 40.9  39.6 15.5  10.9
Indonesia 43.1 127.6 49.5 131.1  7.5  14.9
Malaysia 27.6  62.3 30.0  65.6  7.1  34.7
Singapore 46.4  74.3 42.2  81.0 32.4  20.6
Thailand 35.9  73.2 33.3  73.6 …  10.0
… = data not available, PRC = People’s Republic of China.
Sources: Bank for International Settlements (BIS) for credit to private sector; BIS and CEIC Data Company for property prices (accessed 30 July 2013).
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recently tended to stagnate if not decline. Any sharp reversal of the recent 
upward trend in property markets could threaten the health of Asian 
banks. In other words, notwithstanding healthy soundness indicators, the 
sector remains vulnerable to adverse developments in asset markets.
In fact, financial systems in most Asian economies have 
come under increased strain in recent months. A financial 
stress index (FSI) shows a recent uptick (Figure 1.3.9). FSI 
readings are on the rise in the PRC, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. On the other hand, 
the FSI is fairly stable in Hong Kong, China; the Republic of 
Korea; and Taipei,China. Where the FSI has ticked up, it is 
driven by a combination of pressures in banking, the foreign 
exchange market, and the debt market. While this does 
not necessarily indicate an impending crisis, it does show 
the financial system experiencing heightened uncertainty, 
instability, and vulnerability to external shocks. Financial 
stress was especially evident after the Fed’s May signal 
and the sharp fall in financial markets in the region at the 
prospect of QE tapering.
In addition to prudent monetary and fiscal policies, 
Asian governments need to maintain strong regulation and 
supervision of their financial systems. In this context, they 
may consider implementing macroprudential policies to 
safeguard their financial stability. While a number of Asian 
countries have adopted macroprudential policies, the Republic 
of Korea has been at the forefront of using such policies to 
mitigate financial vulnerability. Evidence indicates that those 
policies have had some success (Box 1.3.2). Asian countries 
should closely monitor cross-border financial transactions, 
particularly short-term capital flows, and their implications for banking 
sector soundness. Monitoring asset markets can help puncture bubbles 
before they grow. In light of volatile capital flows, Asian economies would 
do well to maintain adequate reserves toward preventing erratic exchange 
rate fluctuations that stray far from fundamentals. 
Finally, to convince markets that Asian countries remain on a strong 
and sustainable growth path, structural reforms must be expedited to 
alleviate constraints on long-term growth and encourage foreign direct 
investment. While the central objective of structural reform is to sustain 
growth momentum, reform has the added benefit of reassuring financial 
markets. Similarly, while the aim of strengthening prudential financial 
regulation is to safeguard financial stability, it can also buoy business 
confidence and thus stimulate investment and growth. 
1.3.9  Financial stress index in emerging Asia, 2013
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1.3.2 Assessing macroprudential policies in the Republic of Korea
The Republic of Korea was one of the countries hardest hit 
in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It was severely affected 
again in the financial turmoil after the failure of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008. In both cases, the country’s 
vulnerability stemmed from banks’ rapid buildup of 
short-term foreign currency liabilities.
Before each crisis, domestic banks in the Republic of 
Korea or foreign bank branches there rapidly accumulated 
short-term foreign currency liabilities (box figure 1), which 
exposed the financial system to the deleveraging of banks 
with the onset of the 1997 and 2008 financial crises. As 
Chung, Park, and Shin (2012) note, during the period of 
rapid capital inflows prior to 2008, banks in the Republic 
of Korea, including branches of foreign banks, held some 
dollar assets, but the counterparties were local borrowers 
such as exporting companies who held long-term dollar 
assets arising from their export receivables. Although 
the currency mismatch would cancel out on a balance 
sheet consolidating corporations and banks, long-term 
dollar claims and short-term dollar liabilities created 
maturity mismatches. These mismatches left the financial 
system in the Republic of Korea vulnerable to the global 
financial crisis.
In recognition of the sources of its vulnerabilities, the 
Republic of Korea introduced a series of macroprudential 
measures beginning in June 2010 to build into the 
banking system resilience against capital flow reversals and 
associated disruptions to domestic financial conditions. 
The first policy measure, announced in June 2010, was 
a leverage cap on the notional value of foreign exchange 
derivatives contracts (encompassing currency swaps and 
forwards) that banks could maintain (IMF 2012). For 
branches of foreign banks, the cap was set at 250% times 
their capital, and for domestic banks 50%. In principle, 
foreign banks could increase their positions by allocating 
greater capital to their branches in the Republic of Korea, 
but the leverage cap lowers returns on capital for banks 
engaged in this business segment, discouraging their 
expansion of derivatives positions.
The second component was the levy on the non-core 
liabilities of the banks, called the macroprudential 
stability levy. The levy consists of an annualized charge 
of 20 basis points on banks’ non-deposit foreign currency 
liabilities with maturities of up to 12 months. Lower rates 
are applied in a graduated manner to maturities of over 
1 year. The proceeds of the levy are paid into a special 
segregated account of the foreign exchange reserves, rather 
than into general government revenue. In this respect, the 
levy was designed from the outset as a tool to maintain 
financial stability, not a fiscal measure, in contrast with 
outwardly similar bank levies introduced by several 
European countries after the crisis. Also, by targeting 
only non-core liabilities, the levy was designed to address 
banks’ procyclical tendencies while leaving unaffected, as 
far as possible, banks’ lending of core funding from savers 
to borrowers. The non-core liabilities levy in the Republic 
of Korea was less familiar than standard macroprudential 
tools such as unremunerated reserve requirements. 
Although the policy was discussed publicly from February 
2010, the measure was not formally announced until 
December 2010, after the conclusion of the November 
summit of the Group of 20 in Seoul. The legislation was 
passed in April 2011, and the levy began to be collected in 
August 2011 (IMF 2012).
A recent study by Bruno and Shin (2013) reports on 
a preliminary empirical assessment of the impact of the 
Korean macroprudential measures. The assessment is 
based on a panel study in which the Republic of Korea is 
one of 48 countries in a sample of advanced and emerging 
economies. The approach is to treat the countries other 
than the Republic of Korea as a comparison group and 
ask, first, how its susceptibility to the global “supply–
push” factors in capital flows compared with that of the 
other countries during the entire sample period. Then, 
1  Banks’ short-term foreign currency liability in the 
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having obtained a benchmark for comparison from this 
cross-country panel study, the authors ask whether the 
empirical relationship between the Republic of Korea and 
the comparison group changed in any noticeable way 
following the sequenced introduction of macroprudential 
measures in June 2010. 
They find that capital flows into the Republic of Korea 
did indeed become less sensitive to the global supply–push 
factors after the introduction of macroprudential measures. 
Interestingly, this change in sensitivity to global factors 
contrasts with the experience of other countries in the 
region, as Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and Viet Nam became more sensitive to global 
factors after June 2010.
Box figure 2 indicates that short-term bank liabilities 
in the Republic of Korea continued to shrink after 2010 
and were replaced by long-term liabilities in the form 
of securities and loans. The panel regression study 
in Bruno and Shin (2013) allows a more rigorous 
assessment of the policies by examining the Korean 
experience in comparison with those of other countries. 
Their results confirm the impression given in box figure 2 
that the Republic of Korea became less sensitive to global 
supply–push factors after it introduced macroprudential 
policies in 2010.
The measures should be seen in the context of the 
broader debate on macroprudential policies. The evidence 
from the Republic of Korea suggests that macroprudential 
measures intended to enhance financial stability may 
effectively mitigate vulnerability to external financial shocks.
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The twin challenges of financial 
stability and sustainable growth
Developing Asia currently faces two macroeconomic challenges: 
safeguarding financial stability in the short term and sustaining growth 
momentum in the medium term. Volatile capital flows arising from 
monetary policies in the advanced countries combine with domestic risk 
factors to pose a threat to the region’s financial stability. An uncertain 
external environment conspires with structural change to cast a shadow 
over the region’s growth prospects. However, prudent macroeconomic 
and financial policies can, if reinforced with more vigorous structural 
reform, help the region address the twin challenges of securing short-
term stability and medium-term growth. 
Securing financial stability
Potential shocks emanating from outside or originating within the region 
could undermine the relative calm that followed the global financial 
crisis. The turmoil that struck some financial markets in developing Asia 
is a stark reminder of the need to prepare for all contingencies. Further, 
no market can ever be completely free from the risk of a financial crisis. 
When faced with a crisis, appropriate policy response is vital to mitigate 
its impact and lay the foundation for recovery. Although each event has 
its unique features, the global financial crisis and euro area crisis may 
shed light on how the region’s policy makers can better prepare for future 
financial shocks. Those lessons are summarized below.
Monetary policy 
The global financial crisis marks a major turning point 
in monetary policy in the advanced countries. Facing 
financial meltdown and severe recession, the central banks 
embarked on an extraordinary monetary expansion known as 
quantitative easing (QE). 
While it is too early for a final verdict, these central bank 
actions seem, by and large, to have positively contributed to 
economic and financial conditions in the US and Europe. In 
particular, the data suggest that the bold monetary response 
helped stabilize global financial markets (Figure 1.4.1). 
However, emerging markets cannot rely solely on monetary 
expansion in a crisis. There are limits to monetary policy’s 
countercyclical support, particularly where interest rates 
are low or inflation is a chronic problem. Unlike economies 
whose currencies enjoy international reserve status, emerging 
market central banks cannot pursue QE without accelerating 
inflation, undermining investor confidence, provoking capital 
flight, and causing sharp currency depreciation. Developing 
Asia should therefore look to policy options in other areas.
1.4.1  3-month LIBOR overnight index swap spreads, 2007–2013
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Exchange rate policy 
Fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes both have their 
strengths and weaknesses. However, in the face of a major 
shock, one advantage of flexible exchange rates is their role 
as shock absorbers. In this regard, the ongoing euro area 
debt crisis is instructive. A boost to growth via exports 
would serve the euro area periphery well at this point, as 
these countries’ large and growing public debts bar the use of 
fiscal stimulus. Unfortunately, as members of the European 
Monetary Union, the crisis-hit economies do not have the 
option of unilateral depreciation. 
The real effective exchange rate of the euro, a measure 
of export competitiveness, shows no clear-cut improvement 
(Figure 1.4.2). In striking contrast, the Asian countries hit 
hardest by the Asian crisis benefited by sharply improving 
their external competitiveness through significant currency 
depreciation. Weaker currencies helped to boost Asian 
exports and paved the way for the region’s V-shaped recovery 
(Figure 1.4.3). However, exchange rate flexibility is not without 
costs, as sharp depreciation can exacerbate inflation and 
corporate liabilities. Authorities need to factor in these risks.
Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is quite effective in the short run at mitigating 
the impact of a financial crisis. However, it costs money, 
and the fiscal space required can be built up only during 
good times. The salient lesson from developing Asia’s fiscal 
experience during the global crisis is the vital importance 
of fiscal sustainability. The region was able to embark on 
an unprecedented fiscal expansion in response to the recent 
global crisis precisely because it had the luxury of ample 
fiscal space. A tradition of sound and responsible fiscal policy 
left the region with relatively healthy public finances at the 
onset of the global crisis (Figure 1.4.4).
In contrast, the countries geographically on the European 
periphery but economically at the heart of the euro area’s 
sovereign debt crisis are saddled with high and growing 
public debts (Figure 1.4.5). Indeed, unsustainable fiscal 
policies that ran up huge public debts are exactly what 
triggered the crisis. Going forward, it is imperative for 
developing Asia to revert to its tradition of fiscal soundness 
and running surpluses during good times to rebuild the fiscal 
space that was well spent coping with the global crisis.
Bank restructuring 
One way to deal with a crisis in which major financial 
institutions are insolvent is restructuring. That is, force 
insolvent firms to some form of resolution, such as government-
administered bankruptcy, the price of which is shareholders 
losing their investments, managers losing their jobs, and some 
creditors typically losing some of the money they are owed. 
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During the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998, crisis-hit 
economies followed some version of the resolution route, 
reinforced with reforms, to reduce moral hazard. Asian 
countries moved quickly and forcefully with the restructuring 
of their banking systems during the Asian crisis. While 
painful, Asia’s restructuring of its financial sector built stronger 
sectors that today are more resilient against shocks and more 
likely to sustain growth. Japan, by contrast, failed to respond 
quickly and decisively to the bursting of its asset bubble in 
the early 1990s and was slow to recapitalize or close damaged 
banks. Similarly, the slow recovery in Europe after the global 
financial crisis may be the consequence of far less extensive 
housecleaning than was pursued in the US after 2008 and Asia 
after 1997. The consequent failure of banks to clean up their 
balance sheets constrained growth in bank loans (Figure 1.4.6).
Domestic, regional, and global safety nets 
Recent financial crises illustrate the vital importance of 
having multilayered safety nets. Recent experience confirms 
that domestic safety nets, in particular in the form of 
adequate foreign exchange reserves, provide valuable 
protection against external shocks. 
When domestic safety nets are inadequate, as in the euro 
area periphery, governments may turn to regional safety nets. 
The European Central Bank, European Union, and European 
Stability Mechanism played instrumental roles in restoring 
financial stability in those countries during the euro crisis. In 
Asia, the Chiang Mai Initiative, which evolved from bilateral 
agreements to a multilateral framework in 2009, is the main 
regional safety net. The International Monetary Fund and its 
various lending facilities and contingent credit lines continue 
to be the primary global safety net. Going forward, an 
important challenge for global financial stability is to better 
coordinate the different layers of safety nets so that they 
complement and reinforce one another.
Prudential regulation 
Developing Asia has made great strides since the Asian crisis in 
strengthening the prudential regulation and supervision of its financial 
systems. As a result, its commercial banks have become noticeably more 
healthy, as evidenced by their low incidence of nonperforming loans and 
high capital adequacy ratios and rates of return on assets, as well as by 
the strength in other indicators. However, recent financial turbulence 
has made it clear that this is no time for Asia to rest on its laurels. The 
region’s authorities must continue to exercise utmost vigilance and closely 
monitor capital flows and other market trends. While banking sector 
indicators are generally benign, the health of the financial sector where 
data are inadequate, especially the shadow banking system, is unclear. 
Therefore, harmonizing and improving the transparency and quality of 
financial market data in the region is an urgent task. 
1.4.5  Ratio of public debt to GDP in selected European 
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Sustaining growth momentum
In addition to the short-term challenge of protecting financial stability, 
developing Asia currently faces the medium-term challenge of sustaining 
growth momentum. As the region starts to see noticeable deceleration 
of growth in the wake of the global crisis, some concern arises about 
whether it can continue to grow at a healthy pace in the future. An 
indispensable ingredient for reinvigorating medium-term growth is 
structural reform. Expediting reforms that encourage foreign direct 
investment and, more generally, alleviate constraints on long-term growth 
will help convince financial markets that Asian countries remain on a 
robust and sustainable growth path. The current financial turmoil makes 
structural reform even more important. While the immediate cause of the 
financial stress in India and Indonesia was each country’s large current 
account deficit, concerns about growth momentum played a role. 
Easing supply-side bottlenecks can reduce the cost of doing business 
and thus encourage investment and spur growth. As many markets in 
the region still suffer infrastructure gaps, expanding and improving 
infrastructure can pay a big dividend in productivity and growth. 
Conducive software must complement good hardware. Many Asian 
countries can stand to reduce excessive regulation and red tape to reduce 
the cost of doing business, unleash entrepreneurship and initiative, and 
encourage foreign investment. 
The PRC and other middle-income countries such as Malaysia and 
Thailand face a different set of challenges to medium-term growth. By 
and large, these economies have picked the low-hanging fruit of growth 
achieved by accumulating capital and labor. As they mature, middle-
income economies typically find it harder to grow rapidly, as growth 
must now come primarily from improved productivity. Moving beyond 
middle income requires continuous structural reform to enhance human 
capital, close remaining infrastructure gaps, develop the financial sector, 
and strengthen social protection.
While developing Asia has grown more quickly than other regions 
in the last several decades, governance quality has not kept pace with 
income growth. To catch up with the advanced economies, the region 
must prioritize governance as a key area of structural reform. The special 
chapter of this Update discusses this issue.
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Endnotes
1  The estimates reported here are compatible with those in ADO 2013, which presented 
estimates of spillovers from the PRC into the five largest Southeast Asian economies—
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—based on a global-VAR 
framework. The present analysis measured the spillover effects using a different 
methodology to cover more countries in developing Asia. The point estimate for the 
five countries mentions is –0.2, which lies comfortably within the standard deviation range 
of from –0.4 to 0.0 based on the global-VAR in ADO 2013.
2  The Federal Reserve launched QE1 in late November 2008, buying $600 billion in 
mortgage-backed securities. QE1 peaked on 10 June, when the Fed held $2.1 trillion of 
bank debt, mortgage-backed securities, and Treasury notes. It stopped further purchases 
in response to improving economic conditions. The Fed announced QE2 in November 
2010, buying $600 billion of Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 
2011. In September 2012, the Fed launched QE3, an open-ended program of purchasing 
agency mortgage-backed securities totaling $40 billion per month. Finally, in June 2013, 
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke announced the Fed’s intention to taper QE, contingent on 
economic conditions.
3  In June 1991, India’s reserves fell significantly to the point that they could not cover even 
1 month of imports. 
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Annex: Signs of firming recovery
Economic recovery continues to materialize, albeit slowly, in the major 
industrialized economies. This Update sees the group growing by 0.9% in 
2013 and 1.8% in 2014 (Table A1.1). This year’s aggregate growth forecast 
is pitched up by optimism in Japan but toned down by somewhat lower 
forecasts in the euro area. The gradual improvement in the US economy 
in the first half of the year is essentially in line with the ADO 2013 
outlook, though the forecasts are not strictly comparable because of a 
break in the US national accounts series. Despite the somewhat stronger 
position of the major industrial economies, world trade is likely to remain 
muted as demand from emerging economies slows. 
Inflation in the major industrial economies is expected to remain low 
because international commodity prices declined in 2013 and output gaps 
in these economies are closing only slowly.
A1.1 Baseline assumptions on the international economy
2011 2012 2013 2014
Actual ADO 
2013 Update
ADO 
2013 Update
GDP growth (%)
Major industrial economiesa 1.3 1.5 - 0.9 - 1.8
United Statesb 1.8 2.8 - 1.7 - 2.4
Euro area 1.5 –0.6 –0.3 –0.5 1.2 1.2
Japan –0.6 2.0 1.2 1.9 1.4 1.4
World trade (% change)
Merchandise exports 5.2 2.0 4.0 2.5 5.0 4.5
Prices and inflation
Brent crude spot prices 
(average, $ per barrel)
111.0 112.0 110.0 109.0 105.0 103.0
Energy price index (% change) 30.1 –0.4 –2.0 -2.5 –3.0 –3.0
Food index (% change) 23.9 0.7 –2.0 -2.5 –0.5 –1.0
Consumer price index inflation  
(major industrial economies’ 
average, %)
2.4 1.8 1.2 1.4 1.7 1.7
Interest rates
United States Federal funds rate 
(average, %)
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
European Union refinancing rate 
(average, %)
1.2 1.0 0.9 0.6 0.9 0.5
Japan interest rate (average, %) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
$ Liborc (%) 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
a  Average growth rates are weighted by gross national income, Atlas method.
b  The United States rebased national accounts data in July 2013, resulting in a much higher 2012 
growth rate and rendering ADO 2013 forecasts incomparable with the forecasts for this Update.
c Average interbank quotations on 1-month loans.
Sources: US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov; Eurostat, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu; Economic and Social Research Institute of Japan, http://www.esri 
.cao.go.jp; World Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org; Consensus Forecasts; Bloomberg; 
International Monetary Fund, Primary Commodity Prices, http://www.imf.org; World Bank, Global 
Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org; ADB estimates.
Time for vigilance and reform  31
Developments in major industrial economies
United States
After coming to a near standstill at the end of 2012, GDP 
growth is picking up. Following the fourth quarter of 2012, 
when GDP growth was unchanged from the previous quarter, 
at a seasonally adjusted annualized rate (saar) of 0.1% quarter 
on quarter, modest growth returned in the first half of the year 
(Figure A1.1). GDP expanded by 1.5% in the first half of 2013 
compared with the same period in the previous year. While 
change in inventories was one of the largest contributors to 
growth in the first quarter of 2013, fixed capital investment 
picked up in the second quarter, which bodes well for future 
growth. Another positive sign came from exports, which had 
contracted for 2 straight quarters but returned to positive 
territory in the second quarter, expanding by a saar of 9.4% 
quarter on quarter. 
Government spending, which had been falling even before 
automatic spending cuts took effect on 1 March 2013, continued 
to drop into the first half of the year. With the legislature and 
the administration haggling over stopgap measures to avoid 
a partial government shutdown, and the fight over the debt 
ceiling looming on the horizon (the US Treasury estimates 
the limit will be reached in mid-October 2013), government 
consumption will likely continue to be a drag on growth in the 
months ahead.
Surprisingly, consumption was a large contributor to GDP 
growth in both quarters, despite government spending cuts 
and an increase in payroll taxes in the beginning of the year. 
The consumer confidence index peaked in June 2013 at 82.1, 
its highest since before the global financial crisis, but tapered 
somewhat to 79.7 in September. A rise in the index since 
December 2012 suggests that consumers are becoming more 
confident about the economic outlook (Figure A1.2). This 
confidence is reflected in steady retail sales growth in 2013 
through August.
While still sluggish, recovery in the labor market has 
been steady through 2013. Unemployment has fallen by 0.5 
percentage points during the year, from 7.8% at the end of 
2012 to 7.3% in August. Inflation has remained moderate throughout the 
year. Under soft global commodity prices, the 12-month moving average 
of consumer prices has been falling since the first quarter of 2012, with 
prices ticking up by only 1.7% in the 12 months ending in August 2013 
(Figure A1.3). Core inflation has been below 2.0% for much of the year.
In light of the employment and inflation situation, monetary policy 
will remain accommodative through the forecast period. With steady 
improvements in the economy, there may be scope for the anticipated 
tapering of quantitative easing to begin in 2013. However, the Federal 
Open Market Committee surprised markets on 22 September when it 
put off even token tapering until later in the year at the earliest. Fiscal 
policy remains a worry, however. Contentious debates over a stopgap 
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budget to avoid a government shutdown and signs pointing 
to partisan debates on the debt ceiling dim the odds for 
compromise. Not only will fiscal policy continue to drag on 
growth, but brinkmanship that allows agreement only at the 
last minute may unsettle markets as it did in August 2011.
This Update expects US GDP to expand by 1.7% in 2013 
and pick up further to 2.4% in 2014. The pattern of growth 
in the first 8 months of 2013 has been in line with ADO 2013 
assumptions: a gradual improvement in the labor market, 
rising industrial activity, and a mild acceleration in GDP 
growth over the course of the year, following the surprise 
slowdown in the fourth quarter of 2012. However, after the 
comprehensive revision to the US national account series, 
the forecasts in this Update are not comparable with earlier 
ADO 2013 projections (Box A1.1).
Euro area
The euro area returned to growth in the second quarter. 
GDP rose by 0.3% over the previous 3 months, building on the 
mitigation of deceleration from 0.5% to 0.2% in the previous 2 quarters. 
Notwithstanding positive quarterly growth, the euro area economy 
shrank by 0.5% in the second quarter from a year earlier. The recovery is 
led by Germany (0.7% quarter on quarter) and France (0.5%). Surprisingly, 
Portugal posted 1.1% GDP growth in the second quarter after a severe 
contraction preceding it. Recession in Spain eased to –0.1% and in Italy to 
–0.2% but continues to grip much of the crisis area.
All demand components but inventory adjustments 
contributed positively to the second quarter GDP growth 
turnout (Figure A1.4). Net exports added the most to growth, as 
exports expanded by 1.6% over the previous quarter, outpacing 
the 1.4% increase in imports. Consumer and government 
spending both gained 0.4%. Investment rose by 0.2%, spurred 
by improving business conditions and confidence.
Consumer confidence improved in the euro area 
throughout the first half of this year, most notably in Italy, 
from extremely depressed levels at the turn of the year. Euro 
area retail sales rose by a seasonally adjusted 0.1% in July from 
the previous month, led by a gain of 1.0% for food, drinks, 
and tobacco. However, retail sales were still down from a year 
earlier by 1.1% in June and 1.3% in July. 
Stronger signals concerning the euro area’s improving 
business conditions come from a broad upturn in the composite 
purchasing managers’ index across the euro area excepting 
France. The index continued on a positive trend above the 
expansion threshold, rising to 51.5 in August from 50.5 in July 
and posting the strongest improvement in 2 years.
Inflation has been below the European Central Bank ceiling 
of 2% for 7 months. Euro area inflation fell to 1.3% in August from 1.6% in 
July and 2.6% a year earlier, reflecting mainly energy price developments 
(Figure A1.5). Price pressures remain subdued, as does aggregate demand. 
As expected, the central bank announced after the 5 September meeting 
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of its Governing Council that it intended to keep its main refinancing 
rate at 0.5%. This is in line with its earlier pledge, or “forward guidance” 
in central bank parlance, to keep rates at the present level or lower for an 
extended period, in response to the subdued inflation outlook. 
The hope now is that the second quarter will be confirmed as 
a definitive turning point for the euro area. To address both fiscal 
vulnerabilities and record unemployment, economic recovery would 
need to broaden to the key economies still in recession, such as Italy, 
Spain, and the Netherlands, and later also to the worst-performing cases, 
Greece and Cyprus, where crises still wreak havoc and unemployment 
is high and rising. For the euro area as a whole, the July reading puts 
unemployment at a seasonally adjusted 12.1%, unvaried in monthly 
readings since March 2013 (Figure A1.6). 
A1.1 Revised United States national accounts statistics 
On 31 July 2013, the US Bureau of Economic Analysis 
released revised GDP calculations for the decades from 
1929 to the first quarter of 2013. This was the outcome of 
the 14th comprehensive revision of the national income 
and product accounts. The bureau undertakes these 
revisions every 5 years. According to McCulla, Holdren, 
and Smith (2013), all of the US national accounts data 
have been revised to incorporate new source data, update 
the base year for prices and quantities from 2005 to 2009, 
and reflect other conceptual and methodological changes. 
Among the new data sources, the incorporation of the 
2007 benchmark input–output accounts had a particularly 
profound impact. These accounts are used to benchmark 
GDP expenditure components, affecting, for example, the 
relative shares of personal consumption versus private 
domestic fixed investment. 
The revisions changed nominal GDP totals and real 
growth rates but not so much the long-run growth rate 
for the entire series from 1929 to 2012, revising 3.2% per 
annum in the old series to 3.3% in the new. Notably, the 
impact of the global financial crisis appears much less 
severe in the new data. From the business cycle peak in 
fourth quarter of 2007 to the trough in the second quarter 
of 2009, the old series measured a 3.2% contraction in real 
GDP, but in the revised series the real economy contracts 
by only 2.9%.
The changes in growth rates in recent quarters affect 
ADO 2013 forecasts. The quarterly growth profile year on 
year for the two series is roughly the same for 2011 (box 
figure). However, the revised series shows much more 
rapid growth than the old series in every quarter of 2012, 
especially in the first half of the year. The slowdown in the 
fourth quarter is consequently more severe. In contrast, 
the revised first quarter 2013 pace is much slower than 
previously estimated.
The quarterly GDP profile underlying ADO 2013 
forecasts assumed a gradual uptick in growth over the 
course of 2013 and into 2014. At the time, the forecasts 
assumed that increases in taxes and cuts in federal 
spending would mildly drag on growth but that steady 
improvements in the labor and housing markets would 
support consumption. The data so far suggest the fiscal 
drag was less than expected but labor markets have been 
largely in line with ADO 2013 assumptions. The quarterly 
GDP profile underlying the Update forecasts has been 
calibrated under similar assumptions.
Reference
McCulla, S. H., Holdren, A. E., and Smith S. 2013. Improved 
Estimates of the National Income and Product Accounts: Results 
of the 2013 Comprehensive Revision. Survey of Current Business. 
September. 
United States quarterly GDP growth, ADO 2013 and Update 
1
2
3
4
Q4Q1
2014
Q3Q1
2013
Q3Q1
2012
Q3Q1
2011
%
ADO 2013
Update
Note: ADO 2013 plotted growth bases on the old series, and the Update plots 
growth using the new series
Sources: US Department of Commerce. Bureau of Economic Analysis; ADB 
estimates .
34  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
The outlook is rather sobering, as fiscal burdens will 
continue dragging down growth, and credit remains 
constrained in several euro area economies, reflecting 
heightened credit risk and unresolved balance sheet problems 
in the financial sector and beyond. Annual contraction in loans 
to non-financial corporations extended further, to –2.8% in July 
from –2.3% in June (Figure A1.6). The adequate transmission 
of central bank monetary policy to broadly varying financing 
conditions in euro area countries has not yet been achieved. 
Against this backdrop, output is expected to continue 
expanding during the second half of the year but will likely 
remain subdued as a substantial fall in industrial production in 
July—by 1.5% month on month versus a 0.6% increase in June—
dented hopes for further pickup in the third quarter. The euro 
area GDP growth forecast is revised down from ADO 2013 to 
–0.5% for 2013 but unchanged at 1.2% for 2014.
Japan
Japan’s real gross domestic product is estimated to have 
increased by a saar of 3.8% in the second quarter of 2013, 
making it the third consecutive quarter of growth since the 
fourth quarter of 2012. Acceleration during the first half of 2013, 
resulting from recent policy developments, was broad-based. 
Private consumption, which accounts for 58% of the GDP, grew 
by about 3% in both quarters to contribute half of GDP growth 
in the first half of the year. Purchases of durable and semi-
durable goods continued to be strong, partly in anticipation 
of the hike in the value-added tax in April of next year. In the 
same vein, private residential investment grew strongly at 7.7% 
in the first quarter before moderating slightly in the second 
quarter. 
After declining for 5 consecutive quarters, business 
fixed investment started to pick up in the second quarter as 
corporate profits improved. While investment in manufacturing 
continued to decline as a whole, and particularly for large firms, 
medium-sized and small firms saw an increase. The aggregate supply of 
capital goods, a coincident indicator of machinery investment, saw two 
consecutive quarters of improvement during the first half of this year.
Public sector consumption and investment together contributed 
steadily to GDP for 6 consecutive quarters. In particular, various 
economic measures have caused public investment to surge by a hefty 
saar of 12.7% and contributed 0.6 percentage points to seasonally adjusted, 
annualized GDP growth in the second quarter. The value of contracted 
public works inched up further in July following acceleration in the 
second quarter. Government consumption also picked up in the second 
quarter to grow by a saar of 3.2% in the first half. 
Exports have been accelerating to increase by 12.2% in July, up from 
7.4% in June, the fastest annual pace in 3 years as the benefits of a weak 
yen finally started to take hold. This was supported by brisk sales of 
cars and electronics to the US, Asia, and Europe. Japan nevertheless 
ran its third-biggest trade deficit on record, at $10.5 billion in July, as 
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import growth also galloped along at 19.6% with the weaker 
yen pushing up the bill for imported energy. Net exports 
contributed 0.7 percentage points to growth as a result, down 
from 1.6 percentage points in the first quarter of this year 
(Figure A1.7). 
Inflation expectations appear to be rising on the whole. 
Consumer prices including food and oil started to creep up 
during the first half of this year, rising by 0.7% in July 
2013 on top of a 0.2% rise in June (Figure A1.8). The rise is 
broad-based, but the surges in fuel, electricity, and water 
charges were significant, as were those in transportation and 
communications. Food prices also entered positive territory 
in July, up 0.1%. In month-on-month terms, overall consumer 
prices have inched up every month since April, presenting an 
early indication of a gradual exit from deflation.
With expansionary monetary policy in place to sustain 
expectations of inflation, Japan’s economy is likely to maintain 
current growth momentum at least through the first quarter of 
next year, until the value-added tax rises in April to 8% from 
the current 5%. Continuing growth momentum into 2014 will 
depend on whether fiscal stimulus can prop up consumption 
demand after the tax hike and whether recently improved 
private business investment can maintain its momentum. Signs 
are positive, however, with both the industrial production 
index and the purchasing managers’ index registering solid 
growth since February, underlining a more robust recovery 
in industrial activity. The Bank of Japan’s quarterly Tankan 
survey also showed rising business confidence since the last 
quarter of 2012.
The short-term outlook critically hinges on the credibility 
and effectiveness of government policies. Box A1.2 assesses the 
short-term impact of the current policy package and discusses a 
potential downside risk scenario. The baseline scenario assumes 
growth picking up gradually in the second half of 2014 after the 
dip in the second quarter. As growth in Japan was higher than 
expected in the first half, the baseline growth outlook in this 
Update is 0.7 percentage points higher than the ADO 2013 forecast of 1.2% 
for 2013 but unchanged at 1.4% for 2014.
International trade
Global merchandise trade expanded only moderately in 2012. It failed 
to gain momentum in the first half of 2013 on account of sluggish trade 
in the advanced economies, the PRC, and other emerging markets 
(Figure A1.9). A modest growth outlook in the advanced economies and 
a slower pace for emerging markets points to a downward revision in 
the forecast for trade growth in 2013. The bounce back anticipated in 
ADO 2013 for international trade in 2013 is revised down from 4.0% to 
2.5%, in line with revised forecasts from the World Trade Organization. 
With some uptick in global economic activity expected in 2014, and in 
light of the lower base, trade growth may pick up to 4.5%, which would 
still be slower than the pre-crisis average of 6.0%.
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A1.2 Assessing the impact of Abenomics on the short-term outlook in Japan
The growth outlook for Japan has improved significantly 
since the election in December 2012, supported in large 
part by monetary and fiscal policy announcements 
intended to spark a vigorous recovery following several 
years of stagnant growth. This analysis assesses the 
potential impact of the Abenomics policy package on the 
short-term outlook. 
The transmission mechanism underlying the analysis 
involves a number of interrelated channels. The Bank of 
Japan’s announcement to “do whatever it takes” to raise 
inflation to a target of 2.0%—by keeping short-term policy 
interest rates at zero and making sufficient government 
debt purchases—is intended to reduce yields across the 
term structure and raise inflation expectations, thereby 
pushing down real interest rates. The consequent lower 
cost of capital stimulates domestic demand, as do fiscal 
spending measures approved by the Japanese parliament 
on 15 May, which raises inflationary pressures further and 
thereby reinforces the reduction in real interest rates. The 
yen depreciates in real terms in response to the lower real 
interest rates, causing net exports to expand. Expansion 
in the export sector and of domestic demand, along 
with the decline in real interest rates, raises demand for 
loans and improves the credit-worthiness of borrowers, 
bolstering expansion in credit. As the impact of the 
monetary and fiscal policy measures on growth and 
inflation becomes more apparent, credibility is enhanced, 
lending the measures more traction. Inflation expectations 
become more firmly anchored to the 2.0% inflation target, 
and improved confidence spurs investment and private 
consumption.
In the baseline scenario, the announced policy measures 
are implemented effectively, supporting gradual gains in 
credibility. Simulations indicate that the Abenomics policy 
package contributes 1.2 percentage points to growth in 
2013 and 1.3 percentage points in 2014 (box table). In the 
model, the monetary authority keeps the policy rate at 
the zero bound until mid-2015. The monetary policy 
measures contribute 0.8 percentage points to growth in 
2013 and 0.6 percentage points in 2014. The contribution 
of the fiscal spending measures is expected to pick up to 
0.7 percentage points in 2014 as spending on public works 
continues to rise. 
The simulation results are broadly consistent with 
econometric estimates of the response of output to yen 
depreciation and higher equity prices over the first half 
of 2013. The yen’s 15% depreciation in real effective 
terms from December 2012 to July 2013 contributes 
0.3 percentage points to real GDP growth in 2013. 
Subsequent appreciation beginning in mid-2014 offsets 
further gains, however. Wealth effects associated with 
the 43% increase in the Nikkei stock price from mid-
December 2012 to the end of August 2013 contributes 
an additional 0.3 percentage points to real GDP growth 
in 2013 and 0.1 percentage points in 2014, assuming 
that equity prices remain at levels reached at the end of 
August 2013. 
Downside risks include the possibility of fiscal 
slippage and the delayed adjustment of domestic prices 
and wages to changes in the inflationary environment. 
This is illustrated by an alternative scenario (shown in 
the box table) in which delays in implementing public 
investment projects curtail the fiscal stimulus and the 
delayed adjustment of domestic prices and wages reduces 
disposable income and profit margins, curtailing private 
consumption and investment. In the model, the monetary 
authority responds to weak recovery by keeping the 
policy rate at the zero bound for longer, but this fails 
to support a robust recovery. Lower inflation returns, 
driving up real interest rates, which feeds back to curb 
expansion in aggregate demand and erodes confidence 
in the policy package. Abenomics contributes only 0.8 
percentage points to growth in 2014, revised down from 
1.0 percentage point in the baseline scenario. This scenario 
demonstrates that the success of the Abenomics policy 
package hinges on public and market perceptions of the 
ability and willingness of the government to implement the 
announced measures effectively.
The impact of Abenomics on real GDP growth 
(percentage points)
Scenarios/contributions 2013 2014
Baseline scenario 1.9 1.4
 Contributions of Abenomics 1.2 1.3
  Monetary policy 0.8 0.6
  Fiscal policy 0.4 0.7
 Transmission mechanism
  Exchange rate 0.3 0.0
  Domestic demand 0.9 1.2
  Inflation target 0.0 0.1
Alternative scenario 1.7 0.9
 Contributions of Abenomics 1.0 0.8
  Monetary policy 0.7 0.5
  Fiscal policy 0.3 0.3
 Transmission mechanism
  Exchange rate 0.2 0.0
  Domestic demand 0.8 0.8
  Inflation target 0.0 0.0
Source: ADB estimates.
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Commodity prices
Average commodity prices in 2012 were similar to those of 
the previous year. Nonetheless, developments in the global 
economic and political arena, as well as natural disturbances, 
created wide fluctuations in prices. Improved conditions for oil 
supply in the face of subdued growth in demand are keeping 
oil prices in check, though continuing geopolitical tensions 
hold the potential to disturb the balance. Food prices remain 
stable as adequate supplies calm the markets, but the risk of 
price spikes persists amid low food stocks.
Oil prices
After topping at $120 per barrel in mid-February, Brent 
crude reversed course and fell in mid-April to below $100 for 
the first time since July 2012 (Figure A1.10). Although Brent 
has climbed out of the April trough, it is still 38% below 
its February peak and was trading in the narrow range of 
$115–$117 per barrel in the first week of September. The turmoil 
in Syria saw wild reactions in oil prices—up with the prospects 
of a US-led military action or down with a possible diplomatic 
resolution. The year-to-date average Brent crude price stands 
at $109 per barrel. 
Global demand for oil is forecast to increase only slightly this 
year and next, as economic growth is expected to remain subdued. 
Projected growth in oil demand depends solely on higher consumption 
in developing countries, led by the PRC and India. Demand in OECD 
countries is expected to continue to contract, albeit at a much slower 
pace than in previous years since 2008. Continued demand contraction 
prompts the International Energy Agency to forecast that 2014 will see for 
the first time oil consumption in OECD countries lower than in the rest 
of the world. 
The supply side has seen large changes. Oil production in 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
was lower on average in the first 7 months of 2013 than in 2012 
amid supply disruptions in Libya, Nigeria, and Iraq, while 
non-OPEC oil production continued its upward climb. Average 
non-OPEC oil production in the first half of 2013 increased by 
1 million barrels per day (mb/d) year on year. The International 
Energy Agency forecasts non-OPEC supply growth reaching 
a record of over 1.3 mb/d in 2014, up from forecast growth of 
1.2 mb/d in 2013 and 0.6 mb/d in 2012. Aside from the US and 
Canada, significant production increases in 2014 are expected 
in Brazil, Colombia, Kazakhstan, and South Sudan. The Brent 
crude oil price is projected, on the basis of current oil futures 
prices, to stay elevated at over $100 per barrel for the remainder 
of 2013. Barring any major supply disruptions, Brent is forecast 
to average $109 per barrel in 2013 and $103 in 2014.
Food prices
Prices for agricultural commodities other than food have generally 
been declining since their 2011 peaks. Beverage and raw materials prices 
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were down in August by 35% on average from February 2011 
(Figure A1.11). Food prices initially followed the same trend, 
except for a spike in the second half of 2012, when adverse 
weather caused considerable damage in major crop-producing 
areas. Food prices have since gone back into decline and are 
down by 16% from that peak in August. Better supply has kept 
food prices in check, such that food price inflation year on year 
has been negative since March.
From their August 2012 peak, grain prices were down by 
22% in August 2013, reflecting improved supply. The August 
report of the US Department of Agriculture revised upward 
its projections for global grain production. Record wheat 
production of 705.4 million tons is forecast for the 2013/14 crop 
year, with large production increases expected in Canada, the 
EU, India, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine. This sharp 
rebound from drought-reduced levels in 2012 was reflected in a 
13% fall in wheat prices from August 2012 to August 2013.
Similarly, favorable weather weighed on maize prices, as 
the price of international benchmark US No. 2 yellow maize 
fell by 28% from August 2012 to August 2013, when it averaged 
$239 per ton. Maize plantings have increased, and yields are expected 
to recover markedly from last year. Aside from the US, maize output is 
projected to increase in the PRC, which accounts for the bulk of Asian 
production, and in the Russian Federation, Moldova, and Ukraine.
Rice prices have been declining since February. The export price for 
benchmark Thai white rice 100% B retreated by a further 7% from its July 
average to $505 per ton in August—14% lower year on year. Rice prices 
have averaged lower than 2012 prices since May. The decline was 
primarily attributable to increases in supply. The fall of the benchmark 
Thai export price also stemmed from uncertainties over the rice pledging 
program in Thailand and the depreciation of the baht against the US 
dollar. World rice production in 2013/14 is forecast to expand by 2.1% to 
480 million tons milled equivalent, with strong gains in all regions except 
Europe and North America. 
Expectations of better harvests, weather permitting, should keep 
higher prices at bay. Food prices are projected to decline in 2013 and 
2014. However, as grain stocks are still low by historical standards—and 
unlikely to rise as poor prospects for prices combine with increasing costs 
to restrain expansionary plans—an adverse weather event could induce a 
sharp increase in prices.
External environment in sum
Signs of a firming recovery in the major industrial economies bodes 
well for the future, but developing Asia can expect soft demand for its 
exports in the near term. Possible shocks from fiscal disagreements in 
the US and the prospects for QE tapering as well as continued risks from 
the euro area weakness are clear downside risks to Asia’s outlook. Soft 
international commodity prices should help keep inflation in check.
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Asia’s governance gap
Over several decades, good governance has come to be a watchword for 
the development community. The concept itself is quite broad. When 
applied to the state, governance involves the political system; executive 
decision-making; the legal process of establishing, amending, and 
enforcing laws and regulations; institutions providing public services; and 
even how citizens interact with political and legal institutions. 
Development practitioners often warn that anything less than good 
governance is an economy’s Achilles’ heel—a vulnerable point that can 
hobble growth in an otherwise vibrant system. This view is manifest in 
the weight that development institutions like the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB) and the World Bank place on governance when allocating 
concessional funds.1 The emphasis on governance is likely to intensify. 
One high-level panel recommends that “good governance and effective 
institutions” be included among the universal goals for the post-2015 
global development agenda (United Nations 2013).
Yet, despite all the attention on good governance, it does not 
appear to have played a central role in the economic transformation 
of developing Asia. The region’s economic advance is well known. 
Following Japan’s rapid recovery from world war and expanding 
economic influence regionally, the economies of Hong Kong, China; 
the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China became “newly 
industrialized”—rising from poverty to high-income status within a 
generation. Then market reforms in the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) opened the way for its sustained rapid economic growth. 
More recently, India and the larger members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations have become Asia’s newest tigers. 
Governance and public 
service delivery
This chapter was written by Shikha Jha, Pilipinas Quising, and Juzhong Zhuang of the 
Economics and Research Department, and Guo Xu of London School of Economics. 
Anil Deolalikar of University of California, Riverside provided substantive inputs. It draws 
on the background papers listed at the end of the chapter. Changyong Rhee, chief 
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Rapid economic growth helped developing Asia begin closing 
the income gap with advanced economies and lift millions out of 
poverty. Yet, measures of governance do not show a parallel narrowing 
of the governance gap. This seeming contradiction of conventional 
wisdom raises a key question: What is the role of governance in Asia’s 
phenomenal growth story?
Leading economic development
Over the past 3 decades, developing Asia’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita grew in purchasing power parity terms by a factor of 14—from 
$497 in 1980 to $6,844 in 2012—for an average annual growth rate of 8.5%. 
Except for a dip during the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, economic 
growth has been relatively consistent, even after the global financial crisis 
a decade later. Developing Asia now accounts for one-third of global GDP 
in purchasing power parity terms. In 1980, per capita GDP in the region 
was barely 5.5% that of economies in the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD). In 2012, it was over 18.0%. 
This economic performance is even more impressive when 
compared with growth in other developing economies. In 1980, 
GDP per person in purchasing power parity terms in Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Latin America for convenience) 
and the Middle East and North Africa (Middle East) was 
seven times higher than in Asia. Today, developing Asia’s 
per capita GDP is about half that of Latin America or the 
Middle East, and nearly three times that of sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 2.1.1). 
Consequently, developing Asia has made significant 
progress in reducing poverty (ADB 2013a). From 1980 to 2010, 
some 700 million people were lifted out of extreme poverty 
(defined as living on $1.25 or less per day). In the PRC alone, 
28 million people escaped extreme poverty every year on 
average during this period. In India, the annual decrease 
was 4.2 million from 1994 to 2010. Seventeen of developing 
Asia’s 22 economies with available data have already met 
the Millennium Development Goal of halving by 2015 the 
percentage of the population living on less than $1.25 a day.2
Among non-income indicators of poverty, near universal 
primary education has already been achieved for both girls 
(89%) and boys (91%). As many as 13 economies expect latest 
data to show primary school completion rates of 95% or above. 
Child mortality was slashed by half across the region from 
1990 to 2011. In some countries, including the PRC, deaths of children 
under 5 years old fell by 70%. Almost 86% of Asian households now have 
safe drinking water, 10 percentage points more than in 1990. 
Lagging progress in governance
Progress on governance quality in developing Asia seems to be a less 
uplifting story—to the extent that a complex concept with no uniform 
benchmark can be measured. So how does one measure it? Various 
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sets of indicators use widely different approaches to quantify aspects 
of governance (Box 2.1.1). The critiques of commonly used governance 
measures emphasize issues concerning comparability over time and 
across countries, biases in expert assessments, correlated perception 
errors, definitional problems, and the limitations of subjective and 
perception-based data (Kaufmann and Kraay 2008). Yet looking across 
several different indicators teases out a coherent story.
2.1.1 Measuring governance
If defining governance is a challenge, measuring it is even 
harder. In line with the ever-widening array of governance 
measures, indicators tend to differ in both quality and 
coverage, geographical as well as temporal. Governance 
indicators can be distinguished in two crosscutting ways: 
While some measure perceptions, others gather facts, and 
while some consider de jure indicators of governance, 
others prefer de facto indicators.
Perception-based measures such as the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI) or the Corruption 
Perception Index are largely derived from the subjective 
assessments, opinions, and perceptions of experts, policy 
makers, or citizens. Although subject to sampling and 
reporting biases, perception-based measures such as the 
WGI and International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) are 
among the most frequently used. The WGI is based on a 
combination of surveys and expert assessments. The ICRG 
relies on expert assessments only. 
Fact-based indicators are constructed from 
acknowledged facts such as the existence of pertinent 
procurement and anticorruption laws and the creation 
of oversight bodies. An example is the World Bank’s 
Doing Business indicators for measuring business 
regulations. They examine well-defined outcomes that 
proxy for specific dimensions of regulatory quality. While 
objective measurement is appealing from a methodological 
standpoint, data constraints make it difficult.
Individual perceptions often influence any understanding 
of good governance. Classical, perception-based indicators 
are prone to subjective biases from “halo effects.” Experts 
may, for example, expect poor countries to have poor 
governance. Even a country with good institutions may be 
perceived as having poor institutions simply because it lags 
on many other, more visible dimensions such as corruption 
in providing health care and education. Similarly, fact-based 
“hard” governance indicators may be a poor reflection 
of actual governance in a developing country that is 
conditioned by informal rules, customs, or conventions. 
This raises the distinction based on the often large gap 
between de jure rules and regulations and de facto realities. 
Fact-based indicators are typically based only on formal 
de jure data. They do not reflect de facto realities, which 
often arise through informal and unwritten conventions and 
practices but nevertheless come to shape the true quality 
of governance in a country. Thus, for example, having 
strict anticorruption laws or an anticorruption bureau 
means lower de facto corruption only if laws are effectively 
implemented and the bureau actually prosecutes corruption. 
Given the prevalence of informal institutions across much 
of Asia—where formal institutions are imperfect—the gap 
between de jure and de facto indicators will likely remain.
These limitations on measuring governance are perhaps 
best illustrated in the stark contrast between the popular 
Doing Business indicators and the Enterprise Surveys 
(Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 2011). The surveys 
use different approaches to understand the governance 
constraints private companies face. Doing Business 
indicators use measures of regulatory compliance, while 
the Enterprise Surveys reflect firms’ reported experiences 
under these regulations and other conditions determining 
the investment climate. Hallward-Driemeier and Pritchett 
(2011) note, for example, that Doing Business and 
Enterprise Survey results in the 80 countries that they 
both cover show glaringly different results for the average 
number of days required to obtain a construction permit. 
Enterprise Surveys find it taking 177 days, almost three 
times longer than the Doing Business result of 64 days. 
Finally, most governance indicators are aggregated 
across sub-dimensions. While aggregation may reduce 
measurement errors by balancing positive and negative 
extremes, it masks the effect of the component elements 
of governance. The constituent parts of the aggregate are 
generally easier to interpret and relate to specific policy 
interventions (OECD 2008). Constituent parts can thus 
include actionable indicators such as physical measures 
of performance; the costs of, for example, construction or 
energy supply; and measures of service quality, such as 
the time taken to get goods through ports. Actionable 
indicators can help improve understanding of the impact 
of development efforts on the ground.
Sources: M. Hallward-Driemeier and L. Pritchett (2011); OECD (2008); 
Quibria (forthcoming); Sen (forthcoming); Guo Xu (forthcoming).
44  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
Progress on governance has not matched economic 
development in Asia. One set of governance indicators—
produced by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
since 1980—shows the quality of governance perceived as being 
persistently worse in developing Asia than in the advanced 
economies (Figure 2.1.2). Since 1993, indicators covering the rule 
of law and bureaucratic quality gained only slightly compared 
with average OECD scores. The indicator on corruption 
has been quite volatile. Gill and Kharas (2007) note that the 
1997 Asian financial crisis marked a critical turning point 
for controlling corruption in some East and Southeast Asian 
economies. Institutions and systems for containing corruption 
changed considerably, leaving a vacuum in the short-term before 
becoming more effective with experience. This may explain 
the v-shaped pattern of this indicator. Overall, the ICRG data 
suggest that the quality of governance in Asia relative to that of 
OECD countries has at best remained steady. 
ICRG indicators may be popular, but they covered 
developing Asia only narrowly until the 1990s. As the data aim 
to inform international investors, they may project a particular view of 
what constitutes good governance. For example, the corruption index does 
not measure the extent of corruption per se but, rather, tries to quantify 
the political risk associated with corruption (Williams and Siddique 2008). 
Interestingly, the World Governance Indicators (WGI)—a dataset 
of perception-based relative governance performance collected since 
1996—shows results similar to those in the ICRG. While the scores 
on the indicators are difficult to compare over time, mainly because 
data sources differ from year to year, changes in the relative positions 
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2.1.4 World governance indicators by Asia sub-regions, 2011
Pacific
East Asia
Central Asia
Developing Asia
South Asia
Southeast Asia
–1.5 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
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Political stability and
absence of violence
Government effectiveness
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Index
Note: Indicators range from –2.5 to 2.5 with higher numbers denoting better 
governance quality. Subregional score is the simple average of the country scores.
Source: ADB estimates using data from World Bank, World Development 
Indicators online database (accessed 6 September 2013).
of the groups are telling (Figure 2.1.3). OECD countries had positive 
values for all indicators in 1996 and 2011, showing the strongest scores 
among global regions on all indicators in both years. On the opposite 
end of the scale, sub-Saharan Africa’s scores were negative 
for all indicators in both years, generally putting that region 
at the lowest end of the scale. Developing Asia scored 
generally lower than did Latin America and even lower than 
non-OECD Europe in some cases. The gap in scores between 
the OECD countries and developing Asia is narrowest in 
both years for political stability and absence of violence and 
terrorism (political stability for convenience). The gap with the 
OECD countries is widest for voice and accountability (voice, 
or how much say people have about what the government 
does) and controlling corruption (how much the government 
is perceived to keep corruption in check). 
Developing Asia showed a great deal of heterogeneity in its 
five subregions in 2011 (Figure 2.1.4). Generally strong scores 
in Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China 
made East Asia the strongest subregion overall, with positive 
scores on average for all indicators. The subregion scored 
particularly high on government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and the rule of law. Southeast Asia, though scoring 
lower in all categories, similarly performed at its strongest on 
the same three governance components. 
South Asia and Central Asia scored generally weaker than 
the other subregions. South Asia’s biggest challenges were 
political stability and regulatory quality. Central Asia’s scores 
on controlling corruption, the rule of law, and voice were 
weaker. The Pacific’s performance was less uniform across indicators—
strongest in political stability and voice, and weak in regulatory quality 
and government effectiveness, though the data used to construct the 
scores tend to be less reliable for small Pacific economies. 
Going one step further, governance quality was found to be diverse 
when delving from the regional scale down to the national. Whereas 
advanced economies tend to resemble one another across many 
dimensions of institutional quality, developing economies show greater 
variability in governance quality. As it happens, regional averages in 
developing Asia mask vast heterogeneity in institutions across economies. 
While governance measures in high-income economies such as 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; and Singapore outperform 
many developed countries, others in developing Asia often lag behind.
WGI scores tend to correlate positively with per capita income, 
but income differences alone cannot explain developing Asia’s low 
governance scores. Figure 2.1.5 shows the scatter plot of the six WGI 
governance measures against log GDP per capita for all 187 countries 
measured in 2011. The line within each data plot shows a linear 
relationship, which can be thought of as the global benchmark (or 
expected value) of a governance indicator given a country’s per capita 
GDP. Developing Asian economies consistently rank below those outside 
the region with comparable GDP per capita, i.e., at the same stage of 
development.
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2.1.5 World Governance Indicators against log GDP per capita, 2011
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Sources: World Bank. World Governance Indicators online database; World Development Indicators online database; IMF. World Economic Outklook April online 
database (all accessed 13 September 2013).
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Calculating the difference between an economy’s actual governance 
score and the value predicted for its income on the fitted line, one can see 
which economies deviate positively from the predicted relationship to 
display a governance “surplus” and which underperform the global 
benchmark to show a governance “deficit.” Those lying on the line can 
be taken as performing as predicted. Inspecting the plots shows more 
developing Asian economies lying below the benchmark for controlling 
corruption, but this is less clear for the rule of law. To clarify matters, 
Table 2.1.1 shows the average governance surpluses and deficits for 
countries grouped by global region. Overall, developing Asia shows a 
large governance deficit on controlling corruption, regulatory quality, and 
voice. Government effectiveness and the rule of law are roughly predicted 
by income level. Only political stability shows a slight surplus.
Developing Asia’s ranking among global regions generally improves 
after factoring in income differences, but it still lags Latin America in 
controlling corruption, regulatory quality, and voice. Only the Middle 
East ranks lower than developing Asia on voice or regulatory quality, 
and only the Middle East and non-OECD Europe fare worse than 
developing Asia on controlling corruption. Not surprisingly, these 
three elements of governance show the widest gap between developing 
Asia’s average and that of the advanced economies: a difference of 
0.77 points on voice, 0.67 points on regulatory quality, and 0.78 points on 
controlling corruption.
The differences on governance within developing Asia are further 
magnified when income differences are considered (Table 2.1.2). East Asia, 
for example, shows strong government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
and rule of law, but lags on voice. Unlike East Asia, political stability and 
regulatory quality are the key issues in South Asia, which is stronger on 
voice than East or Southeast Asia. 
So developing Asia poses a conundrum. Recent history shows 
consistently high economic growth despite relatively low ratings on 
governance. The region’s relative economic success would appear to 
strongly contradict the good governance principle that intuitively 
accompanies development. According to this view, good governance 
2.1.1 Average deviation from predicted World Governance Indicator scores by world region, 2011
Region
Controlling 
corruption
Government 
effectiveness
Political 
stability
Regulatory 
quality Rule of law Voice
Developing Asia –0.208 –0.071 0.062 –0.202 –0.043 –0.171
LAC –0.024 –0.089 0.029 –0.093 –0.243 0.295
MENA –0.429 –0.394 –0.694 –0.389 –0.365 –1.025
Non-OECD Europe –0.400 –0.262 –0.164 –0.013 –0.265 0.004
OECD 0.567 0.477 0.181 0.471 0.523 0.599
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.191 0.085 0.160 0.117 0.133 0.012
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development. 
Notes: Regional values are simple averages of country residuals from a linear regression of each World Governance Indicator against log 
per capita GDP using a sample of 187 countries. Negative values signify a region is in deficit on average against the global benchmark 
for that indicator and vice versa. 
Source: ADB estimates.
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enables more efficient division of labor, higher productivity of investment, 
and efficient implementation of social and economic policies (United 
Nations 2005). These changes are supposed to catalyze further growth. 
Good governance also has intrinsic value as a key development goal in 
itself—one people increasingly demand as incomes rise. 
The concept of governance covers a broad range of issues, often 
without uniform benchmarks to guide policy makers. Moreover, 
different elements of governance may come into play at different stages 
of development. Understanding the role of governance in developing Asia 
is critical. This complex question gains urgency when assessing the 
implications of the recent slowdown in economic growth. In the past, 
lower incomes spurred developing Asia to focus on policies for higher 
growth. As more Asian economies graduate from low- to middle-income 
status, does a strongly growth-oriented stance still serve their interests? 
Or will their understanding of good governance, economic management, 
and policy reform deepen to help them avoid stalling in the middle-
income trap? This would require disentangling the disparate elements of 
the growth–governance needs to clarify how governance and development 
connect.
2.1.2 Average deviation from predicted World Governance Indicator scores by Asian subregion, 2011
Region/Subregion
Controlling 
corruption
Government 
effectiveness
Political 
stability 
Regulatory 
quality Rule of law
Voice and 
Accountability
Developing Asia –0.208 –0.071 0.062 –0.202 –0.043 –0.171
Central Asia –0.736 –0.315 –0.280 –0.341 –0.641 –1.010
East Asia –0.057 0.210 0.042 0.236 0.108 –0.246
Pacific 0.030 –0.308 0.956 –0.475 0.329 0.773
South Asia –0.116 0.104 –0.709 –0.182 –0.040 –0.074
Southeast Asia –0.221 0.128 –0.108 0.003 –0.089 –0.674
Notes: Subregional values are simple averages of country residuals from a linear regression of each World Governance Indicator against 
log per capita GDP using a sample of 187 countries. Negative values signify a subregion is in deficit on average against the global 
benchmark for that indicator. 
Source: ADB estimates.
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How governance and 
development connect
Resolving the conundrum of the governance–development nexus has 
been an important area of policy research and discussion in recent years 
(Grindle 2004). Good governance is increasingly recognized as not only 
a goal in itself but also a means to economic growth and improvement 
in other development indicators (Gisselquist 2002). Many believe good 
governance promotes market exchange, spurs investment and innovation, 
and supports poverty reduction. It advances growth and development by 
reducing transaction costs, protecting property rights, ensuring contract 
enforcement, providing checks and balances, preventing the abuse of 
power, and enabling the poor to participate in decision-making and in 
the development process itself. On the other hand, weak governance holds 
back economic growth and prevents the benefits of public policies from 
reaching the poor. 
Many have tried to empirically determine and substantiate the 
governance–development nexus. Studies typically run cross-country 
regressions linking growth with the quality of governance, while taking 
into consideration other variables that may also affect growth. However, 
they are often criticized for methodological weakness. One fundamental 
issue is how to measure the quality of governance (Box 2.1.1). Another 
is the chicken-and-egg question of which comes first, better governance 
or development. Given these caveats, simple correlation analyses 
and technical studies show some interesting relationships between 
governance and development. These results could have important policy 
implications. 
Explaining a complex relationship 
By and large, better governance correlates with better development 
performance (Figure 2.2.1). The fitted lines generally show higher 
governance scores correlating with higher incomes. Some may interpret 
this as showing the need for good governance to nurture economic 
development and build prosperity. Others may argue cause and effect 
running the other direction—that economic growth enables institutional 
development. Still others accept two-way causality (Zhuang, de Dios, 
and Lagman-Martin 2010). In any case, the close and positive association 
suggests that governance matters for growth and development. 
Many empirical studies support this conclusion, using sophisticated 
econometric techniques to disentangle the governance–development 
nexus. Among the earliest studies, Barro (1991) found that political 
instability—proxied by the frequency of coups d’etat, political 
assassinations, and revolutions—had a significant and negative impact on 
per capita GDP growth during 1965–1985. Mauro (1995) found a positive 
and significant effect of bureaucratic quality on growth. Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1995) found the rule of law to be particularly important in 
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explaining per capita GDP. More recent studies show positive correlation 
between governance quality, on the one hand, and many development 
indicators, including GDP growth, per capita income, public investment, 
macroeconomic and financial stability, and social indicators measuring 
poverty reduction, income equality, and education and health outcomes 
(see page 84). 
While governance matters for growth and development, the 
relationship varies across its various dimensions (Figure 2.2.1). Data 
observations are far more widely scattered along the fitted line for voice 
and political stability than for others. This suggests that government 
effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory quality, and controlling 
corruption are more closely and positively related to development 
performance than is voice or political stability. 
One explanation is how governance indicators are measured. For 
example, in the case of democracy—which is closely equivalent to 
voice and accountability—Bardhan (2008) distinguishes three aspects: 
minimum civil and political rights enjoyed by citizens, procedures of 
accountability in day-to-day administration, and periodic elections. It is 
unclear to what extent the perception-based survey can capture all these 
elements: a country may get a high score in voice and accountability 
because it holds regular elections, but its procedures of accountability in 
day-to-day administration may nevertheless remain weak. Apart from 
measurement problems, Rodrik (2008) argues that, even if a causal link is 
established, improvements in a governance dimension will help generate 
growth only if that dimension is one of the country’s most binding 
development constraints. 
The correlation between governance and development is weaker in 
lower-income than in higher-income economies. In Figure 2.2.1, data 
points are widely scattered along the fitted lines at their low-income 
end but tighten up toward the higher-income end occupied by more 
developed countries. This is especially true of voice and political stability. 
This suggests that various dimensions of governance quality may affect 
development performance differently depending on a country’s level 
of income. Fukuyama (2008) argues that state capacity may be more 
important than either the rule of law or democracy in countries with low 
per capita income.
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco (2005) offer another explanation. In a 
country with many market failures, a policy that seeks to address a single 
failure may remove or correct the targeted distortion, thus succeeding 
in its direct effect, but at the cost of indirect and unintended effects that 
create additional distortions in other markets. As developing countries 
are subject to particularly severe market failures, partial reforms may do 
little good—or even do harm, if the distortions created outweigh those 
corrected. The implication is that policy makers should prioritize reforms 
that remove the most binding market failures. This strategy promises 
direct effects that do the most economic good and will often outweigh 
any negative indirect effects. Because countries with different initial 
conditions have different binding constraints, they likely require tailored 
policies, including governance reforms. 
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2.2.1 Per capita GDP and governance indicators
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Sources: World Bank. World Governance Indicators online database; World Development Indicators online database; IMF. World Economic Outlook April 2013 online 
database (all accessed 13 September 2013).
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Asia’s Conundrum—or is it?
The disconnect between Asia’s rapid, sustained growth and its tardy 
improvement of governance is often viewed as a paradox that calls into 
question the conventional wisdom that good governance is a critical 
driver of growth. Particularly provocative is the exceptional development 
in several East Asian economies that lack textbook standards of good 
governance (Rodrik 2008, Gill and Kharas 2007). A popular way to 
explain away Asia’s growth–governance conundrum is to simply describe 
Asia as different from the rest of the world. Empirical evidence here 
suggests, though, that Asia shares a broadly similar relationship between 
governance quality and development performance, with the difference 
being that the relationship is stronger on government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality than on voice. 
Governance and growth
Asian countries that score high in government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and controlling corruption have grown more quickly than others. 
Han, Khan, and Zhuang (forthcoming) use a global dataset from 1998 to 
2010 to empirically estimate the relationship between GDP growth and 
governance quality, explicitly testing whether the governance–growth 
relationship in Asia is different (Box 2.2.1). Their results show that all 
governance indicators—voice, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, the rule of law, and controlling corruption—have 
a positive and significant relationship with growth performance in 
the global sample of countries. More critically, their results show this 
relationship holds for Asian countries as well. However, government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality correlate much more strongly with 
growth in Asia than in the global sample. 
 To estimate what numerical difference good governance can have 
on growth performance, Han, Khan, and Zhuang (forthcoming) divide 
the sample countries into two groups: those with a governance score 
for a particular dimension in surplus (above the expected value for 
countries at a similar stage of development) and those with a score in 
deficit (below the expected value). The expected values are determined 
by a fitted regression line between the governance score as the dependent 
variable and per capita real income as the explanatory variable, estimated 
using cross-country data from 1998. The results show that countries in 
developing Asia with a surplus on government effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, and controlling corruption in 1998 grew annually during 
1998–2011 by about 1.5 percentage points more quickly than those with 
deficits on those indicators (Table 2.2.1). 
Government effectiveness and regulatory quality appear to be 
governance indicators particularly important for middle-income 
countries. In Latin America, countries with regulatory quality in surplus 
grew annually 0.8 percentage points more quickly than those in deficit; 
in the Middle East, countries with government effectiveness in surplus 
grew annually 1.8 percentage points more quickly than those in deficit. 
In these two middle-income regions, most countries with surpluses 
on other governance indicators also grew more quickly than countries 
with deficits, though the difference was not statistically significant. 
Among high-income OECD countries, those with surpluses on voice and 
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2.2.1 Governance and growth—salient features of an empirical analysis
Han, Khan, and Zhuang (forthcoming) empirically estimate 
the relationship between GDP growth as the dependent 
variable and the following explanatory variables: GDP 
per capita governance quality (taking one of the six 
World Governance Indicators at a time), labor supply 
(measured by the share of the working-age population), 
trade openness (measured by the sum of exports and 
imports as a share of GDP), and net inflows of foreign 
direct investment as a share of GDP. Using data for a panel 
of 156 countries from 1998 to 2010, their analysis involves 
two steps. 
In the first step, a principal component analysis is 
applied to each of the explanatory variables to address the 
issue of multicollinearity between the governance indicator 
and other explanatory variables. In the second step, GDP 
growth is regressed against one-period lagged log GDP per 
capita (to control for the stage of development) and the 
four principal components mentioned above (the selected 
governance indicator and the three other explanatory 
variables). 
To test whether Asia is different from the rest of 
the world, an interaction term between the governance 
indicator and a dummy for Asian countries is introduced 
as an additional explanatory variable. The analysis also 
considers country-specific fixed effects and simultaneity, 
which was addressed by using explanatory variables lagged 
by two or more periods as their instruments, following the 
generalized method of moments. 
All governance indicators—voice, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of 
law, and controlling corruption—are statistically significant 
at the 1% level with a positive sign for their respective 
coefficients, suggesting that all have significant power 
to explain variations in growth performance among all 
sample countries (box table). 
The coefficients of other control variables are also 
statistically significant at the 1% level and display effects 
in the expected direction, suggesting they have significant 
explanatory power. Lagged GDP per capita has a negative 
coefficient, suggesting that less-developed countries grow 
more quickly, capturing the catch-up effect. The share of 
working-age population, openness, and net foreign direct 
investment all have positive coefficients, which suggests 
that they are important drivers of GDP growth. 
Critically, the results on the interaction term show that 
government effectiveness and regulatory quality correlate 
much more strongly with growth in Asia than elsewhere, 
as indicated by the positive statistically significant 
coefficients on the interaction of the Asia country dummy 
with these two governance indicators. 
Estimation results from cross-country regression analysis (Dependent variable: GDP growth)
Explanatory Variables
Controlling 
corruption
Governance 
effectiveness
Political 
stability
Regulatory 
quality Rule of law
Voice and 
accountability
Lagged GDP per capita –20.26 –21.51 –20.72 –21.23 –21.51 –21.75
(–5.00)*** (–5.67)*** (–5.32)*** (–5.55)*** (–5.45)*** (–5.88)***
Governance indicator 3.30 5.28 4.75 4.37 5.96 7.22
(3.00)*** (3.58)*** (4.62)*** (3.67)*** (3.78)*** (4.84)***
Dummy Asia x Governance indicator 1.67 8.18 –0.63 3.20 0.21 –5.06
–0.93 (3.12)*** (–0.38) (1.72)* –0.11 (–2.16)**
Share of working age population 10.04 11.48 10.40 10.61 11.02 11.15
(4.27)*** (4.88)*** (4.83)*** (4.63)*** (4.74)*** (5.36)***
Openness 3.49 3.76 3.73 3.50 3.84 3.90
(3.51)*** (3.78)*** (3.94)*** (3.58)*** (4.07)*** (4.40)***
Net foreign direct investment 1.64 2.00 1.83 1.87 2.07 2.36
(4.73)*** (4.61)*** (5.03)*** (4.92)*** (4.95)*** (5.69)***
GDP = gross domestic product.
Notes: All controlling variables and governance indicators are principal components. For each specification, all original lagged governance indicators and 
working age population shares are used as instrumental variables. Critical values for the Sargan test, test for second-order serial correlation, and Wald test for 
coefficients are within their respective ranges for the models to be valid. The values in parenthesis are Z test statistics. *** means significant at 1, ** means 
significant at 5, and * means significant at 10.
Source: X. Han, H. Khan, and J. Zhuang (forthcoming).
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2.2.1  Annual average growth rates of GDP per capita: comparing regions with governance in surplus with those in 
deficits (1998–2011, %)
Governance 
indicators
Governance 
status
Developing 
Asia
Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Middle East and 
North Africa
OECD: High 
income
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
Controlling corruption Deficit 3.10* 1.90 0.98 2.43 2.29
Surplus 4.70* 1.76 1.95 1.50 2.34
Government 
effectiveness
Deficit 3.29* 1.76 0.68*** 2.27 2.57
Surplus 4.67* 2.11 2.49*** 1.50 2.20
Political stability Deficit 4.07 1.72 0.87 1.26* 2.78
Surplus 3.82 2.02 1.88 1.81* 2.00
Regulatory quality Deficit 3.12* 1.36** 1.15 1.43 2.97
Surplus 4.69* 2.18** 1.36 1.76 1.97
Rule of law Deficit 3.96 1.85 1.11 1.80 2.30
Surplus 3.93 1.89 1.36 1.67 2.35
Voice and 
accountability
Deficit 4.94** 1.84 1.11 1.11* 1.94
Surplus 2.71** 1.88 3.40 1.72* 2.66
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Notes: *** means that the difference between the two regions is statistically significant at 5 level; ** means that the difference is statistically 
significant at 10 level; * means that the difference is statistically significant at 20 level. Annual growth rates, computed from gross domestic 
product per capita in 2005 purchasing power parity international dollars, are from 1998 to 2011 and unweighted simple averages. 
Source: X. Han, H. Khan, and J. Zhuang, forthcoming.
political stability grew more quickly—by about 0.6 percentage points 
in both cases. For other indicators, the differences are not statistically 
significant. Finally, in sub-Saharan Africa, growth does not seem to be 
affected much by whether a country has a governance score above or 
below the expected value. 
Governance and development outcomes
Better governance correlates with superior growth in developing Asia. 
Beyond this, can correlation be found between better governance and 
development indicators such as poverty reduction and improved education, 
health care, and infrastructure? This is particularly relevant as many 
Asian countries with strong economic growth and impressive expansion in 
public services still lag in delivering key development outcomes. 
For many development indicators, developing Asia’s shortcomings 
leave huge gaps with performance achieved in other regions, except 
sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2.2.2). The only exceptions among 
development indicators are the quality of infrastructure and gender 
equity, for which Asia underperforms only the OECD and non-OECD 
Europe. Within Asia there is wide variation in development outcomes, as 
Central and East Asia do better than South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the 
Pacific on most indicators. 
Sen (forthcoming) examines whether higher rankings on governance 
quality correlate with greater achievement in economic and social 
development, and if the relationship holds equally well for developing 
Asia. He posits three mechanisms that transmit the benefits of good 
governance to development outcomes: higher per capita income, especially 
for the poor; enhanced tax collection to enable more spending on social 
development; and more effective social development spending and delivery 
of public goods (Box 2.2.2). His analysis yields two major results. 
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First, better governance on most WGIs generally correlates with 
better development outcomes: lower rates of extreme poverty, higher 
human development index, less gender inequality, lower maternal and 
under-5 mortality rates, better access to sanitation, higher educational 
attainment, better infrastructure quality, and more reliable electricity 
supply (Table 2.2.2). 
Second, Asia resembles the rest of the world in its links between 
governance, on the one hand, and rates of extreme poverty, under-5 
mortality, and years of schooling on the other. However, the link 
between governance and infrastructure quality and reliability is 
stronger in Asia than elsewhere. In other words, weak governance and 
poor infrastructure go hand-in-hand. The link between governance 
(especially voice and government effectiveness), on the one hand, and 
human development index, gender inequality, maternal mortality, and 
access to improved sanitation appears to be weaker in Asia than in the 
rest of the world. 
2.2.2 Development indicators by world region and by subregion of Asia
MENA
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Development indicators in Asia and the Pacific 
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Years of schoolingg
Under-5 mortality ratef
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Human Development Indexc
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Access to  
adequate sanitationa
LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,  
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
Notes: 
Data is for the latest available year. 
a  Access to adequate sanitation refers to the proportion of population with access to improved sanitation facilities. Its values have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
b  The Gender Inequality Index shows human development losses from inequality between female and male achievements in these dimensions. It ranges from 0, 
which indicates that women and men fare equally, to 1, which indicates that women fare as poorly as possible in all measured dimensions.
c  The Human Development Index is a tool to measure achievement in three basic dimensions of human development: longevity, knowledge, and a decent standard 
of living. Its value ranges from 0 to 1, with higher number indicating better human development. 
d The maternal mortality ratio is the number of women who die in pregnancy and childbirth per 1,000 live births. 
e  Quality of infrastructure, taken from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, is an assessment of the general infrastructure such as for 
transport, communications, and energy, with 1 indicating extreme underdevelopment and 7 indicating extensive and efficient development by international 
standards. 
f Under-5 mortality rate is the risk that one newborn baby in 100 will die before reaching age 5. 
g Years of schooling is the number of years that a child of age to start school can expect to receive, given cohort enrollment rates divided by 10.
Sources: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Indicators online database; World Bank. World Development Indicators online database; 
World Economic Forum. Global Competitiveness Index data platform (all accessed 20 September 2013).
56  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
2.2.2 Governance and development—salient features of another empirical analysis
Sen (forthcoming) analyzes the impact of governance in 
developing Asian countries vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
He assumes that governance can affect social and human 
development through three mechanisms:
Higher household incomes allow them to invest more 
in health, nutrition, and education. Better governance 
through improvements in legal infrastructure provides 
companies with incentives to accumulation capital 
and invest in developing new goods and production 
technologies. Better governance also means that 
households need to divert less of their income to bribe 
corrupt government officials for essential services or 
protect their investments. 
The state is able to collect more tax revenue and, 
consequently, spend more on social goods. Greater 
administrative capacity in the government allows more 
efficient tax collection, while curbed corruption plugs tax 
revenue leakage (Mookherjee 1999). 
Social sector spending and public goods delivery 
become more effective. If service providers are more 
accountable to citizens and politicians, services such 
as education and health care reach more people, with 
less diversion of public funds from the poor (World 
Development Report 2004). Dawson (2010) finds evidence 
that improved rule of law reduces child mortality. 
Rakjumar and Swaroop (2008) find that less corruption 
translates into more effectiveness in service delivery. 
Hallerod et al. (2013) find that better governance has a 
strong positive effect on a wide range of child poverty and 
nutrition measures.
The coefficients are obtained from ordinary least 
squares cross-sectional regressions for 2010 or the nearest 
year with data. The regressions are run separately for each 
governance measure. The controls are the number of civil 
society organizations in the country, net aid inflows as a 
ratio of gross national income, and degree of urbanization. 
The dependent variables are a range of development 
indicators: headcount poverty at $1.25 a day, under-5 
mortality, maternal mortality, human development index, 
gender inequality index, years of schooling for children 
under 15 years,1 access to adequate sanitation, and a 
combined measure of the quality of ports, railroads, and 
electricity supply.2
Five disaggregated measures of WGIs are used as 
explanatory variables: government effectiveness, controlling 
corruption, regulatory quality, voice, and the rule of law. 
The number of countries included was 69 for 
headcount poverty, 119 for the human development 
index and under-5 and maternal mortality, 99 for the 
gender inequality index, 116 for sanitation, 93 for years of 
schooling, and 80 for ports, railroads, and electricity. 
The Asian effects are captured by an intercept dummy 
for developing Asian countries and the interaction between 
the governance measure and the intercept dummy. 
Sources: Dawson 2010; Mookherjee 1999; Sen forthcoming; Rakjumar 
and Swaroop 2008.
Helping policymakers decide 
Certainly, good governance should be pursued in all its dimensions 
because it is a basic development goal in its own right. Maximizing how 
good governance spurs economic growth and development requires, 
however, a more nuanced view. A one-size-fits all approach will not 
work. Governance solutions need to be uniquely suited to address 
the challenges facing each country. Governance priorities need to 
be contextualized in the distinct cultural identities and institutional 
realities of individual countries. Policy makers need to focus on those 
aspects of governance that address the most binding constraints on a 
country’s development. 
The analysis above highlights four main points. First, governance 
matters for growth and development. By and large, worldwide data 
1  Average schooling years in total population aged 15 years or less, obtained from Barro and Lee (2010), and as reported in the World 
Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
2  World Economic Forum reports the quality of port and railroad infrastructure and quality of electricity supply with a range of 1–7 for each 
measure, where 1 is extremely underdeveloped and 7 is efficient by international standards. This data is obtained from the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report. 
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2.2.2 Governance quality and development outcomes: how they are linked
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Source: Sen (forthcoming).
show that better governance correlates with faster growth and better 
development performance. However, it is more difficult to establish 
a causal relationship between the two. A plausible interpretation is 
two-way causality working between better governance quality and higher 
development performance, each reinforcing the other. 
Second, the relationship between governance and development 
performance is complex. It varies with different elements of governance. 
In general, government effectiveness, the rule of law, regulatory quality, 
and controlling corruption correlate more closely and positively with 
growth and development performance than do voice or political stability.
Third, the relationship between governance and development appears 
to be weaker where incomes are low and stronger after a country reaches 
a certain income level. 
Finally, Asia resembles the rest of the world in that faster growth 
and better development correlate with good governance, in particular 
with government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and 
controlling corruption. The correlation of growth with government 
effectiveness and regulatory quality is stronger in Asia than elsewhere. 
For low-income countries, this may mean they should strive to 
strengthen government effectiveness, improve regulatory quality and the 
rule of law, and tighten control of corruption—what Fukuyama (2008) 
calls potential entry points toward wider governance reform. Middle-
income economies must look to the experience of advanced economies. 
At this stage, maintaining an environment supportive of growth is 
important, but policy must also respond to the rising aspirations of the 
populace. As their incomes improve and access to technology expands, 
citizens demand greater say in national affairs. Graduating to even 
higher income entails improving governance quality with respect to 
participation and accountability. In all countries, whatever their income 
status, governance reform should target actionable areas that are not only 
relatively easy to implement quickly but also offer low-hanging fruit in 
the form of more clearly visible impacts on development—the delivery of 
public services. 
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Public services as the frontline 
of governance 
The elements of good governance most critical to any particular 
country depend on its stage of development. Given the magnitude and 
complexity of the challenge, where should policy makers begin? Focusing 
on those elements offering strong benefits up front can pave the way 
for incremental improvement of governance overall. In this regard, 
strengthening public services is the most visible means of delivering 
governance benefits to the most people. 
Developing Asia’s governance problems are distilled in public 
services.3 Weak governance in Asia relative to advanced economies can 
be seen in its public services gaps. These services address such basic 
social needs as clean water and sanitation, health care and education, 
and nutrition, but also economic infrastructure for power supply, 
telecommunications, and transport by road, rail, and water. Public 
services extend beyond these tangible investments to encompass land 
registry systems for formalizing property rights, the issuance of licenses 
and permits, and the codification and enforcement of law, among other 
services. Most citizens judge the quality of governance by their experience 
in receiving essential public services. Indeed, public service delivery is 
the main channel of contact that most people have with their government 
and bureaucracy—sometimes the only one.
Public services are particularly important to the poor. Unlike 
the well-off, the poor often cannot afford to replace deficient 
public goods with the costlier alternatives provided by the 
private sector. Asia’s governments are thus challenged to make 
public services more responsive to the needs of the poor. Despite 
substantial gains in poverty reduction, Asia remains home to 
two-thirds of the world’s poor, and it must confront worsening 
inequality. Because public services can help distribute the gains 
of economic development more evenly, ensuring their effective 
delivery is critical to making growth inclusive.
Service delivery and 
development outcomes
Across much of developing Asia, public service delivery 
has achieved significant progress in recent decades. This is 
particularly true regarding education, health, potable water, 
and sanitation. A vast army of teachers and new schools in the 
region has propelled net primary enrollment rates above the 
global average to become nearly universal. In East Asia and 
the Pacific, the average years of schooling a child can expect 
to complete lengthened from 7 years in 1970 to 12 years in 2011 
(Figure 2.3.1). In South and West Asia, it doubled from 5.5 years 
2.3.1 Expected years of schooling
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online database. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases.aspx
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to a little over 10 years. The number of primary school-aged 
children out of school in the subregion plunged from almost 
40 million in 1990 to just 13 million in 2010, with most of the 
decline occurring since 2000. 
Asia’s health improvements have been equally impressive. 
From 1990 to 2011, average life expectancy at birth increased 
by 8 years in South and Eastern Asia and 6 years in the 
Western Pacific, the two World Health Organization regions 
that cover Asia. These are exceptionally large regional 
increases in life expectancy. Under-5 mortality rates have 
also fallen significantly in developing Asia (Figure 2.3.2). 
These improvements in education and health reflect in large 
part expanded access to publicly provided schooling and 
health-care services. Resources generated by the region’s 
rapid economic growth made this possible. Higher incomes 
have also fueled the increased provision and use of privately 
provided health and education services, which contributed to 
achievements in social and economic development.
However, the provision of education and health services 
has been uneven across Asian countries. In Sri Lanka, for 
instance, almost the entire population has access to education, 
with primary school attendance close to 100%. Viet Nam and 
Indonesia follow closely. But Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Pakistan 
have primary school attendance rates below 90% (Son 2012). The results 
of the 2009 OECD Programme for International Student Assessment—an 
international comparative survey of 15-year-olds’ knowledge and skills in 
reading, math, and science—showed that while students in some higher-
income Asian economies like the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Hong 
Kong, China performed better than those in many European countries 
and the United States, students in low- and middle-income countries 
such as Indonesia, India, and the Kyrgyz Republic performed 
poorly. Other evidence shows poor math skills among grade 5 
students in rural India (ASER Centre 2011) and among students 
in grades 5 and 8 in rural Pakistan (South Asian Forum for 
Education Development 2012). More troubling is evidence that 
student performance has deteriorated over time in rural India. 
Even allowing for sharply increased enrollment ratios during 
the period—admitting into the system children from extremely 
disadvantaged families (often the first generation to go to 
school)—cannot explain the decline in standards.
In terms of health, poor delivery of public health-care 
services has caused household flight to the private sector 
(Figure 2.3.3). In the Philippines, for instance, among children 
up to age 5 in the poorest wealth quintile taken for treatment of 
an illness, only 25% visited a public health-care provider. The 
rest went to formal or informal private providers. The absence 
of high-quality public services costs poor households dearly. 
In infrastructure, developing Asia lags behind in providing 
safe drinking water, ranking below North Africa and Latin 
America in piped water coverage (Figure 2.3.4). In South Asia, 
for example, only 25% of households have water piped to their 
2.3.2 Trends in under-5 mortality rates in world regions
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2.3.3  Choice of public or private health care provider 
by wealth quintile, 2005
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homes. In East Asia the percentage is significantly higher (at 70%), but 
remains well below North Africa (83%) or Latin America (86%). Again, the 
record is uneven across subregions. From 1990 to 2010, while East Asia 
rapidly expanded access to improved drinking water, South Asia enjoyed 
only modest gains. 
Similarly, only 41% of South Asians have access to improved 
sanitation—a lower percentage than any region except sub-Saharan 
Africa (Figure 2.3.5). Sanitation coverage is better in East Asia (at 66%) 
and Southeast Asia (69%), but these subregions remain behind Latin 
America (80%) and North Africa (90%). Large infrastructure deficits in 
transport and connectivity keep the region behind OECD and world 
averages (Figure 2.3.6). Similarly, electricity coverage is significantly 
lower in developing Asia than in the Middle East or Latin America 
2.3.5 Access to sanitation by region, 2010
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2.3.4 Access to piped water by region, 1990 and 2010 ()
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2.3.6 Quality of transport infrastructure, 2013
0 2 4 6
SSA
OECD
Non-OECD Europe
MENA
LAC
Developing Asia
Score
Quality of port infrastructure
Quality of roads
LAC = Latin America and the Carribbean, MENA = Middle East and North Africa, 
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,  
SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa.
Note: 1 = worst, 7 = best.
Source: ADB estimates using data from World Economic Forum, Global 
Competitiveness Report online database. 
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(Table 2.3.1). The quality of electricity supply, ports, and air transport in 
Central and West Asia, South Asia, and the Pacific lag behind the OECD 
by huge margins.
Disparities in access to services
Impressive statistics for regions as a whole mask distributional 
disparities within them. The benefits of public services accrue 
disproportionately to those who are not poor, while the amounts 
governments spend on the services the poor need most—such as 
primary education, preventive health care, and drinking water—are 
limited. For example, in Pakistan the government spends less than 1% 
of GDP on health-care services, to which access is unequal (Akram 
and Khan 2007). Provincial expenditures on health in rural areas have 
generally been regressive, with preventive measures as the notable 
exception. In the Philippines, access for the poor relative to access for 
others actually declined from 1998 to 2007 (Son 2009). In most Asian 
countries, the poor are much less likely than the rich to have skilled 
health personnel assist in child delivery (Table 2.3.2). Notable exceptions 
are Indonesia and the Philippines, where over three-quarters of the 
poorest quintile enjoy the service.
Inequality persists in access to education, influenced by wealth. 
In Bhutan, net attendance in primary school for the top quintile of 
households (by per capita household expenditure) was more than twice as 
high as for the bottom quintile. In Pakistan, it was similarly about twice 
as high (ADB 2012b). Data from India and Sri Lanka show poor students 
achieving weaker math and English results than the rich. The general 
belief that the poor are prone to perform below par in math may not hold 
(Gladwell 2008). While many countries in East, Central, and Southeast 
Asia have progressed toward achieving gender equality in secondary 
education, wide gender gaps persist in some countries in South and 
Southeast Asia and the Pacific (ADB 2012b). Despite considerable 
improvement in health care, inequality persists. 
2.3.1 Electricity access, 2010
Region
Proportion without electricity Electrification rate Electrification rate %
millions % Urban Rural
Developing countries 1,265  76  92  64
Africa 590  43  72  24
 North Africa 1  99 100  99
 Sub-Saharan Africa 589  32  64  13
Developing Asia 628  83  96  74
 East Asia 157  92  98  88
 South Asia 471  70  92  61
Latin America 29  94  98  76
Middle East 18  91  99  75
Transit economies and OECD 2 100 100  100
World 1,267  82  95   68
OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Source: International Energy Agency. World Energy Outlook 2012.
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Issues of public service quality
The gap in governance between developing Asia and the advanced 
economies typically leaves corresponding gaps in the quality of public 
services. OECD countries outperform all other regions, as expected, 
with scores for all service quality indicators (from the 
perspective of business executives) above 5 out of a possible 7 
(Figure 2.3.7). All regions except sub-Saharan Africa score 
over 6 on the quality of health services. On health, developing 
Asia earns its highest score—though trailed only by 
sub-Saharan Africa. In primary education, Asia ranks second 
worldwide, not much behind the OECD and marginally 
ahead of non-OECD Europe. It is striking, however, that in 
higher education Asia falls behind not only to non-OECD 
Europe but also to Latin America to rank fourth. On the 
quality of infrastructure, the OECD outshines by a wide 
margin the other regions, which cluster within the 3–4 range, 
with developing Asia only marginally behind the Middle East. 
Asia’s subregions are seen providing more uniform 
quality of public services than is apparent when comparing 
world regions (Figure 2.3.8). All four subregions (excluding 
the Pacific for lack of data) score above 6 on the quality of 
health services. Primary education shows the most diversity, 
with East Asia at the top and Central Asia at the bottom. 
This subjective view resonates with the objective findings of 
the OECD Programme for International Student Assessment 
mentioned above. Central Asia is the best subregional 
performer on infrastructure, which is its legacy from the 
former Soviet Union. South Asia trails the other subregions in 
higher education and infrastructure quality. 
How well do these subjective perceptions align with objective 
measures? Experience shows citizens’ satisfaction with basic services 
varies widely. One reason for this could be satisfaction reflecting 
differences in expectations. Where service quality is consistently poor, 
clients have very low expectations from public providers and may report 
2.3.7 Quality of public services by region, 2013
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2.3.2 Women who received skilled prenatal care (%)
Country Year
Wealth quintile
Lowest Second Third Fourth Highest
Bangladesh 2007 22.4 27.7 37.4 56.8 79.8
Cambodia 2005 55.2 63.7 68.4 77.6 90.2
India 2005/06 52.0 64.5 76.4 87.7 96.2
Indonesia 2007 82.2 92.1 95.5 98.5 99.2
Nepal 2006 17.7 30.5 38.4 60.7 84.1
Pakistan 2006/07 36.9 48.3 61.4 73.7 91.9
Philippines 2008 77.1 91.4 95.9 97.6 98.3
Viet Nam 2002 51.7 61.7 68.9 78.8 97.0
Note: Data is for the most recent birth in the 5 years preceding the survey by wealth quintile. 
Source: Wang et al. 2011.
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2.3.8 Quality of public services by Asian subregion, 2013
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2.3.3  Satisfaction with public service delivery by country (% of respondents satisfied with quality and efficiency of public service delivery)
Public health
Primary/
Secondary 
educaton Traffic police
Official 
documents
Vocational 
education
Social 
security Unemployment Civil scouts
Armenia 61 72 44 70 70 43 39 30
Georgia 75 82 75 92 83 28 ... 36
Uzbekistan 64 74 43 54 65 48 14 29
Tajikistan 57 62 36 62 51 42 38 29
Kazakhstan 54 69 40 50 62 50 43 27
Mongolia 53 67 14 48 66 34 36 17
Kyrgyz Republic 53 58 21 36 56 46 44 5
... = data not available.
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 2011. Life in Transition Survey II. http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/surveys/LiTS2ed.pdf
satisfaction with any service actually provided, however 
low in quality. Variations in the perceived quality of public 
services across countries may also reflect countries’ stages of 
development. While more developed regions likely have better 
public institutions, the poor may view these institutions’ more 
arcane services as irrelevant or even detrimental. 
Indeed, results from a survey of residents published 
in 2011 seem to support this view. For example, 36% of 
respondents in Georgia were satisfied with civil courts, 
contrasting with only 5% in the Kyrgyz Republic (Table 2.3.3). 
Likewise, a larger percentage of people in better-off 
economies such as Armenia and Kazakhstan were more 
satisfied with primary, secondary, and vocational education, 
while residents of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan were 
more responsive regarding unemployment and social security 
benefits, which are elements of public services that matter 
more to them as they affect their day-to-day survival. 
The administrative level from which services are provided 
can affect their perceived quality as well. Saich (2012) reports 
that surveys conducted in the PRC show respondents viewing the state 
not as a single actor but, rather, as distinct levels of administration. 
While respondents express high satisfaction with the central government, 
satisfaction subsides with each step toward local government. In 2011, 
over 90% were either relatively or extremely satisfied with the central 
government, but barely 60% expressed similar satisfaction with their 
local government. Similarly, Bardhan (2008) notes that voice is weaker in 
Indian villages and municipalities than at the state or federal level.
64  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
2.3.1 Delinquency, incompetence, and pilferage as corruption 
Too many unmotivated service providers in weak systems 
in developing Asia fail to show up for work. This insidious 
form of corruption—wrongfully diverting for private 
gain not funds per se but paid-for time and talent—robs 
children of education, the sick of hope, and society of 
welfare gains foregone (Banerjee et al. 2012). Better 
monitoring can limit the scope for shirking and other 
forms of petty corruption.
In India, despite substantial improvement in physical 
infrastructure for schools and pupil–teacher ratios, 
teacher absence rates barely changed from 2003 to 2010, 
with some states performing significantly worse than 
others (Muralidharan et al. 2013). Data from Indonesia 
show teacher absenteeism nationally in public primary 
schools is 19% (Usman, Akhmadi, and Suryadarma 2007). 
Even when teachers show up, there is no guarantee 
that education will be high quality. Teachers evaluated 
according to the test scores of their students may, for 
example, decide to teach to the test at the expense of 
improving other dimensions of teaching (Glewwe et al. 
2010, Figlio and Getzler 2002). 
Muralidharan et al. (2013) calculated the fiscal cost 
of teacher absenteeism from public schools in India at 
$1.5 billion per year. They found strong evidence that 
better monitoring reduces teacher absence and estimated 
that investments that increase the frequency of teacher 
monitoring would yield a nine-fold return on investment. 
Usman, Akhmadi, and Suryadarma (2007) noted that 
teacher recognition programs in Indonesia reduce teacher 
absenteeism. Analysis from Indonesia’s school-based 
management system shows that evaluating teachers more 
frequently and arranging greater participation in teacher 
working groups improve learning in public primary 
schools (Menno Pradhan forthcoming). 
 As with teachers, the mere presence of doctors 
does not guarantee high-quality health care. Health 
workers may resort to rule-of-thumb decisions that risk 
overmedicating patients, rather than follow through with 
time-consuming diagnostic procedures. Das and Hammer 
(2004) found the quality of doctors in Delhi to be very 
low on average, noting that as few as 30% of health-care 
providers correctly prescribe oral rehydration therapy 
to treat diarrhea, a common affliction in developing 
countries. 
In addition to shirking, contracted providers may 
divert economic resources for private gain. If corruption 
is pervasive, little public funding ends up being used 
productively, regardless of how much is allocated. 
Olken (2006) and Jha and Ramaswami (2012) provide 
interesting evidence from food subsidy programs in 
Indonesia and India. To detect corruption, the authors 
compared the amount of food the national government 
officially reported as disbursed in a given village or 
district with the amount households reported receiving. 
The discrepancy suggests that 18%–50% of the food was 
diverted by corruption in the supply chain. 
Weak service delivery means long waiting times, 
inadequate attention, and inferior treatment for the poor. 
Extortion, bribes, and theft of resources hurt the poor 
most as they either struggle to scrape together money to 
pay or simply lose out on services. The wide prevalence 
of this kind of petty corruption is a major challenge for 
policy makers in developing Asia. 
Sources: Banerjee et al. 2012; Muralidharan et al. 2013; Usman, 
Akhmadi, and Suryadarma 2007; Pradhan, (forthcoming; Chaudhury 
and Hammer 2004; Chaudhury et al. 2006; Banerjee et al. 2004; Das 
and Hammer 2004; Olken 2006; Jha and Ramaswami 2012.
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It is also clear that corruption and lack of commitment undermine 
welfare gains, as an examination of critical education, health-care, and 
nutrition services shows. Teacher absenteeism mocks investments to 
improve school infrastructure and raise teacher–student ratios. Doctors 
absent from public health clinics and rice missing from distribution 
programs also typify casual corruption on the frontlines that routinely 
deprives communities of 20%–40% of funded benefits (Box 3.2.1).
Many governance projects fail to curb corruption, reinforcing the 
need for comprehensive reforms that carefully assign official discretion 
to limit the scope for abuse. It is important, too, that the quality of public 
services depends not just on the quality of governance but also on the 
fiscal resources needed to deliver public services. Half of developing 
Asian countries spend less than 5% of their GDP on health and a similar 
amount for education (Lavado and Domingo forthcoming). While 
greater investment is required in social and infrastructure services to 
empower the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable, so is giving them voice 
to demand accountability and basic public services of acceptable quality. 
Public service delivery needs reform from the perspective of both supply 
and demand, with input from the public and private sectors, including 
civil society. If market providers work efficiently, they can satisfy the need 
for some services and free up public resources for use elsewhere.
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Ways to improve 
public service delivery
Discussing the larger issues of governance and service delivery is one 
thing, but it is another to actually deliver public services through micro 
interventions that reach local communities, households, and individuals. 
Public service delivery that effectively reaches target groups and 
efficiently uses available resources—providing roads and computerized 
health-care records to communities, electricity to homes, and textbooks 
to students—depends on a clear understanding of the opportunities and 
pitfalls posed by each intervention. Central governments often lack the 
knowledge about local needs and preferences to provide public services of 
adequate quality to their citizens. They can compensate by collaborating 
with local governments, the private sector, and civil society. 
Decentralization and civic participation are two complementary ways 
of strengthening and legitimizing local governance reform. In recent 
decades, central governments have increasingly shared responsibility 
for providing public services with local governments to improve public 
accountability and responsiveness. Local governance comprises a set 
of institutions, mechanisms, and processes through which citizens 
and community groups can voice their interests and needs, mediate 
differences, and exercise rights and obligations locally (UNDP 2004). 
When local governments lack the administrative capacity to design or 
administer public services, local civil society—citizens and nonprofit 
organizations—can fill the gap. Civic engagement develops individual 
capacity; builds social trust, norms of cooperation, and the ideal of 
the common good; and promotes more equal protection of interests 
(Lehman, Verba, and Brady 1999). Public–private partnerships in Asia are 
proliferating and becoming more complex, at their best infusing service 
provision with social dynamism (Capuno forthcoming).
Whether Asian governments are successful in addressing these 
issues—by either raising more funds or using existing local resources 
more efficiently—depends largely on the extent to which they can use 
three central mechanisms for public service delivery—the “three Es”:
?? Empowering citizens enables people to participate in public 
service delivery or monitor service provision, as well as demand 
accountability from service providers, thereby limiting scope for 
corruption. 
?? Engaging local governments and the private sector to provide 
public services addresses communities’ particular needs and—in 
a hands-on fashion—the uneven delivery of public services across 
provinces. 
?? Expanding information and communication technology provides 
a catalyst to enhance the leveraging that empowerment and 
decentralization bring to service delivery.4 
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Empowering citizens 
One effective way of delivering public services to a targeted clientele 
is civic empowerment. This grants people the freedom to decide on 
matters that affect their lives and the right to participate in development, 
empowering them by expanding their assets and capabilities. This 
concept is influenced by the rights and capacity approach elucidated by 
the economist and Nobel laureate Amartya Sen. It emphasizes that people 
should be free to choose what they want to do, have the ability to put 
those choices into action, and live in an environment that allows them to 
actually get it done (Sen 2005). When adequately empowered, citizens can 
use their client power to improve service provision and the accountability 
of politicians and service providers.
Empowerment can occur in three major ways: 
?? rights-based entitlements, in which the state guarantees to people 
the right to information and specific social services and basic 
necessities, such as food, employment, health, and education; 
?? performance monitoring by citizens and communities, who 
monitor and evaluate the implementation of public services—
often against indicators the people themselves have selected—
toward demanding better performance from service providers; 
and 
?? community participation, wherein groups of end users or entire 
communities become involved in delivering services and thereby 
directly controlling their quantity and quality.
Rights-based entitlements 
Some public services are so basic to decent human life that they are 
considered fundamental human rights. Without formal rights, people—
especially the poor—may struggle under continual uncertainty, at risk of 
deprivation and destitution with no means of subsistence, and perhaps 
displaced from ancestral lands. A common form of empowerment is 
through rights-based entitlements—enforceable rights enshrined in 
the legal framework or national constitution—with specific roles and 
responsibilities for implementing authorities, and clear criteria for 
identifying eligible beneficiaries. 
Many Asian countries have adopted this rights-based approach. 
They include Bangladesh and Pakistan for education; Bangladesh, India, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka for water; and Indonesia, the 
Maldives, Nepal, Thailand, and Timor-Leste for health care. India is one 
country that has adopted rights to information, jobs, and food in a steady 
and successive manner (Aiyar and Walton forthcoming). Most recent is 
a new law on food security, passed in September 2013, that grants a legal 
right to heavily subsidized food grains to nearly 800 million people—
three-quarters of the rural population plus half of the urban population. 
In 2012, most member states of the International Labour Organisation 
voted for “social protection floors,” which establish as rights the receipt 
of public services that meet minimum service standards (International 
Labour Organisation 2012). National social protection floors—based on 
national objectives and economic and fiscal capacity—are expected to 
address poverty, vulnerability, and social exclusion.
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However, simply proclaiming a public good as a human right is 
useless without a legal structure for exercising that right. Many countries 
list legal rights, but few stress enforcement. In less-developed economies, 
the vast majority of people may not even be aware of their legal rights. 
Information about rights available on the internet cannot reach those 
without internet access or e-literacy. This situation contrasts starkly with 
standards in advanced countries, where citizens—even those accused of 
atrocities and murder—are fully apprised of their legal rights before their 
trial or, as in the US, even before their interrogation begins. 
Public monitoring, media coverage of gaps and lapses, and direct 
client pressure are effective tools to improve service provision, taking the 
pursuit of human rights beyond the limits of law and drawing strength 
from an empowered public (Sen 2006 and 2009). 
Legal rights are not without pitfalls as means of empowerment. 
Legalizing demands for social and economic rights may favor the more 
affluent. Gauri and Brinks (2008) offer as an example the concentration 
of litigation in the richer south and southeast parts of Brazil rather than 
in the poorer northeast. Similarly in India, more legal claims are filed in 
Delhi than in poorer states. Legal cases about education more commonly 
address the university level than the primary, reflecting a bias toward the 
middle class.
2.4.1 Empowerment and land acquisitions
Forcible land acquisition for the public interest is often 
cited as a human rights violation that evicts residents 
from ancestral lands or otherwise threatens their 
livelihoods without providing adequate compensation. 
Cases have been cited in the PRC, India, Indonesia, 
the Philippines, and Viet Nam. Expropriation is often 
done “for the purpose of clearing the hurdles for rapid 
urban development…[without adequate] attention paid 
to the protection of private property rights” (Cai 2010). 
An important indicator of good governance for land 
acquisition is empowerment (box figure). 
However, citizen empowerment can have unintended 
consequences, as in India. Until recently, land acquisition 
was governed by an 1894 colonial law that allowed the 
government to acquire any land it wanted with little 
compensation to landowners. A new law—the Right to 
Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, 
Rehabilitation, and Resettlement Act—stipulates that 
landowners must be compensated by up to four times 
the commercial value of rural land, or up to twice its 
commercial value in urban areas. While the law was 
expected to clarify and streamline land acquisition for 
business, it may have done exactly the opposite. The cost 
of land is expected to increase significantly because of the 
new law, and this may deter business from purchasing land 
for industrial development. In addition, while landowner 
consent is not needed for public projects such as highways, 
private projects need the consent of 80% of the landowners 
in the area prior to land acquisition, and public–
private partnership projects need the consent of 70% of 
landowners. This is likely to lengthen the time required to 
acquire land, thrusting another monkey wrench into the 
gears of growth and development.
Sources: Cai 2010, Wallace 2010.
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Rights-based entitlements can be misused or exploited. Empowered 
communities and citizens have sometimes jeopardized high-priority 
national infrastructure projects such as large irrigation works, dams, and 
public highways by mounting protests—that is, by exercising voice. Land 
acquisition under eminent domain frequently falls victim to entrenched 
interests (Box 2.4.1).
Perhaps the biggest challenge to implementing a rights-based 
approach is resource constraint, especially in low-income countries and 
in countries with high fiscal deficits. Economic and social rights to social 
protection, health, and education require particularly large resources 
(Munro 2008). Pursuing these rights risks amassing government 
commitments that are both excessive and inflexible, threatening 
macroeconomic stability and crowding out other worthy investments. 
For example, India’s new food security law is estimated to expand the 
country’s food subsidy burden by 18%, or 1% of GDP (Ramaswami, 
Murugkar, and Kotwal 2013). Kelkar and Shah (2011) frame this explicitly 
in terms of a substantive shift toward social democratic commitments 
that is unaffordable at India’s stage of economic development. 
If fundamental rights-based entitlement programs are to seriously 
address poverty and inequality, the rights-based framework must be 
fiscally sustainable and reflected in government budgets. Sustaining 
the quality of services requires resources for operating and maintaining 
service facilities and sufficient capacity to deliver on these commitments. 
This demands an efficient use of scarce public funds (Lavado and 
Domingo forthcoming). 
Public monitoring 
Social accountability mechanisms—such as the public’s monitoring and 
evaluation of service delivery—build government responsiveness through 
civic engagement. Citizen report cards, community score cards, social 
audits and public hearings, grievance redress systems, and opinion 
surveys are some ways of building accountability. 
Citizen report cards gather information about users’ perceptions 
and views of service delivery performance, outcomes, and usefulness. 
They provide stakeholders with feedback toward taking remedial action. 
Success stories from Asia include, in India, the 1994 and 1999 Bangalore 
citizen report cards and the 1997 Ahmedabad report card, and, in the 
Philippines, the 2001 citizen report card (Babajanian forthcoming).
Social public service audits safeguard transparency and accountability 
by verifying discrepancies in government records and expenditures on 
services. In the Philippines, participatory audits of local government 
infrastructure projects by social groups—including the poor and 
women—and assessment reports by nongovernment organizations 
(NGOs), such as the Concerned Citizens of Abra for Good Governance, 
became conditions for the release of local government funds for service 
provision (PAF, Sirker, and Cosic 2007, Ramkumar and Krafchik 2005).
Community score cards are hybrids of citizen report cards and 
social audits, relying heavily on community monitoring to assess 
service quality and performance, as well as to negotiate with service 
providers remedies for any shortcomings. These monitoring tools have 
been effective in Africa and Asia at exposing corruption, building 
70  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
awareness of entitlements, empowering people to claim their rights, 
and facilitating citizen engagement in service delivery (Joshi 2010, 
McGee and Gaventa 2010). However, their impact can be limited by the 
difficulty of identifying and involving poor and marginalized groups 
that live in remote areas, exercise little voice, and are easily excluded 
from empowering processes (Agarwal, Heltberg, and Diachok 2009, 
Chambers 1995). Institutional arrangements for redressing grievances 
and enforcing social accountability must be accompanied by 
effective citizen outreach to support information dissemination and 
awareness building. 
Community participation 
Community participation typically addresses two major barriers to 
empowering citizens vis-à-vis the state and public service providers: 
Information is often lacking about what constitutes adequate quality in 
public services, and poor coordination and participation in monitoring 
may stop citizen-clients’ expressing their views, robbing them of voice.
The main factors affecting people’s willingness and ability to 
participate in service delivery is poor governance, especially inadequate 
rule of law, discrimination, and privileged patron–client relationships. 
A recent review of nearly 500 studies on participatory development by 
Mansuri and Rao (2012) suggests that the key to success is to distinguish 
between organic participation (participation spurred by civic groups) 
and induced or mandated participation (state efforts to promote 
participation). The success of either type depends on local capacity for 
collective action. 
One challenge is how to ensure that the poor and marginalized get 
involved to promote their interests, even as they face a perennial risk 
of capture of benefits by more prominent elite community members 
(Chambers 1997, Cleaver 2001). To improve services, the state apparatus—
including local government, the bureaucracy, and public service 
providers—must change the way it does business and become more 
user-friendly. Practical issues of institutional redesign and realigning 
incentives for service providers need to be addressed. This may 
sometimes require far-reaching civil service reform, which may include 
performance-based pay for civil servants and public service providers, 
as well as allowing local communities to sanction unsatisfactory civil 
servants such as teachers and health workers. 
Engaging local government and 
the private sector 
National governments can compensate for their shortcomings in 
local knowledge, institutions, technical capacity, and fiscal resources 
by devolving to provincial and local governments responsibility for 
delivering public services. Another option—one that can augment limited 
capacity in local governments and bring social dynamism to service 
provision—is to collaborate with the private sector and civil society.
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Devolving service provision to local governments 
Almost every Asian country has attempted to decentralize government 
functions or intends to (Brosio forthcoming). Fiscal decentralization 
gained momentum in East and Southeast Asia during the 1990s, driven by 
structural and political imperatives ranging from the end of authoritarian 
regimes in Indonesia and the Philippines to the transition to market 
economies in the PRC and Viet Nam (Gill and Kharas 2007). With their 
huge diversity, developing Asian economies adopted a range of models 
for decentralizing governance—de jure federal systems (in India and 
Pakistan), de facto quasi-federal systems (the PRC), regional systems 
of governance (Indonesia and the Philippines), unitary systems (the 
Republic of Korea), and deconcentrated systems under which the agents 
of central government control are geographically dispersed either in part 
(Thailand) or to a great extent (Cambodia and Viet Nam). Huge variation 
exists in indicators of fiscal decentralization, with the PRC, at one 
extreme, decentralizing over 70% of general government expenditure to 
subnational governments and Nepal, at the other extreme, decentralizing 
barely 9%. In large countries such as India and the PRC, system 
diversity challenges any analysis or evaluation of intergovernmental 
relations. Indian states and PRC provinces are so large that thousands of 
government units exist at lower levels, and each state or province employs 
its own distinct system of intergovernmental relations. 
Moving decision-making closer to people improves efficiency, 
accountability, manageability, and autonomy (Ivanyna and Shah 2013). 
Weighed against the benefits of centralization—such as economies 
of scale, the ability to resolve inter-jurisdictional disputes, and 
redistribution—the perceived benefits of decentralization include healthy 
competition, higher production efficiency, higher growth, and services 
matched to local preferences and stages of economic development 
(Ahmad and Brosio 2009). To raise revenue and effectively deliver public 
services, central governments in developing economies face information, 
capacity, and enforcement constraints that are much more severe than in 
2.4.1 Extent of fiscal decentralisation in South Asia and the world
Country
% of government 
revenue raised 
by subnational 
government
% of government 
expenditure done 
by subnational 
governments
Transfer to 
subnational 
units as a share 
of subnational 
revenues
India 33.6 52.0 39.0
Bangladesh <2 3–4 64–70
Pakistan 7.3 30.3 81.1
Sri Lanka 7.0 12.0 82.5
World 21.7 29.1 32.5
China, People’s Rep. of 59.7 81.5 35.0
Canada 52.2 59.7 21.3
United States 41.1 49.3 28.9
Mexico 23.5 23.1 47.0
Source: Ghani et al. 2012.
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most developed countries (Gadenne and Singhal 2013). The trend toward 
decentralization in developing Asia is perhaps explained by these costs 
and benefits. According to the World Development Report 1999–2000, 
“[t]he experience of the last 15 years shows that the devolution of 
powers affects political stability, public service performance, equity, and 
macroeconomic stability” (World Bank 1999).
Gadenne and Singhal (2013) observe that developed countries 
devolved more revenues and taxes to subnational governments than 
did developing countries (adjusted for per capita GDP) from 
the late 1990s to the late 2000s, during which shares of 
subnational taxes and revenues in developing countries were 
reduced. In 2010, shares of subnational revenues and taxes 
were twice as high on average in developed countries than in 
developing countries: 27% versus 14% for revenues and 21% 
versus 10% for taxes. Against this global picture, the share of 
subnational government spending in developing Asia has risen 
significantly (Figure 2.4.1). Notably, decentralization in the 
PRC exceeds that of even OECD countries (Shen et al. 2012). 
Although fiscal decentralization continues, large 
subnational fiscal disparities persist, as subnational 
governments’ spending responsibilities generally far exceed 
their revenues (Table 2.4.1). The consequent fiscal gap must be 
filled with locally levied taxes. Local governments with greater 
autonomy to raise taxes and spend revenues have stronger 
incentives to increase local tax collection and spend on public 
services locally (Ambrosiano and Bordignon 2006). Indeed, 
evidence from Albania, Bangladesh, Brazil, and the PRC shows that such 
incentives for local governments to fill the fiscal gap spur them to retain 
the revenue, invest more in health and education infrastructure and 
better targeted poverty programs, and promote growth (Gadenne and 
Singhal 2013). 
However, fiscal decentralization is no panacea. The small economic 
and resource bases available to local governments limit their tax capacity. 
To cope with this limitation, provinces rely heavily on non-tax sources 
such as user charges, which now account for a rapidly growing share of 
public spending—and of private spending, as user charges raise citizens’ 
out-of-pocket expenses (Gill and Kharas 2007). Out-of-pocket spending 
is usually regressive, disproportionately affecting the poor and exposing 
them to financial risk.
Uneven capacity to raise revenues causes large disparities in local 
government spending and service provision across provinces. For 
instance, the PRC municipality of Shanghai (with provincial status) 
spends eight times as much per capita as nearby Henan Province. 
Differences at the sub-provincial level can be much larger still, as the 
county in the PRC with the highest per capita expenditure spends 
48 times as much as the one with the lowest (Gill and Kharas 2007). 
Spending disparities distort education and health outcomes in the PRC, 
Indonesia, and Viet Nam (Hofman and Guerra 2004). Evidence suggests 
that fiscal decentralization in the PRC following reform worsened 
disparity in per capita consumption expenditures across provinces and in 
terms of urban areas versus rural, and coastal regions versus inland. 
2.4.1 Subnational governments’ share of public spending
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However, in itself, providing greater resources to poorer areas would 
be insufficient, as it would not address the key challenge of building 
adequate channels of accountability at different government levels. 
Decentralization is prone to problems such as limited administrative 
capacity, financial constraints, and elite capture (Scott 2009, Bardhan and 
Mookherjee 2008). 
Decentralization poses its own challenges to controlling corruption, 
the scope of which correlates with large informal sectors and weak 
institutions. Where corruption and tax evasion are widespread and pose 
little risk of capture or penalty, the cost to programs providing services 
can be high, reducing the amounts available for service delivery. In 
Indonesia and the Philippines, World Bank investment surveys of firms 
suggest that decentralization may have worsened corruption. However, 
greater freedom of the press and the prosecution of corrupt public officials 
have significantly dented corruption in Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; the 
Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Viet Nam (Gill and Kharas 2007).
Addressing large fiscal disparities between subnational governments 
is key to more equitably distributing public services. Wide regional 
heterogeneity and differing stages of development mean that the specific 
policy choices that are appropriate will vary significantly according to 
individual countries’ conditions. 
Public service provision outside government 
The state normally assumes responsibility for providing essential services 
like water, sanitation, and primary education, as their benefits extend 
beyond their direct users. Measles and polio vaccinations, for instance, 
protect others besides the vaccinated child, and pollution control ensures 
clean air and water for the enjoyment of all. Public utilities like gas, water, 
and electricity are typically either provided or regulated by government 
because competitive markets do not exist for these services and the 
infrastructure required to produce and deliver them is expensive to 
build and maintain. Finally, public services such as subsidized food and 
housing, need-based student scholarships, supplemental income transfers, 
and family planning are provided by governments to redress inequality 
and poverty. Typically, there would be little profit incentive for private 
providers of these services unless they were contracted and paid by the 
government.
However, as many Asian governments have limited fiscal resources, 
a substantial share of service provision for microcredit, health care, 
sanitation, and education is contracted out to NGOs and private 
providers. NGOs usually have wider reach than government providers 
and often serve marginalized communities in remote areas—contracting 
them may mean better access for more people (Capuno forthcoming). In 
fact, most random evaluations in developing countries on, for example, 
health and education interventions are conducted in collaboration with 
NGO providers rather than with government agencies (Gadenne and 
Singhal 2013).
Because private service providers, unlike public providers, depend for 
their sustenance on demand for their services, they are more vulnerable 
to sanctions instigated by consumers and thus have stronger incentive 
to respond to consumer needs and concerns. Finally, non-state providers 
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2.4.2 Information technology for public service delivery
ICT helps to make governments more efficient, 
effective, transparent, and accountable by reengineering 
administrative processes, improving public service delivery, 
and promoting citizen engagement and participation in 
policy making. 
E-government for empowerment
E-government is considered key to improving governance 
through both front-office and back-office applications 
of ICT. Empirical evidence associates e-government 
development with reduced corruption (Anderson 2009). 
It helps restore and improve citizens’ trust in government 
and enhance their participation and empowerment (Welch, 
Hinnant and Moon 2005, Tolbert and Mossberger 2006). 
E-participation refers to citizens’ inclusion in providing 
information (e-information), interacting with stakeholders 
(e-consultation), and engaging in decision making 
(e-decision-making). 
E-government has continued to advance in Asia and the 
Pacific. Some countries are at stage one, with only one-way 
communication as the government website provides public 
information to citizens, government officials, and businesses. 
Some others are at stage two, interacting with citizens 
through online services such as e-tax, e-procurement, 
e-licensing, and other systems. Yet others are at the highest 
current stage of seamless integration or transformation, 
wherein many related online services and databases are 
integrated vertically and horizontally. 
On average, Asia is at a stage of e-government 
development close to the world average but below that of 
Europe or the Americas—though East Asia performs better 
than the latter (box figure 1). Within developing Asia, 
first-ranked Republic of Korea and tenth-ranked Singapore 
perform far better than many high-income countries 
(box figure 2). The Government of the Republic of Korea 
established the Social Welfare Integrated Management 
Network System to improve the efficiency and quality of 
information and services, integrating 16 social welfare 
service institutions and 17 other public agencies. The system 
manages eligibility and personal information regarding 
residency, land, finance, taxes, and welfare. Notably, it 
prevents duplicate benefit payments and fraud, while 
protecting citizens from overbilling. In most countries, there 
is a clear gap between the supply of e-government services 
and effective demand or e-participation. This perhaps 
reflects inadequate attention paid to creating the user 
capacity required to enable them to use available e-facilities. 
E-government and e-participation indexes show 
lower-middle-income countries in Southeast Asia such as 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Viet Nam as more proactive 
than their South Asian peers India, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. The e-participation index shows little participation 
by low-income countries such as Bangladesh. At the other 
end, Kazakhstan, an upper-middle-income economy, 
ranks higher than three other upper-middle-income 
economies: the PRC, Malaysia, and Thailand. To promote 
e-participation, the Government of Kazakhstan allows 
citizens to communicate with the executives of government 
agencies directly by posting comments and questions on the 
official blog site. 
1  E-governance by region 
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Matching local needs and capacity to maximize e-dividends 
Developing Asian economies need to optimize their use 
of ICT and maximize ICT dividends by matching various 
ICT technologies to local needs and local capacities. 
Countries should consider their technological, economic, 
human, and geographical factors when choosing 
appropriate ICT applications for local use. For example, 
mobile broadband is more economical and feasible than 
fixed lines for tackling tough geographical challenges 
such as reaching small communities in the mountains 
or on scattered islands. Such initiatives potentially 
provide effective instruments for public sector reform 
to make government more transparent, accountable, 
and participatory. They also serve as a springboard for 
ICT developments in other sectors by creating a more 
ICT-receptive institutional environment and stimulating 
ICT markets with government purchases of ICT devices, 
services, and infrastructure. National e-government 
initiatives need to be practical and strategic, incorporating 
ICT governance structure, financing mechanisms and 
procurement plans, and national and local e-government 
projects. 
Prioritization is essential to make good use of limited 
resources in developing Asia. Governments should carefully 
prioritize various e-government services in conjunction 
with infrastructure development to maximize trickle-down 
benefits. A number of successful cases such as the Republic 
of Korea, Singapore, and Taipei,China demonstrate how 
strong e-government initiatives orchestrate the development 
of e-government services, public sector reform, and the 
development of ICT infrastructure in tandem, particularly 
at early stages. These cases suggest that governments’ strong 
involvement initially can very effectively advance public 
sector reform while developing ICT services and, more 
generally, advancing social and economic development. 
Sources: ADB forthcoming; Anderson 2009; Welch et al. 2005; Tolbert 
and Mossberger 2006.
2  E-Government in selected Asian countries
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often incur lower costs for delivering services than do government 
providers. This means more services provided under a given budget 
(Bräutigam and Segarra 2007, Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff 2002 and 
2011, Feiock and Jang 2009, Joshi and Moore 2004, McLoughlin 2011).
There are downsides to contracting out public services. Although 
various constraints limit the ability of the state to provide public 
services—and NGOs may fill the gap—over time, provision by NGOs 
may contribute to government failure by crowding out public service 
providers and ignoring the national agenda. Contracted providers may 
have very different interests than either the client or the state. From the 
point of view of decentralization, NGOs are usually thought of as local 
because of their close integration with local communities. However, many 
NGOs are global, supported by governments and private contributions 
from abroad (Werker and Ahmed 2008). NGO funding and the agenda it 
serves may not derive solely from the local community or even the nation. 
Even when pro-poor policies are pursued, imperfect compliance 
with targeting rules—and corruption in providers—may reduce policy 
effectiveness. As the quality of service provision is difficult to monitor, 
especially in remote or inaccessible areas, providers may shirk or skimp 
on the quality of services provided to the communities that need 
them most. Sometimes, alternative provisioning of basic services can 
slacken broader pressures to improve bureaucratic and organizational 
performance in the public sector.
Expanding information technology 
Information and communication technology (ICT) has emerged in 
the past 2 decades as a powerful tool for improving how efficiently 
governments perform and monitor their internal functions, thereby 
supporting empowerment and decentralization in service delivery. ICT 
leverages empowerment through e-health, mobile banking, e-education, 
and e-transfer payments to accelerate information dissemination, 
facilitate citizen participation in local governance (through, 
for example, e-platforms), and improve transparency and 
accountability in government administration—all making 
public services more effective. ICT also catalyzes the effects 
of public–private partnerships and NGOs’ provision of public 
services by bringing the providers and beneficiaries together 
in cyberspace. 
Indeed, ICT has taken root in Asia. Governments, private 
enterprises, civil society, and cooperatives in several Asian 
economies are experimenting with its use. Telephone usage 
is quite significant on average, and internet usage is catching 
up, but broadband subscription remains abysmally low in the 
region. Moreover, penetration rates vary widely, once again 
displaying tremendous heterogeneity (Figure 2.4.2). Apart 
from high-income economies like Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China, the economy in the region with the highest 
percentage of subscribers is Viet Nam, with about two 
telephones per person, counting both fixed line and mobile. 
This achievement can be attributed to Viet Nam’s proactive 
initiative to improve broadband access in remote and inland 
areas, toward meeting universal service and access goals. 
2.4.2  Internet, mobile, and broadband users in Asia 
by region
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While more than a third of Indians have a phone, the much-discussed 
success of ICT in India relates to its Aadhaar unique identification 
project. This pioneering project is expected to reach the entire 
population with ICT-enabled infrastructure to enhance government 
transparency, efficiency, and effectiveness and empower the poor. 
More than a dozen state governments in India participate in an 
initiative to computerize land record management and issue ownership 
records toward obtaining bank loans for agriculture (Bhatnagar 
forthcoming). It has yielded impressive results. Manual systems could 
achieve only poor service delivery requiring an average of 
3–4 trips to government offices, 2–6 hours of waiting on 
each trip, and bribes equal to 20%–90% of the transaction 
value. After computerization, the number of trips fell by one, 
average waiting time was reduced by 30%, and bribery was 
significantly curtailed. Reduced face-to-face contact with 
government officials limited opportunities for bribery and 
corruption and protected low-income and disadvantaged users 
from potential bribe-seekers.
Despite several success cases, penetration rates in Asia 
remain below those in most regions except sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 2.4.3). This record broadly echoes Asia’s performance 
in governance. Far more needs to be done to apply ICT toward 
better governance, to improve public services and contribute to 
growth and development (Box 2.4.2). 
To maximize the social and economic impacts of service 
delivery using ICT, developing economies need to pursue 
inclusive ICT that minimizes digital divides and gaps and 
maximizes the number of citizens empowered through the 
benefits from online services and e-government programs. 
Transparency, accountability, and speedy access to information 
through ICT will also improve the efficiency of publicly and 
privately provided services. 
However, like any other technology-heavy program, 
ICT-assisted delivery of public services must have a backup to avoid 
disruption caused by electricity failure, which is common in many parts 
of the region. Also, participating citizens must be educated on how to 
identify and handle phishing spam and other online threats. Moreover, 
e-delivery of services in most Asian countries lags, as the current focus 
is on building ICT infrastructure. Very few ICT initiatives have been 
scaled up to the national level, which has kept the impact of experiments 
modest. Policy makers need to identify scalable initiatives and design 
institutional mechanisms to replicate successful experiments elsewhere.
2.4.3  Internet, mobile, and broadband users in Asia
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ARM = Armenia; AZE = Azerbaijan; BAN = Bangladesh; BHU = Bhutan; BRU 
= Brunei Darussalam; CAM = Cambodia; FIJ = Fiji; FSM = Federated States 
of Micronesia ; GEO = Georgia; HKG = Hong Kong, China; IND = India; INO = 
Indonesia; KAZ = Kazakhstan; KGZ = Kyrgyz Republic; KIR = Kiribati; KOR = 
Republic of Korea; LAO = Lao People’s Democratic Republic; MAL = Malaysia; 
MLD = Maldives; MON = Mongolia; NEP = Nepal; PAK = Pakistan; PAL = Palau; 
PHI = Philippines; PNG = Papua New Guinea; PRC = People’s Republic of 
China; SAM = Samoa; SIN = Singapore; SOL = Solomon Islands; SRI = Sri Lanka; 
TAJ = Tajikistan; THA = Thailand; TIM = Timor-Leste; TON = Tonga; TKM = 
Turkmenistan; TUV = Tuvalu; UZB = Uzbekistan; VAN = Vanuatu; VIE = Viet Nam.
Source: United Nations Development Programme. Human Development 
Indicators online database (accessed 20 September 2013).
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Moving forward on 
governance reform
Empirical analysis reported here shows that governance matters for 
growth and development. Yet, despite its phenomenal economic growth 
and rapid gains relative to advanced economies, Asia has seen less 
progress in closing the governance gap. The World Bank’s perception-
based World Governance Indicators in 2011 place developing Asia below 
the OECD and Latin America in all areas measured. Accounting for 
income differences improves the region’s global ranking somewhat, but 
Asia still lags these regions on controlling corruption, regulatory quality, 
and voice. Within Asia, large differences in governance performance exist 
across subregions and between countries. East Asia performs better on 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of law, but lags 
on voice. Political stability and regulatory quality are the key issues for 
South Asia, where voice is stronger.
A tailored approach to governance reform
Better governance seems to influence economic growth in Asia more 
than it does social development indicators. This can be expected as social 
changes often bear fruit only slowly. Better education and health systems 
may take a generation to register as higher educational attainment 
and better health. The importance of various elements of governance 
depends on the constraints countries face and their social and historical 
backgrounds.
Governments therefore need to prioritize those components of 
governance that hold back development. For low-income countries, 
priorities are likely to be strengthening government effectiveness through, 
for example, civil service reform; improving regulatory quality and the 
rule of law; scaling up corruption control; and improving the quality of 
public services. These improvements can provide entry points for wider 
governance reform and accelerate the attainment of middle-income status. 
Middle-income economies, for their part, must look to the experience of 
advanced economies. Maintaining an environment conducive to growth 
remains important for them, but policies must also acknowledge people’s 
rising aspirations and demands for a better quality of life. People with 
higher incomes demand from their governments greater transparency, 
participation, and accountability.
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Public service delivery focus for 
improving governance
In Asia, most people judge the quality of governance through their 
experience of public service delivery, such as the quality of social services 
and infrastructure. Governance may be a broad concept, but it distils to 
public service delivery in the eyes of most ordinary people as they decide 
whether or not their government is doing its job. Improved public service 
delivery can create momentum for broader governance reform later on. 
Because public services are particularly important to the poor, effective 
delivery is central to making economic growth more inclusive.
Despite significant improvements already achieved in developing 
Asia, many countries lag in both the quantity and quality of essential 
services provided. This hinders development and growth. In many 
Asian countries, the reading, math, and science skills of elementary 
and middle-school children remain subpar. In addition, the massive 
infrastructure deficit across much of the region stunts development, 
leaving about one-fifth of Asians—over half the population in some 
countries—without electricity (ADB 2013a). 
Weak governance is often to blame for public service failures. 
Corruption and the lack of transparency in service delivery attract 
the most attention. To access health, education, electricity, water, and 
other vital social services, people must navigate an obstacle course of 
corruption that includes bribes, favoritism and discrimination, theft 
and other diversion of public resources, and elite capture. The poor and 
marginalized are particularly vulnerable, as they can afford neither to pay 
bribes nor to acquire services through private providers. Long waiting 
lines impose heavy opportunity costs. Ensuring the effective delivery of 
public services is thus crucial to drawing Asia’s poor into the economic 
growth and development process. 
While a multipronged strategy is required to improve public services, 
case studies and experimental evidence show that quality improves when 
those using public services have a voice in their provision. In several 
Asian countries, a complementary set of mechanisms—the “three Es” as 
described in the previous section—improve public services. Empowering 
citizens, engaging local governments and the private sector, and 
expanding the use of ICT can be effective if policy makers recognize the 
limitations of each mechanism and use them according to their strengths, 
rather than haphazardly. 
Empowering citizens—giving them basic human rights and the 
chance to participate in and monitor public service delivery—generates 
the dynamism needed to make service providers accountable. Some 
Asian countries have established public services as human rights. At the 
same time, low-income countries, and those with high fiscal deficits, 
must be careful to ensure that entitlements do not sap resources for 
future development. 
Engaging local governments and the private sector can expand the 
scope and scale of public services and their delivery. Decentralization 
helps by relieving central authorities of more responsibility and by 
adjusting service delivery to local needs. Experience shows that devolving 
powers improves macroeconomic and political stability, public service 
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performance, and equity. However, local governments must have the 
institutional capacity to effectively take on responsibility. And they must 
balance their higher spending responsibilities with their limited authority 
to levy taxes. 
Where public resources are scarce and private service providers 
competitive, hybrid arrangements such as partnering with private 
firms and NGOs can provide services and incentives to innovate and 
to monitor and contain costs. Involving private providers must be 
complemented, however, by appropriate government regulation and 
monitoring of service quality.
Expanding ICT use can improve public service provision and delivery 
by strengthening both demand and supply—whether e-governance 
for online requests, registration, and applications, or for delivery 
through identification cards or ATM banking. ICT improves access to 
information, transparency in government processes and procedures, and 
the accountability of public officials, while squelching opportunities for 
corruption. However, ICT often requires large investments up front and 
the provision of technical training to ensure enough technical literacy 
in the general population for broad consumer access with adequate 
protection from online scams. 
The three Es enjoy great synergies with ICT boosting the other two 
mechanisms: ICT supports empowerment and decentralization. It not 
only provides effective mechanisms for delivery, but also mitigates their 
unintended consequences by boosting access to information, as well as 
transparency and accountability. Empowerment and decentralization 
generate in turn greater demand for ICT. Therefore, when designing a 
package of the 3Es’ to improve public service delivery, ICT use should 
rank high. 
The three mechanisms will help improve public service delivery 
through better governance, thus creating a base for broader governance 
reform, which is critical to sustaining economic growth and reducing 
poverty. Good governance remains a cornerstone of sound development. 
Developing Asia has reached the point where reinforcing governance can 
no longer be delayed. Fortunately, Asia’s leaders recognize this and are 
stepping up efforts to build public confidence through policy reform and 
action. Anticorruption initiatives have flourished in response to public 
demand (Box 2.5.1). While progress is commendable, the road to good 
governance is long and strewn with obstacles. Overcoming them may be a 
challenge, but the payoff to development will be huge.
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2.5.1 Recent anticorruption initiatives in Asia and the Pacific
It is clear that the cost of corruption can be very high. The 
World Economic Forum estimates that corruption costs 
the equivalent of more than 5% of global gross domestic 
product (GDP), and International Monetary Fund research 
shows that investment in countries deemed corrupt is 5% 
less than in countries that are relatively free of corruption 
(OECD 2013). The World Bank estimates that $1 trillion 
is paid in bribes globally each year (World Bank 2013b). 
Corruption hampers not only investment and growth, but 
also poverty reduction and equitable income distribution. 
Studies show child and infant mortality rates 30%–50% 
higher in countries with prevalent corruption than in those 
with corruption under better control. Student drop-out 
rates are five times higher (Gupta et al. 2002).
More and more countries in Asia and the Pacific are 
responding by stepping up anticorruption efforts. Most 
have ratified the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption. In many countries, fighting corruption ranks 
high on the agenda of top political leaders. In the PRC, 
fighting corruption is a policy centerpiece of the new 
leadership. The current governments of Indonesia and 
the Philippines campaigned on strong anticorruption 
platforms. 
Boosting the integrity and transparency of the public 
sector, and of elected officials, has been a keystone of 
anticorruption initiatives in Asia in recent years (ADB and 
OECD 2006). Policies and reforms have been introduced 
to identify and discourage corruption committed by 
institutions or individuals, make decision-making and 
budgeting more transparent, limit official discretion, and 
strengthen safeguards. Several countries have introduced 
social accountability mechanisms that expose corruption, 
empower people to claim their rights, and facilitate 
engagement—mechanisms such as citizen report cards, 
community score cards, social audits, and grievance 
redress systems. Key to success is the use of modern 
information technology for e-governance, which squelches 
opportunities for rent-seeking in routine administrative 
procedures. Yet implementation and enforcement are huge 
challenges. 
Anticorruption legislation and its enforcement have 
improved. Some countries, such as Bangladesh and 
Indonesia, have embedded individual reform projects 
in long-term anticorruption strategies. Many countries 
have legislated enabling laws and taken steps to ensure 
compliance with international standards. Provisions have 
been added to other laws to punish any activities that 
smell of corruption. The PRC, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, and Taipei,China all have laws criminalizing 
bribery. Several countries, including Bhutan, Cambodia, 
India, Indonesia, Mongolia, and the Philippines, have 
recently strengthened their legal regimes for combating 
money laundering and the financing of terrorism.
Legal procedures addressing corruption have been 
strengthened, as have efforts to detect and investigate 
corruption. Many jurisdictions have established dedicated 
anticorruption agencies, including Bhutan; Hong Kong, 
China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Taipei,China; Thailand; 
and Timor-Leste. This year, Indonesia’s Corruption 
Eradication Commission received the prestigious Ramon 
Magsaysay Award. The PRC has established a 24-hour 
corruption hotline, and many countries—India, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea—recently 
introduced witness protection programs or whistleblower 
protection laws. 
The role of civil society in fighting corruption is 
increasingly recognized, and many governments have 
entered into partnerships with civil society organizations to 
run advocacy programs, information campaigns, and other 
dissemination activities. In some countries, governments 
have targeted youngsters, teaching them early on about the 
perils of corruption and what they can do about it. These 
are encouraging developments, but much remains to be 
done. Civil society’s involvement must be clearly defined 
and institutionalized. 
Engaging the private sector is critical to a successful 
fight against corruption. Private sector corruption comes 
in various forms, such as corporate fraud, account 
manipulation, bribery, and insider trading. Government 
efforts to prevent corruption in the private sector have 
so far received less attention than such efforts in the 
public sector in developing Asia and the Pacific. Where 
government initiatives have lagged, however, the private 
sector is taking up the slack to show its willingness to root 
out corruption. 
While progress is encouraging, developing Asia’s fight 
against corruption is only just setting out on what will be 
a long journey. Legal frameworks need to be tightened 
and gaps filled. Implementation and enforcement must 
be intensified. Coordination and cooperation among 
stakeholders—internally and externally—should be 
developed and enhanced. Public awareness and support 
for anticorruption efforts should be enhanced to bring 
the fight against corruption before the whole community. 
Knowledge, skills, and expertise should be sharpened so 
that those in charge will be able to perform their duties 
well. More than ever, the momentum to combat corruption 
must be sustained.
Sources: ADB and OECD 2006; ADB and OECD 2010; Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Tiongson 2002; OECD 2013; World Bank 2013b.
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Appendix Table: Relationship between governance and developmental outcomes, selected studies
Study Sample Interpretation Findings
Impact of governance on national income
Rauch and Evans 2000 Cross-section, 35 LDCs, 1970–1990 Correlation The quality of state bureaucracies 
is positively associated with 
GDP growth.
Barro 1996 Panel, 100 countries, 1960–1990 Correlation Democracy enhances growth where 
political freedom is limited but 
depresses growth where moderate 
freedom has been attained.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and 
Robinson 2001
Cross-section, 75 LDCs Causal interpretation Better institutions have a positive 
impact on economic development 
over the long term.
Zhuang, de Dios, and  
Lagman-Martin 2010
Cross-section, 36 in developing 
Asia, 1998–2008
Correlation and causal 
interpretation
Better governance initially—
measured by government 
effectiveness, the rule of law, and 
regulatory quality—spurs growth 
performance in subsequent periods.
Dincecco and Prado 2012 Cross-section, 96 countries Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Fiscal capacity is positively 
associated with GDP per worker.
Impact of governance on investment
Cavallo and Daude 2011 Panel, 116 LDCs, 1980–2006 Causal interpretation Stronger bureaucracies and 
rule of law correlate with public 
investment that does not crowd out 
the private sector excessively.
Keefer and Knack 2007 Cross-section, 114 countries Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Stronger property rights and less 
corruption correlate with more 
public investment.
Impact of governance on likelihood of economic crises
Du 2010 Cross-section and panel, 69 
countries, 1970–1999
Correlation Historical institutions predict 
the occurrence and intensity of 
currency and economic crises better 
than do institutions that change 
over time.
Acemoglu et al. 2003 Cross-section and panel, 64 LDCs, 
1970–1999
Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Exchange rates are less misaligned, 
inflation is lower, and budget 
deficits are smaller in systems 
where governments are held 
accountable.
Impact of governance on income distribution
Amendola, Easaw, and  
Savoia 2011
Cross-section and panel, 47 LDCs, 
1970–2004
Correlation Property rights are positively 
associated with inequality, but less 
so in more democratic countries.
Chong and Calderon 2000a Cross-section, 70 countries Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Institutional quality is positively 
associated with inequality in poor 
countries but negatively associated 
in rich countries.
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Endnotes
1  ADB’s allocation methodology for concessional resources—similar to the World Bank’s—is 
detailed in ADB (2008).
2  Bangladesh, Georgia, India, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, and the Philippines are 
the exceptions.
3  Discussion of improving service delivery and outcomes, disparities in access, issues of 
service quality, and concerns with governance draws in part on ADB. 2013. Empowerment 
and Public Service Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific. Manila.
4 Part of the discussion of the three Es is drawn from ADB. 2013. Empowerment and Public 
Service Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific. Manila.
Background papers
Aiyar, Y. and M. Walton. forthcoming. Accountability and Service Provision 
in India. Background paper for Empowerment and Public Service 
Delivery in Developing Asia and the Pacific Policy Report. Manila: Asian 
Development Bank.
Babajanian, B. Forthcoming. Citizen Empowerment in Service Delivery. ADB 
Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Bhatnagar, S. Forthcoming. Public Service Delivery: Role of ICTs in improving 
Governance and Development Impact. ADB Economics Working Paper 
Series. Manila: ADB.
Brosio, G. Forthcoming. Forthcoming. Decentralization and Public Service 
Delivery in Asia. ADB Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Capuno, J. Forthcoming. Forthcoming. Public-Private Service Delivery 
Arrangements and Incentive Schemes in Developing Asia. ADB 
Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Appendix Table: continuation
Study Sample Interpretation Findings
Impact of governance on poverty
Chong and Calderon 2000b Cross-section, 49 countries Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Better institutions, as measured by 
International Country Risk Guide 
scores, correlate with poverty 
reduction. 
Tebaldi and Mohan 2010 Cross-section, 107 countries Correlation and causal 
interpretation 
Better institutions as measured by 
World Governance Indicator scores 
correlate with poverty reduction.
Impact of governance on health and education
Dawson 2010 Panel, 93 countries, 1990–2005 Correlation Stronger rule of law correlates with 
decreasing child mortality, but fiscal 
capacity has no effect.
Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008 Panel, 91 countries, 1990–2003 Correlation Public spending is not associated 
with better health and education 
outcomes in countries where 
institutions are poor.
Impact of governance on happiness
Bjøernskov, Dreher, and 
Fischer 2010
Panel, 62 countries Correlation Better institutions as measured 
by World Governance Indicator 
scores correlate with improved self-
reported well-being.
Source: Guo Xu (forthcoming).
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Guo, X. Forthcoming. Development through Empowerment: Delivering Effective 
Public Services. ADB Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Han, X., H. Khan, and J. Zhuang. Forthcoming. Do Governance Indicators 
Explain Development Performance: A Cross-Country Analysis. ADB 
Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Lavado, R. and G. Domingo. Forthcoming. Publice Service Spending: Efficiency 
and Distributional Impact—Lessons from Asia. ADB Economics Working 
Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Pradhan, M. Forthcoming. Teacher Incentives or motivation? The effect of 
teacher management on student learning in Indonesia. ADB Economics 
Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Quibria, M. Forthcoming. Governance and Developing Asia, Concepts, 
Measurements, Determinants and Paradoxes. ADB Economics Working 
Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
Sen, K. Forthcoming. Governance and Development Outcomes in Asia. 
ADB Economics Working Paper Series. Manila: ADB.
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Subregional assessment and prospects
This Update reduces the growth projection for Central Asia in 2013 made in 
the Asian Development Outlook 2013 (ADO 2013) from 5.5% to 5.4%, as lower 
forecasts for Georgia and Kazakhstan slightly outweigh higher forecasts 
for Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. The growth projection 
for 2014 stays unchanged at 6.0% (Figure 3.1.1). The subregion’s inflation 
forecast for 2013 remains at 6.7%, as lower inflation in Georgia should offset 
higher inflation in Armenia. However, the inflation forecast for 2014 is now 
a notch higher at 6.8%, reflecting higher inflation in Armenia (Figure 3.1.2). 
The subregion’s current account surplus projection for 2013 has been 
lowered to 2.4% from 3.1%, reflecting narrower surpluses in Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan and wider deficits in Armenia and the Kyrgyz Republic that 
more than offset narrower deficits in Georgia and Tajikistan. The forecast 
surplus for 2014 remains at 4.5% of GDP, as smaller deficits in Georgia and 
Tajikistan should offset a larger deficit in Armenia (Figure 3.1.3). 
This Update lowers GDP growth projections for Georgia and 
Kazakhstan. For Kazakhstan, the 2013 growth forecast is reduced from 
5.2% to 4.8%, as growth slowed in the first half of 2013 and the short-
term outlook is less buoyant. Industry and agriculture are growing 
slowly, while construction is dragging. Slow oil production and weak 
demand for metals have also reduced growth. However, growth is still 
projected to recover in 2014 to 5.6%, boosted by public investment and 
the commissioning of the Kashagan oil field. In Georgia, growth in 
the first 7 months of 2013 slowed to an annual rate of 1.7%, reflecting 
a wait-and-see attitude among investors, along with continued fiscal 
consolidation, weak domestic demand, and slower global growth. 
3.1.1 GDP growth, Central Asia
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Accordingly, this Update lowers Georgia’s growth forecast for 2013 from 
5.5% to 3.0%. In light of the weaker 2013 forecast, the 2014 projection, 
which assumes higher growth in agriculture and food processing and 
more favorable investor sentiment, has been reduced to 5.5%.
Growth projections for Armenia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan 
remain unchanged. In Armenia, growth accelerated to a robust 7.5% 
in the first quarter of 2013, driven mainly by services, industry, and 
agriculture. However, growth forecasts remain at 4.5% for 2013 and 
4.6% for 2014, reflecting an expected slowdown in the euro area and the 
Russian Federation later this year and adverse repercussions from a steep 
hike in utility prices during July 2013. In Turkmenistan, rapid growth has 
continued in 2013, with GDP rising by slightly more than 9.0% year on 
year during the first 6 months, driven by public investment and rising 
hydrocarbon exports. This Update thus maintains the growth forecast at 
9.0% for 2013 and 8.0% for 2014. In Uzbekistan, GDP grew by 8.0% in the 
first half of 2013, driven mainly by higher output in industry and services. 
Noting strong performances in construction, services, communications, 
information technology, and agriculture, but also an expected weakening 
of external demand and slower growth in investment spending during the 
second half of the year, this Update maintains growth projections of 7.5% 
for 2013 and 8.0% for 2014.
Despite the subdued global environment, this Update raises growth 
projections for Azerbaijan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Tajikistan. In 
Azerbaijan, growth in the first half of 2013 exceeded earlier projections, 
as the economy excluding oil expanded at a particularly strong annual 
rate of 10.9%. Expectations of continued public investment spending 
and a small recovery in oil production prompt this Update to revise 
the 2013 growth forecast from 3.1% to 4.0% while maintaining the 2014 
growth forecast at 4.8%. In the Kyrgyz Republic, GDP grew at a robust 
7.9% in the first half of 2013, mainly because output recovered at the 
Kumtor goldmine. For 2013 as a whole, GDP is now expected to grow by 
7.5%, well above the 5.5% projected in ADO 2013, but the growth forecast 
for 2014 remains at 4.5%. For Tajikistan, the 2013 growth forecast has 
been raised from 6.5% in ADO 2013 to 7.0%, as higher-than-expected 
remittances will buoy retail trade, services, and construction. The 2014 
GDP growth forecast remains at 6.0%.
Historically, the Russian Federation has been a major provider to 
Central Asia of trade, investment, and workers’ remittances. Although the 
Russian economy continues to run at full capacity, boosting remittances 
to many Central Asian countries, investment and exports from the 
Russian Federation have slowed, partly because of weakness in the euro 
area. Growth in the Russian Federation is expected to recover during 
2014, in response to anticipated easing of its fiscal and monetary policy, 
supporting higher growth in Central Asia. 
During the first half of 2013, inflation in the Central Asian countries 
has generally proceeded as expected in ADO 2013, as food and commodity 
prices have been fairly stable. Thus, inflation forecasts remain unchanged 
for six of the eight countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
However, this Update halves Georgia’s 2013 inflation forecast from 
3.0% to 1.5%, as deflationary pressures have persisted in line with falling 
3.1.2 Inflation, Central Asia
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food and oil prices and the reining in of anticompetitive practices. 
Georgia’s inflation forecast for 2014 remains at 4.0%. 
In addition, the Update projects higher inflation in Armenia, 
revised from 3.6% to 5.0% in 2013 and from 3.2% to 4.5% in 2014. These 
revisions reflect the ongoing relaxation of price controls, the inflationary 
consequences of severe hailstorms in May 2013, and the pass-through of 
the July 2013 increase in utility prices to other goods, which will likely 
maintain inflationary pressures for some time. 
Current account surpluses are still expected for Central Asia’s 
energy-exporting countries: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. The projection of Azerbaijan’s surplus in 2013 is narrowed 
from 13.0% of GDP to 10.0%, because higher growth will likely mean 
more imports of food and other consumer goods even as oil exports have 
slowed. The surplus forecast for 2014 is maintained, however, at 17.0%. 
In Kazakhstan, the current account surplus during the first quarter of 
2013 was less than half that of a year earlier, as lower oil prices cut the 
value of exports while imports expanded rapidly. Accordingly, the current 
account surplus projected for 2013 is trimmed to 2.0% of GDP from the 
2.5% forecast in ADO 2013. However, the surplus is still expected to reach 
4.0% in 2014, as the Kashagan oil field is commissioned. 
Current account deficits are still expected in the subregion’s four 
energy-importing countries: Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and 
Tajikistan. Armenia’s deficit projection has been raised from 9.8% to 10.4% 
for 2013 and from 9.1% to 9.6% for 2014, following an upward revision in 
the 2012 deficit. In addition, the 2013 current account deficit projection 
for the Kyrgyz Republic is revised from 7.0% of GDP to 8.0% because 
of strong import growth coupled with declining exports and lower 
remittances caused by slower growth in external trade and labor markets.
This Update cuts projections of current account deficits in Georgia 
and Tajikistan for both 2013 and 2014. In Georgia, the current account 
deficit projection is now reduced to 10.1% from 11.9% for 2013, and from 
10.7% to 10.0% for 2014, in expectation of higher workers’ remittances, 
surpluses in services, and lower imports. In Tajikistan, lower projections 
of current account deficits in 2013 and 2014 anticipate slower import 
growth (partly reflecting a temporary slowdown in external loan 
disbursements) combined with continued strong remittances.
Country highlights
Armenia
Growth accelerated to 7.5% in the first quarter of 2013 from 5.4% in the 
same period in 2012 and to 7.2% for 2012 as a whole. The acceleration 
resulted mainly from growth in services at 9.2%, industry at 3.4%, and 
agriculture at 2.4%, which offset a decline in construction. On the 
demand side, private and public consumption and net exports were the 
main contributors, while investment shrank. Despite the strong first 
quarter performance, full-year growth forecasts remain unchanged 
from ADO 2013 at 4.5% for 2013 and 4.6% for 2014. Besides the expected 
slowdown in the euro area and the Russian Federation, steep price 
increases for electricity (27%) and imported gas (18%) in July 2013 will 
likely slow growth later in the year.
3.1.1  Selected economic indicators, 
Armenia (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  4.5   4.5  4.6  4.6
Inﬂation  3.6   5.0  3.2  4.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–9.8 –10.4 –9.1 –9.6
Source: ADB estimates. 
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These factors, coupled with severe hailstorms that struck several 
provinces in May 2013, helped drive inflation to 8.5% year on year in 
July 2013 and annualized inflation during January–July 2013 to 4.7%. 
Inflationary pressures will likely persist for the rest of the year and in the 
first half of 2014 as the July 2013 rise in utility prices is passed through. 
Inflation forecasts have thus been raised from 3.6% to 5.0% for 2013 and 
from 3.2% to 4.5% for 2014.
Revised data now show that the current account deficit widened to 
11.2% of GDP in 2012 from 10.9% a year earlier, as the trade deficit grew 
to 24.8% of GDP in 2012 from 23.6% in 2011. As only small improvements 
in the current account are projected, the current account deficit forecast 
has been raised to 10.4% of GDP in 2013 and to 9.6% in 2014, from 9.8% 
in 2013 and 9.1% in 2014 in ADO 2013. While higher-than-expected fuel 
prices could widen the deficit further, increased remittances and higher 
earnings from exports of goods and services are expected to offset the 
impact of any further rise in fuel prices. 
Azerbaijan
GDP grew by 5% in the first half of 2013, outperforming the ADO 2013 
forecast and well above the 1.5% recorded during the first half of 2012. 
Petroleum now provides less than half of GDP, and other sectors of 
the economy grew by 10.9%, mainly reflecting gains in services and 
construction, with the latter growing by 35.5% as investment surged. 
Moreover, agriculture expanded by 4.9%, and further growth is expected 
from the government’s funding of the state company Agroleasing and of 
a national program to support entrepreneurship. Oil production declined 
by 1.6% in the first half of 2013. Weighing continued public investment 
spending and an expected modest recovery in oil production, however, 
this Update raises the growth forecast for 2013 from 3.1% to 4.0% while 
maintaining the 2014 growth forecast at 4.8%. 
Annual inflation averaged only 2.0% during the first half of 2013, 
albeit with the inflation rate slowly rising over the period, reflecting a 
2.8% rise in food prices and further relaxation of monetary policy in 
February. However, robust credit growth and growing domestic demand, 
reflecting higher public spending (including a 10% salary increase for civil 
servants), are likely to exacerbate inflationary pressures. Thus, the Update 
maintains ADO 2013 inflation forecasts of 6.0% for 2013 and 7.0% for 2014.
The trade surplus weakened during the first half of 2013, as lower 
petroleum exports outweighed a rise in exports other than oil, and 
as higher domestic demand boosted imports by nearly 17% during 
January–May, particularly for food and other consumables. As these 
trends should continue for the rest of the year, the Update lowers the 
2013 current account surplus projection from 13.0% of GDP to 10.0% 
while maintaining the forecast of 17.0% for 2014.
Georgia
GDP growth slowed to 1.7% year on year in the first 7 months of 2013, 
reflecting investor caution linked to the political transition, delays in 
public infrastructure projects, weak domestic demand, and slower global 
growth. Recovery in agriculture and some resilience in communications, 
trade, and financial services helped offset a 9% drop in construction. 
3.1.2  Selected economic indicators, 
Azerbaijan (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  3.1  4.0  4.8  4.8
Inﬂation  6.0  6.0  7.0  7.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
13.0 10.0 17.0 17.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
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Because of these developments, the Update lowers the growth forecast 
for 2013 from 5.5% in ADO 2013 to 3.0%. In addition, the growth forecast 
for 2014—which assumes accelerated growth in agriculture and food 
processing, continued strength in services, and improved investor 
sentiment—has been cut to 5.5% from 6.0%. 
Annual inflation was only 0.2% in June 2013, mainly reflecting higher 
prices for food and utilities. This followed a period of deflation during 
the first 5 months of the year attributable to subdued aggregate demand 
and low inflation in Georgia’s main trading partners. The government’s 
efforts to strengthen competitiveness and enhance governance by curbing 
anticompetitive practices have also tempered price increases. Accordingly, 
the Update lowers the inflation forecast for 2013 from 3.0% in ADO 2013 to 
1.5%, while maintaining it at 4.0% for 2014. 
Early evidence suggests that the current account deficit may 
narrow in 2013 on account of higher workers’ remittances, a surplus in 
services, and a stronger trade balance due in part to slower growth and 
correspondingly lower imports. In the first half of 2013, exports rose by 
8.6% year on year, following the reopening of trade with the Russian 
Federation, while imports fell by 6.6%. Accordingly, the Update reduces 
the current account deficit forecast from 11.9% of GDP to a still high 
10.1% for 2013 and from 10.7% to 10.0% for 2014, contingent on a favorable 
outlook for Georgia’s major trading partners. Strong capital inflows 
pushed official reserves up to $3.0 billion during the first half of 2013. 
Total external debt remains worrisome, however, at 63% of GDP.
Kazakhstan
Growth slowed in the first half of 2013 to 5.1% from 5.6% in the same 
period of 2012, partly because of slower growth in the euro area, Russian 
Federation, and People’s Republic of China. Industrial production rose 
by only 1.8%. Construction is dragging, despite continuous state support. 
In addition, low export demand prompted several metallurgical enterprises 
to reduce output or close for renovation. However, agriculture’s expansion 
by 1.1% compared favorably with a 6.0% decline in the first half of 2012, 
oil production rose by 1.8%, and services expanded as quickly as in the 
first half of 2012, driven by trade and communications. During the second 
half of the year, agriculture may suffer from unfavorable weather and 
a locust invasion in the north. In view of these developments, the 2013 
growth forecast has been cut to 4.8% from 5.2%. Growth is still expected to 
recover to 5.6% in 2014, reflecting higher fixed capital investment and the 
commissioning of the Kashagan oil field. 
Inflation forecasts remain unchanged from ADO 2013, with prices 
expected to rise by 6.7% in 2013 and 6.5% in 2014. During January–June 
2013, inflation accelerated to 6.5% from 5.0% in the same period of 2012. 
Food prices rose by 4.8% (versus 4.5% in 2012) and service fees by 12.0% 
(5.6% in 2012), including higher tariffs for communications, transportation, 
utilities, and education, though inflation for nonfood goods slowed to 3.3% 
from 5.0%. An 8.0% rise in wholesale prices, including a 24.4% jump for 
agricultural goods, should worsen food inflation in the coming months, 
despite the slow 1.0% growth in real wages.
During the first quarter of 2013, the current account surplus was 
only 30% of that during the same period in 2012, as exports fell by 11.4%, 
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reflecting lower prices for oil and reduced grain and metal exports, 
and as imports rose by 7.2%. Accordingly, the Update revises down the 
projection for the 2013 current account surplus to 2.0% of GDP from the 
2.5% forecast earlier. However, the surplus is still expected to reach 4.0% 
in 2014, on the assumption that the Kashagan oil field is commissioned by 
early 2014.
Kyrgyz Republic
During the first 6 months of 2013, GDP grew by 7.9%, as a rebound in 
output at the Kumtor goldmine boosted industrial output by 18.4%. 
Agriculture grew by 1.9%, and trade by 8.2%, while construction soared 
by 15.0%, reflecting a substantial rise in new capital projects and extensive 
repairs to existing structures. In view of these developments, and because 
the ongoing dispute at the Kumtor mine is no longer expected to affect 
output in 2013, the Update raises the growth forecast for 2013 to 7.5% from 
the 5.5% projected in ADO 2013, leaving the forecast for 2014 at 4.5%. 
Inflation during January–June 2013 reached 7.8%, driven mainly 
by price increases of 6.7% for food, 7.9% for other goods, and 8.5% for 
services. However, the anticipation of good grain harvests in Kazakhstan 
and the Russian Federation has since stabilized food prices. Inflation is 
expected to moderate slightly during the second half of the year, easing 
to 7.5% by year-end and thus matching the ADO 2013 forecast. The 
forecast remains for inflation to fall further to 5.5% in 2014 in line with an 
expected slowing of economic growth. 
The trade deficit widened during January–May 2013, reflecting 13.0% 
growth in imports and 7.9% decline in exports. Remittance inflows 
decreased, as did exports of textiles and textile products, reflecting 
weaker external demand and slower growth in major trading partners. 
At the same time, petroleum imports increased. Nonetheless, the current 
account balance is forecast to improve by year-end, with export growth 
narrowing the deficit to 8.0% of GDP in 2013, slightly above the 7.0% 
projected in ADO 2013. The current account deficit is still projected at 
5.0% of GDP for 2014. 
Tajikistan
Tajikistan’s growth in the first half of 2013 remained robust at 7.5%. 
Fueled by remittances, retail trade and services continued to be the 
main drivers of growth, rising by 13.2% and 8.4% respectively. Industry 
expanded by 6.6%, reflecting more than 80% growth in mining and 
extractive industries and 16% expansion in chemicals. However, a 2.8% 
decline in aluminum output, caused by shortages of natural gas, and a 
0.8% reduction in industrial processing constrained industrial output. 
Agriculture grew by 12.1% and is expected to continue to grow strongly 
for the rest of the year. 
Noting the economy’s strong performance in the first 6 months, 
as well as the expectation that higher remittances and a continuing 
accommodative monetary policy will support growth in trade and 
services alongside moderate industrial growth, the Update raises the 2013 
growth forecast to 7.0% from 6.5% in ADO 2013. However, aluminum 
and cotton production are likely to shrink further in response to lower 
international prices. The 2014 GDP growth forecast remains at 6.0%.
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Average inflation rose slightly to 6.2% in the first half of 2013, higher 
than in the same period of 2012. However, a stable exchange rate has 
helped to moderate inflationary expectations, and the authorities remain 
committed to prudent fiscal and monetary policies, so the inflation 
rate forecast remains at 6.5% in 2013 and 7.0% in 2014, as projected in 
ADO 2013.
Exports shrank at an annual rate of 8.6% during the first half of 2013, 
dragged down mainly by lower aluminum and cotton earnings, while 
higher remittances helped boost imports by 8.7%. Import growth slower 
than previously expected (partly reflecting a temporary slowdown in loan 
disbursements for the public investment program) and continued healthy 
remittance inflows will help to ease the current account deficit during the 
second half of the year. Accordingly, the current account deficit is now 
expected to narrow to 4.5% in 2013 and further to 4.0% in 2014, down 
from ADO 2013 projections of 5.0% and 4.8%, respectively.
Turkmenistan
Rapid growth driven by public investment and rising hydrocarbon 
exports continued during the first half of 2013, with GDP rising at 
an annual rate of slightly more than 9.0%, according to government 
reports. All sectors recorded growth, with construction surging by 
17.7% and services by 11.3%, while agriculture grew by 7.0% and industry 
by 6.6%. Growth in industry reflects the completion of the first stage 
of the Galkynysh gas field, which is expected to boost gas production 
by 19% relative to 2012. In view of the generally favorable economic 
environment, the Update maintains growth forecasts of 9.0% for 2013 
and 8.0% for 2014. 
The Update maintains inflation forecasts at 6.0% for 2013 and 6.5% for 
2014. Inflation will reflect the country’s expansionary fiscal stance and 
rising consumption, both public and private, fueled in particular by rising 
public sector wages, which rose by 11% in the first half of 2013; a further 
10% increase in teachers’ salaries slated for September 2013; and some 
liberalization of administered prices. Inflation is expected to rise further 
in 2014 with the government decree mandating a 10% rise of salaries, 
pensions, stipends, and other benefits starting in January 2014, coupled 
with the rapid pace of public investments.
The giant Galkynysh gas field will come onstream in the second 
half of 2013 and is expected to raise gas exports by the equivalent of 
2.6%–3.0% of GDP in 2013. Despite this, the current account surplus 
forecast is maintained at 2.0% of GDP in 2013 and 3.0% in 2014 because 
Turkmenistan will continue its extensive imports of services for 
construction and hydrocarbon extraction, and of industrial machinery 
and high-tech equipment.
Uzbekistan
GDP grew by 8.0% in the first half of 2013, in line with 8.1% in the same 
period of 2012. Growth resulted mainly from the output gain of 8.2% in 
industry and 11.0% in services. Industry, especially the energy sector, 
benefitted from government-led investment spending, nearly a third 
of which went to industry, mainly for energy. Construction rose by 
16.1%, led by housing, ongoing industrial modernization, and the start 
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of the government’s electrified railway project. Continued lending by 
commercial banks and the lagged impact of remittances buoyed finance 
and other services, notably trade and catering. Communications and 
information technology recorded 22% growth on the back of strong 
demand. Favorable weather during the first half of 2013 supported large 
increases in grain, fruit, and vegetable harvests, spurring agricultural 
growth. Weighing these developments against an expected weakening in 
external demand and slower growth in investment spending during the 
second half of the year, the Update maintains earlier projected growth 
rates of 7.5% in 2013 and 8.0% in 2014.
The government reported that inflation during the first half of 2013 
averaged 7.4% on an annualized basis. Slower growth in net foreign assets 
offset inflationary pressures from wage and pension increases and from 
higher import costs thought to be attributable to additional import 
restrictions introduced early this year. Nevertheless, trends in supply 
and demand remain in line with the scenarios described in ADO 2013, 
so the Update maintains the inflation forecasts of 9.5% for 2013 and 9.0% 
for 2014.
The government reported that external trade in goods and services in 
the first 6 months of 2013 recorded a surplus of $400 million, 64% below 
the corresponding period of 2012. Although total exports rose, exports of 
traditional earners of hard currency—cotton, metals, and machinery—
were down from the first half of 2012. Meanwhile, imports increased by 
8.1%, led by capital goods and chemical products. ADO 2013 anticipated 
that falling external demand and international prices for the country’s 
main export commodities would narrow the trade surplus. This Update 
thus maintains its current account surplus forecasts of 4.3% for 2013 and 
3.2% for 2014.
East Asia
Subregional assessment and prospects 
Economic developments in the first half of 2013 varied across East Asia. 
Growth decelerated in Mongolia, the PRC, and Taipei,China as domestic 
and external demand weakened, but accelerated slightly in the Republic of 
Korea and Hong Kong, China. Mongolia endured sharp drops in coal 
exports and commodity prices in the first quarter but received a boost 
from increased public expenditure in the second. Taipei,China was 
resilient despite the weak external environment, but growth was still 
lower than in the previous 6 months. Despite fragile external economic 
conditions, strong domestic demand propelled Hong Kong, China to 
higher growth, while consumption was the main driver of growth in the 
Republic of Korea.
The PRC economy slowed in the first half of 2013 as industrial 
and agricultural output declined owing to weakening demand and 
unfavorable weather. Investment surpassed consumption as a domestic 
contributor to growth, but both grew more slowly than a year earlier. 
Waning global demand, friction with trade partners, and rising export 
prices took their toll on the growth rates of exports and imports. 
However, slower growth in the PRC is also the price of structural 
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reform for the long term. The authorities in the PRC seek to engineer a 
strategic shift away from growth led by exports and investment toward 
more balanced growth. The shift is most evident in the government’s 
recent efforts to wrestle down credit bubbles and come to grips with a 
burgeoning shadow banking system. From this perspective, moderated 
growth in the PRC over the medium term signals a healthy and welcome 
transition to a more sustainable growth path.
East Asia is expected to maintain stable growth and inflation rates 
and shrink current account surpluses in 2013 and 2014. GDP growth 
is projected to remain at 6.6% in both years, almost unchanged from 
2012 but substantially below the ADO 2013 forecast of 7.1% (Figure 3.1.4). 
Despite downward revisions to growth projections, East Asia still 
outpaces other Asian subregions as high PRC growth dominates 
the subregional average. As in the past year, growth rates will vary 
substantially across East Asia. 
Inflation was subdued in the first half of 2013 throughout East Asia 
except Mongolia, East Asia’s resource-driven outlier, which saw double-
digit inflation return. Year-on-year inflation ranged from 1.3% in 
Taipei,China to 3.9% in Hong Kong, China. In the PRC, strong demand 
for food pushed up the August consumer price index by 2.6% year on 
year, but core inflation (excluding food and energy) edged down to 1.5% 
on account of weak domestic demand, falling commodity prices, and an 
appreciating currency. 
The subregion’s average inflation rate is projected to moderate 
further to 2.4% in 2013 (Figure 3.1.5). The lower projection mainly reflects 
smaller price hikes in the PRC and a drop in Mongolia’s inflation to 9.5% 
from 14.3% in 2012. Inflation is expected to pick up slightly to 2.7% in 
2014, as rising domestic demand exerts inflationary pressure throughout 
the subregion. 
The subregional balance of payments in 2013 and 2014 is projected 
to weaken from a current account surplus equal to 3.0% of subregional 
GDP in 2012 to 2.7% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014 (Figure 3.1.6). Unbundling 
the subregional average finds PRC and Republic of Korea current 
account surpluses shrinking in relation to GDP, as terms improve in 
Mongolia and Hong Kong, China and remain essentially unchanged in 
Taipei,China. 
Balance of payments forecasts for the PRC and Mongolia are 
especially noteworthy, the former for subregional heft and the latter for 
fragility. The PRC’s current account surplus is projected to decline slightly 
to 2.2% of GDP in 2013 and 2.1% in 2014, as external demand remains 
weak and a stronger renminbi tamps down export growth, and despite 
weaker domestic demand weighing on imports. Mongolia continues to 
be the only economy in East Asia with a current account deficit, which 
will remain sizeable while trending down relative to GDP before the 
beginning of major extraction from its new mining investment. The 
deficit in the first half of 2013 combined with a sharp drop in capital 
inflows sharply drained Mongolia’s foreign currency reserves and 
weakened its currency, illustrating vulnerability to external shocks.
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Country highlights
People’s Republic of China
Economic growth slowed in the first half of 2013 to 7.6% year on year. 
Services expanded briskly, but the industrial rebound of late 2012 could 
not be sustained and agricultural growth declined. On the demand side, 
investment surpassed consumption as a domestic contributor to growth, 
but both grew more slowly than a year earlier.
Weakening global demand, friction with trade partners, and rising 
export prices sharply slowed growth in exports and imports in the 
first half of 2013. However, with exports growing during this period by 
10.3% year on year against growth at 6.7% for imports, the trade surplus 
widened, driving up the current account surplus by 23.9% to $95.8 billion 
(or 2.4% of 2012 GDP), despite a widening deficit in the services and 
income accounts. Foreign direct investment rose by 4.9% in the first half 
of 2013, reversing a 3.0% drop a year earlier. 
Strong demand for food pushed up the consumer price index by 
2.6% year on year in August 2013, but core inflation (excluding food and 
energy) eased to 1.5% as domestic demand weakened and commodity 
prices fell. The renminbi had appreciated by 1.9% in nominal terms 
against the US dollar in the first 8 months and by 6.8% in real effective 
terms as of July.
Money supply growth accelerated to 16.1% year on year by April 2013, 
exceeding the central bank’s 13.0% target, owing to the growth of less-
regulated financial transactions. Money supply growth eased to 14.7% 
by the end of August after financial sector regulation was tightened 
and liquidity injections into the interbank market curtailed. However, 
interbank rates rose sharply from mid-May to mid-June, prompting 
targeted liquidity injections to lower them, albeit not down to their levels 
before the turbulence. 
The consolidated fiscal surplus remained substantial at 3.6% of GDP 
in the first half of 2013 but down from 4.3% a year earlier. As economic 
activity decelerated, central government revenue rose by only 1.5%, far 
less than the 8.1% rise in expenditure. In contrast, local governments saw 
revenues rise by 13.5% and outpace 11.3% expenditure growth. To improve 
fiscal revenue and ease local government finances, value-added taxes 
are replacing taxes on turnover, the property tax pilot will likely extend 
to other jurisdictions, and more local governments were authorized to 
issue bonds.
Moderating growth and lower current account surpluses are expected 
in 2013 and 2014. The growth forecast is revised down to 7.6% in 2013 and 
7.4% in 2014 as structural reforms will take time to gain traction. Tighter 
regulation of local governments’ borrowing and some shadow banking 
activities will likely affect investment. Consumption is projected to 
continue growing at the current rate. External demand will remain weak 
as a stronger renminbi may discourage exports. Despite weaker domestic 
demand weighing on imports, the current account surplus is projected to 
narrow to 2.2% in 2013 and 2.1% in 2014.
The inflation forecast is revised down to 2.5% for 2013 and to 2.7% 
for 2014, in line with current trends and unexpectedly weak domestic 
demand. Renminbi appreciation will likely slow, with periods of 
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depreciation, as the currency is believed to be near equilibrium and 
foreign trade and capital flows are both increasingly volatile. 
Domestic risks to the projections stem mainly from monetary 
and financial developments, including rising local government debt. 
Warning signs would be continued strong growth in shadow banking, 
sharply falling property prices, or local governments further in arrears. 
External risks stem from the US Federal Reserve tapering quantitative 
easing, which could dry up capital inflows, heighten risk aversion, and 
undermine business confidence. 
Hong Kong, China
Economic expansion accelerated in the first half of 2013, reaching 3.1% 
year on year on strong domestic demand and despite fragile external 
conditions that softened exports to traditional trading partners. Private 
consumption grew robustly at 5.2% year on year in the first half of 2013, 
propelled by rising real incomes as continued tightness in the labor 
market pushed up wages. Investment expenditure recovered from 3.3% 
contraction in the first quarter to 6.9% growth in the second, largely on 
private sector purchases of machinery and other equipment. 
Although domestic demand will continue to propel growth, still 
subdued exports will likely moderate it for the rest of the year. The 2013 
growth forecast is revised down to 3.2%, while the forecast for 2014 
remains unchanged at 3.8%.
In the first half of 2013, inflation averaged 3.9% year on year, which 
was a substantial drop from 4.7% a year earlier thanks in part to stable 
international oil and food prices. Inflation in 2013 is now expected at 4.1%, 
a bit higher than earlier forecast, as residential rents rise. The ADO 2013 
forecast of 4.3% inflation in 2014 is revised to 4.0% with envisaged decline 
in global food and energy prices.
The trade account recorded a $21.5 billion deficit in the first half 
of 2013 as imports grew by 10.8%. Goods exports expanded by 8.6% as 
markets in Asia, the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Latin America 
took up slack left by the major industrialized economies. Net services 
receipts recorded a surplus of $17.1 billion, buoyed by tourism and 
financial services. The current account recorded a deficit of about 0.4% of 
GDP in the first half of 2013, wider than the deficit of 0.2% a year earlier. 
The deficit in the first half, and a downward revision of the PRC growth 
forecast, prompt narrower current account surplus forecasts at 1.6% for 
2013 and 3.5% for 2014.
Republic of Korea
The economy performed well above forecasts of 0.8%–0.9% growth in the 
second quarter of 2013, as robust domestic demand offset weak exports. 
GDP expanded by 1.1% in the quarter, up from 0.8% in the first quarter, 
notably recording the first quarterly growth rate above 1.0% since the first 
quarter of 2011. Year-on-year GDP growth was 2.3% in the second quarter, 
up from 1.5% in the first. 
This surprisingly good outcome was driven by stronger growth of 
both public and private consumption, which outweighed investment 
contracting by 0.1% in the second quarter from 2.1% growth in the first. 
Private consumption grew by 0.7% in the second quarter, spurred by 
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strong demand for services and durables following a 0.4% decline in 
the first quarter. Recovering consumer appetite for durables may herald 
consumer confidence on the mend. Construction investment held up 
well, despite growth decelerating from 4.1% in the first quarter to 3.4%, 
as healthy domestic demand offset weak external demand. Export 
growth remained feeble and slipped from 3.0% in the first quarter to 
1.8% as a soft world economy, still weighed down by the euro crisis, 
combined with a slowdown in the PRC, the Republic of Korea’s largest 
export market. The sharp depreciation of the Japanese yen further 
dented export growth by eroding the price competitiveness of Korean 
manufactured exports. 
Monetary and fiscal stimulus contributed to robust domestic 
demand. The central bank unexpectedly lowered the benchmark interest 
rate from 2.75% to 2.50% in May, the first cut in 7 months. Confirming 
its more optimistic assessment of the economic outlook, the central 
bank has since held the rate steady. Concerns about growth prompted 
the government to unleash a W17.3 trillion supplementary budget in 
mid-April, boosting government consumption by 2.4% in the second 
quarter from 1.2% growth in the first. Measures to support the housing 
market such as tax breaks and eased borrowing restrictions spurred 
construction. 
The impact of fiscal and monetary stimulus will likely taper off in the 
second half of 2013, and it remains to be seen whether domestic demand 
can maintain momentum without stimulus. However, external demand 
is likely to strengthen and take up any slack in domestic demand. Such 
strengthening is expected in tandem with improvement in the global 
outlook and trade, fueled by economic revival in the advanced economies, 
especially the US, which should outweigh the drag on exports caused by 
the slowdown in the PRC and the cheap yen.
In sum, the GDP growth projection is maintained at 2.8% for 2013 
but revised down to 3.5% for 2014. The structure of growth is not mainly 
from external demand, as envisaged in April, but the outcome is the same 
because appropriate policy stimulus cushioned disappointing external 
demand. Global commodity prices are likely to continue to be soft, 
dampening the effect of fiscal stimulus on prices. The inflation forecast 
is now more benign than in April, at 2.0% in 2013 and 2.6% in 2014. 
The forecast for the current account surplus is unchanged, projected at 
3.0% in 2013 and 2.5% in 2014. 
Mongolia
The economy grew in the first half of 2013 by 11.3% year on year, down 
from a revised 12.4% in 2012, because of a slowdown in the PRC and falling 
commodity prices. Agriculture was a main driver of growth, increasing 
by 20.6%, while mining output fell by 18.5%. Growth slowed in the first 
quarter but recovered in the second, largely on higher public expenditure, 
including substantial outlays by the Development Bank of Mongolia. 
Exports fell by 7.3% and imports by 10.2%. Exports of copper 
concentrate held up, but those of coal plunged by 48.6% as demand in the 
PRC waned. The current account deficit (32.6% of GDP in 2012) increased 
by 21.9% to $1.8 billion. With the narrowing of the surplus in the capital 
account, the balance of payments recorded a deficit. 
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Foreign currency reserves fell by $1.4 billion to $2.7 billion (30% of 
2012 GDP) as foreign direct investment plunged by 41.9% because of 
uncertainties arising from changes to legislation governing it, slower 
growth in the PRC, and the completion of the first phase of the Oyu 
Tolgoi copper and gold mine. Reflecting these developments, the local 
currency slid by 8% against the US dollar from early July to mid-August 
and by 11% since the beginning of the year.
Government revenue increased by 11% during the first 7 months 
year on year but by less than the budgeted amount, mainly because 
lower mining prices and output reduced royalty and tax receipts. 
Revenue shortages and implementation challenges tamped down public 
investment, reducing government expenditure by 5%. The budget deficit 
was thus smaller than planned and, at $72 million, a fraction of the 
$366 million shortfall in 2012, but it excludes off-budget expenditure 
of $640 million (7.2% of 2012 GDP) financed by the Development Bank 
of Mongolia. 
Falling food prices slowed consumer inflation to 10.2% year on 
year in the first 7 months of 2013 from 14.1% a year earlier. These 
prices were influenced by the phaseout of a cash grant program and 
falling government expenditure, and, at least temporarily, by the price 
stabilization program. The inflation projection is revised down to 9.5% for 
2013 but maintained at 10.0% for 2014.
Savings Bank became in July 2013 the first commercial bank in 
Mongolia nationalized since 2009, when the government established State 
Bank to take over two commercial banks declared bankrupt that year. 
Holding 8% of banking assets in the country, Savings Bank was declared 
insolvent after affiliated companies defaulted on loans.
Modest recovery in the global economy and the start of commercial 
mining at Oyu Tolgoi in July 2013, may accelerate economic growth in 
the coming months, but growth is now forecast to slow to 12% in 2013 
and 13% in 2014. The short- to medium-term prospects for the Mongolian 
economy are subject to trends in the PRC and the global economy, and 
expansive fiscal policies historically make it vulnerable to external shocks. 
Taipei,China
After a weak first quarter, the economy expanded by 2.5% year on year 
in the second quarter, bringing GDP growth in the first half of 2013 to 
2.1%. The rise reflects modestly improved domestic demand but mainly 
surprisingly strong growth in exports of goods and services, despite an 
external environment that is still weak and the renewed slowdown in the 
PRC. Growth was broad, with all major sectors increasing output. 
Exports of goods and services, which account for nearly 75% of the 
GDP, rebounded by 5.1% during the first half, compared with a 2.9% drop 
in the same period of 2012. They added 3.7 percentage points to growth. 
The boost came mostly from robust exports of industrial products 
including capital goods, which returned to positive territory in the first 
7 months after registering a huge drop a year earlier. Exports to the PRC 
grew by 3.0%, reversing the 8.9% slump in 2012, as those to the US almost 
held their own after tumbling by 12.5% last year. Meanwhile, imports 
expanded by 4.9%, which lifted net exports by 5.8% year on year, adding 
1.1 percentage points to GDP growth. 
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Domestic demand contributed 1.0 percentage point to growth in the 
first half. Private consumption grew by 1.0% year on year, aided mainly 
by low unemployment and healthy increases in average earnings across 
sectors. Modestly rising consumer confidence in the first 6 months, 
though still below the average trend in 2012, also fueled private spending. 
Investments added 0.4 percentage points to GDP growth, contrasting 
with the 2.0 percentage point deduction observed in 2012, as the 3.4% 
contraction in government investment was more than outweighed by the 
6.9% pickup in private sector investment (compared with a 7.4% slump 
in 2012). These outcomes were buttressed by low interest rates as the 
central bank held its policy rate at 1.875%. 
Growth prospects for the rest of the year and into 2014 will depend 
largely on developments in the PRC and the advanced economies. Growth 
momentum may be tempered during the second half of 2013 if the PRC 
slowdown and weakening external demand persist. Some indicators have 
already started to improve, pointing to a better outlook in the second half. 
However, the composite leading index, which forecasts the economy’s 
performance in the next 3 months, rose by only 0.03% in July from a month 
earlier, reflecting renewed sluggishness in the near term. The government 
is moving to revive the economy, including with a stimulus program 
launched in May 2013, but the effect will likely be limited. Therefore, the 
GDP growth forecast is revised down to 2.3% for 2013 and to 3.3% for 2014.
The current account surplus is expected to remain substantial in 2013 
and persist into 2014 but below the April forecast. These projections 
reflect the trend in the balance of payments in the first half of 2013, as 
rising trade and service account surpluses drove the current account 
surplus higher to $24.9 billion, 13.2% higher than in 2012 and currently 
equaling 10.6% of GDP. 
The inflation forecast for 2013 is revised down to 0.9% because average 
inflation slowed in the first 8 months to 0.9% from 1.8% in the same period 
of 2012, as prices for food, clothing, and communications fell. The inflation 
forecast for 2014 is also revised down to 1.4%.
South Asia 
Subregional assessment and prospects
Growth in South Asia for 2013 is revised down by a full percentage 
point to 4.7% from ADO 2013 to take into account the intensification of 
macroeconomic challenges facing India over recent months. The South 
Asian regional economy is likely to regain some momentum in 2014 
to grow at 5.5%, an improvement over 2013 but still short of the 6.2% 
expansion set in ADO 2013 (Figure 3.1.7). 
The earlier forecasts assumed an improved global economic outlook 
and concrete steps in India to tackle structural rigidities, consolidate 
government finances, and reform distorting economic policies. However, 
structural reform has lacked impetus. Continuing fiscal and current 
account imbalances left India vulnerable to capital withdrawals and 
currency depreciation. These development have stemmed from the 
mid-year turmoil in global capital markets that was set off by investor 
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fears that the US Federal Reserve was about to begin tapering of its bond 
buying program and push interest rates higher. 
The Reserve Bank of India and the Government of India have 
undertaken multiple measures since July to boost capital inflows and 
investor confidence. However, tightened monetary policy, which has 
been implemented to support the rupee and suppress inflation, has also 
affected the growth prospects of the South Asian giant. Supply-side 
bottlenecks, continued slowdown in fixed capital formation, weakness in 
industry, and slow progress in pushing through structural reforms will 
further continue to constrain growth. Consequently, this Update revises 
the forecast for growth in India down to 4.7% in 2013 and 5.7% in 2014. 
The growth forecasts for other South Asian countries are little 
changed. Forecasts for Afghanistan and Nepal are modestly upgraded 
for both years. Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka appear 
to be broadly on track to meet ADO 2013 forecasts. The newly elected 
Government of Pakistan signaled ambitious economic reforms to address 
persistently slow growth, extensive power outages, declining investment, 
excessive budget deficits, and draining foreign exchange reserves. It 
began implementing a wide-ranging economic program supported by 
the International Monetary Fund to restore stability and enhance future 
growth prospects. A pickup in the economy will come, however, after this 
Update’s 2014 horizon, as imbalances are corrected and structural reforms 
take hold. 
Several factors mitigating price pressures in South Asia—low global 
commodity prices, a favorable monsoon, strengthened monetary policies, 
and slow growth in India—leave the inflation outlook generally benign. 
While recent downward pressure on South Asian currencies threaten 
to import inflation, monetary policies have become better focused on 
stabilizing prices as countries have coped with price pressures caused by 
the rolling back of fuel and electricity subsidies. This Update forecasts 
inflation in South Asia at 6.7% in FY2013, less than the 7.4% forecast 
earlier (Figure 3.1.8). The decline reflects mostly the downward revision 
for India to 6.5%, but inflation forecasts for 2013 are trimmed for all South 
Asian countries except Afghanistan. The forecast for inflation in 2014 is, 
at 7.0%, only slightly below the 7.1% April projection. 
South Asia’s current account deficit forecast for 2013 is revised 
down to 3.2% of GDP from 3.7% earlier (Figure 3.1.9), almost entirely 
reflecting a lower deficit expected in India. The forecast for Nepal is 
revised to show a comfortable surplus expected from higher remittances 
and earnings from tourism. Afghanistan’s current account surplus 
forecast, excluding official grants, is revised up to account for more 
grant assistance being channeled through the national budget rather 
than administered directly by development partners. Forecasts for other 
countries are little changed. The deficit projection for 2014 is slightly 
narrower as India trims its deficit further.
Country highlights
Afghanistan
The GDP growth forecast for FY2013 (ends 21 December 2014) is revised 
up to 3.7% because rains have been highly favorable for a second year, 
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keeping agricultural production at last year’s high instead of falling back 
to trend, as assumed previously. This positive development will be partly 
offset by industry and services somewhat weaker than expected in April. 
The cause appears to be business and consumer uncertainty in view of 
insurgents’ stepped up attacks in connection with the 2014 full transfer 
of security responsibility to local forces. Private consumption is still the 
main source of demand but trending down.
Headline inflation reached 7.6% in June year on year, followed by a 
sharp rise to 9.1% in July mainly because of large price increases for foods, 
especially vegetables, though clothing, housing, and health costs also 
increased. The Afghani depreciated by about 8.8% to AF56.4 per US dollar 
in the first 8 months of FY2013. International reserves declined slightly in 
the first 5 months to $6.0 billion.
The government missed its revenue targets in the first and second 
quarters of FY2013, largely because customs revenues continue to fall 
short. As development partners increasingly channel grants and project 
assistance through the national budget rather than administer them on 
their own account, the current account balance, excluding security and 
partner-administered grants, is now projected at 3.4% of GDP in FY2013 
(more than double the ADO 2013 projection), sliding to 2.8% in FY2014. 
The Update revises growth projections up to 3.7% in FY2013 
to accommodate healthy agriculture and to 5.3% in FY2014 on the 
assumption that domestic demand will gather momentum as current 
political and security uncertainties are resolved. This could come about 
after the country’s presidential elections scheduled for April 2014 and the 
finalization, likely by the end of 2013, of an agreement on the status of 
forces under limited US military assistance after 2014. Inflation forecasts 
remain as in ADO 2013 at 6.1% in FY2013 and 5.8% in FY2014. The current 
account balance is now estimated higher at 3.4% of GDP in FY2013 and 
2.8% in FY2014, as budget grants rise.
Bangladesh
GDP in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) grew by 6.0%, higher than projected 
in ADO 2013. Export growth accelerated briskly, but imports were flat, 
such that net exports markedly contributed to growth. Agriculture growth 
slowed to 2.2% because weather was unfavorable and rice prices fell. 
Industry grew by 9.0%, with strong expansion in construction and small-
scale manufacturing. Services growth slowed slightly to 5.7%, reflecting 
stagnant imports and politically inspired strikes that disrupted trade.
Year-on-year inflation edged up from 7.2% in October 2012 to 8.0% in 
June 2013, as national strikes disrupted food supply and drove up prices, 
and as administered power and fuel prices were increased. Inflation 
slowed to 7.7% in FY2013 from 10.6% a year earlier. 
Imports rose by only 0.8% in FY2013. Exports grew by 10.7%, 
accelerating from 6.2% growth in FY2012, on higher garment exports. 
The balance of payments showed a large surplus of $5.1 billion in FY2013, 
boosting gross international reserves to $15.1 billion. Following the tragic 
garment factory collapse in April 2013, comprehensive protocols were 
signed to foster worker safety and welfare.
Money supply growth was below the central bank’s program target, 
even as banks’ net foreign assets rose sharply. The reason was growth 
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in credit to the private sector languishing far below target as political 
uncertainty deterred investment. The Bangladesh taka has strengthened 
against the US dollar since early 2013, reflecting the large balance of 
payments surplus. 
GDP growth in FY2014 is projected at 5.8%, lower than the ADO 2013 
forecast, as exports and consumer and investment demand fall short of 
expectations. The current account will show a small deficit. The central 
bank is expected to adopt measures to contain inflation but also ensure 
adequate credit flows to maintain steady economic growth. The key 
challenges are to boost private investment and maintain macroeconomic 
stability in the run-up to elections. 
Bhutan 
The economy is estimated to have expanded by 8.4% in FY2013 (ended 
30 June 2013), broadly tracing its long-term trend. This is slightly below 
the ADO 2013 projection because of weak hydropower sales, slower 
tourism growth, and ongoing foreign exchange and credit restrictions 
imposed by the Royal Monetary Authority, the central bank, to manage 
liquidity. Hydropower sales contracted by an estimated 2.5% in FY2013 
following 3.8% contraction the previous year, as there was no capacity 
added and rainfall was below average. Meanwhile, revenue growth from 
tourism, while still strong at 13.5% and in line with the long-term trend, 
was down from the extraordinary 48.4% gain a year earlier that reflected 
the opening of new international and domestic air routes coordinated 
with a promotion campaign. 
Looking forward, hydropower sales are expected to pick up moderately 
from recent lows as rainfall returns to normal. Tourism will continue 
a robust trend and support service sector growth. Ongoing credit 
restrictions may moderate growth but, assuming some restrictions are 
lifted in FY2014, momentum from hydropower and, to a lesser extent, 
tourism will allow growth to reach 8.5%, as projected in April. The current 
account deficit is expected to remain wide at about 20% of GDP, as 
estimated earlier, driven mainly by imports for hydropower projects. 
The inflation estimate for FY2013 is revised down to 8.4% in view of 
moderation to date and fiscal and monetary tightening in India, Bhutan’s 
largest trading partner. In mid-2012, the Prime Minister stressed easing 
private and fiscal expenditures in line with resource constraints, a 
stance evidenced by budget expenditure cuts in FY2012 and into FY2013. 
Inflation is expected to ease further to 7.4% in FY2014, in line with the 
ADO 2013 forecast, as the foreign exchange position relaxes.
India 
Growth is expected to moderate in FY2013 (ended 31 March 2014). 
The Reserve Bank of India, the central bank, prioritized stabilizing 
the exchange rate when turmoil gripped global capital markets at 
midyear. Policies adopted along with clarification of US Federal policy 
in September stanched portfolio outflows and currency depreciation. 
Tight monetary policy targeting price stability, along with limited fiscal 
headroom for stimulating growth, however, will constrain economic 
activity. Moreover, the growth outlook continues to be hampered by 
challenges of policy and execution. 
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A favorable monsoon is expected to help agriculture achieve robust 
growth and provide a fillip to rural consumption but not to offset the 
slowdown in industry caused by liquidity tightening and slow progress 
on structural, pricing, and fiscal reforms required to loosen supply-
side rigidities. Accordingly, growth is now forecast to weaken to 4.7% 
in FY2013 before recovering to 5.7% in FY2014, both rates well below 
ADO 2013 projections.
Though core inflation fell to 2.1% in August, wholesale price 
inflation will come under pressure for the remainder of the year with 
the pass-through of higher costs from currency depreciation, hikes 
in administered prices especially for fuel, and supply issues in food 
production. Nevertheless, price increases will be held in check by tighter 
monetary policies already in place. Inflation in FY2013 is expected to be 
6.5%, lower than 7.2% as forecast in ADO 2013, as slowing growth forces 
businesses to trim profit margins and absorb higher costs. In FY2014, 
inflation is likely to edge higher to 6.8% with further adjustments to 
administered prices and somewhat higher growth. 
With fiscal pressures building as tax revenues and asset sales slow, 
and as the subsidy burden grows, reining in the budget deficit will be 
challenging. Some strain can be mitigated by reducing weakly targeted 
subsidies like those on fuel and fertilizer. This would reduce the possible 
need to cut capital spending to meet deficit targets. 
Prospects for global growth are varied, as recovery in US and Japan 
counters sluggish growth in European Union and moderation in the 
People’s Republic of China. However, a depreciated currency and a pickup 
in growth in some major markets will help exports grow by 4% in FY2013 
to $319 billion, for a modest rebound from the 1% decline last year. A 
slowing economy, a depreciated currency, and curbs on gold imports 
will cause imports to contract by 2.4% to $490 billion. The trend of 
moderating growth in invisibles poses a risk, but a depreciated currency 
should provide some fillip to software exports and remittances. On 
balance, the current account deficit is likely to moderate to 3.8% of GDP 
in FY2013, further than projected in ADO 2013.
Improved prospects in advanced economies will help exports grow by 
8% in FY2014. At the same time, an uptick in domestic growth and the 
removal of some curbs introduced in 2013 will boost imports by 6%. The 
current account deficit is expected to moderate further to 3.5% of GDP in 
FY2014. 
Maldives 
Growth and current account forecasts from ADO 2013 are retained. 
Growth is expected to recover modestly to 4.3% in 2013 and 5.5% in 2014, 
as moderate recovery in the global economy lifts tourism, which provides 
28% of GDP. Up by 17.8% in the first half of 2013, versus 2.3% a year earlier, 
tourist arrivals are consistent with a strong recovery in the sector and 
the larger economy. Election-related spending ahead of the presidential 
vote in September may bolster growth moderately. Political certainty and 
a clearer policy direction provided by a new government may increase 
appetites to invest in tourism. Notably, GDP growth forecasts are well 
below the 7.0% expansion in 2011, when growth in tourist arrivals was 
comparable, and fall short of the 5-year average of 6.6% since 2007. 
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Downside risks include how the recent slowing of GDP growth 
reflects the unsustainability of funding broad economic activity by 
expanding the government deficit. With a fiscal deficit averaging 14% of 
GDP over the past 5 years in tandem with a large and growing current 
account deficit, the government must urgently modify its fiscal stance. In 
2012, the government deficit was over 12% of GDP, despite earlier attempts 
at consolidation, and public debt was estimated at 78% of GDP, more than 
double its share only 4 years earlier. Thus, serious questions about debt 
sustainability and concerns regarding repayment capacity undermine 
the government’s credibility and jeopardize future economic stability. 
Moreover, low gross international reserves, sufficient to cover only 2.6 
months of projected imports in late 2013, mean any exchange rate shock is 
likely to challenge the stability of the currency. While a large and positive 
entry of errors and omissions in the balance of payments suggests sizable 
unreported capital inflows, the magnitude of the current account deficit 
leaves the economy very vulnerable.
Inflation as reported by the Maldives over recent months is volatile, 
recently falling well below expected rates. Inflation forecasts are thus 
revised down to 5.5% in 2013 and 5.0% in 2014. Price moderation is in line 
with longer-term inflation rates, as large increases in the price of fish and 
some other imported staples have declined sharply.
Nepal 
GDP grew by 3.6% in FY2013 (ended July 2013), slowing from 4.5% growth 
a year earlier. Unfavorable weather, chemical fertilizer shortages, and 
delay in passing a budget for FY2013 (ended 15 July 2013) weakened 
growth. Inflation climbed to an estimated 9.9% from 8.3% last year as 
agriculture faltered, higher prices in India raised the import bill, and the 
Nepal rupee depreciated. 
The lack of political consensus delayed approval of the FY2013 budget 
for 9 months, constricting capital expenditures. Combined with robust 
revenue growth, this left a year-end budget surplus equal to 0.4% of 
GDP, reversing the 2.2% deficit last year. The external position weakened 
slightly as remittances decelerated and imports rose, narrowing the 
current account surplus to an estimated 3.4% of GDP from 4.9% in 
FY2012. However, this outcome is significantly better than the ADO 2013 
forecast, as imports expanded much more slowly and remittances grew a 
bit more quickly than expected.
In FY2014, GDP is now expected to exceed the ADO 2013 forecast and 
grow by 4.5% on the favorable monsoon, restored supplies of chemical 
fertilizers, and a timely budget. Remittances will sustain expansion in 
services, but growth in industry will remain constrained by persistent 
power outages and long-standing structural bottlenecks, including a 
distorted labor market, deficient skills, investment lacking in research 
and development, inadequate infrastructure, and low productivity. 
Prices in FY2014 will be under pressure from hikes in administered 
fuel prices, continued inflation in India transmitted through the 
currency peg, and higher import prices as the Nepal rupee depreciates. 
The Update raises the inflation forecast to 10.5%. The current account 
balance forecast is greatly improved from the April projection as greater 
remittance inflows and tourism income offset rising imports. The 
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increase in the number of migrants to the Gulf and higher incentives to 
remit money as the rupee weakens are expected to accelerate remittance 
growth greatly in FY2014. 
Pakistan
GDP growth slowed to 3.6% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) from 
4.4% a year earlier. The falloff was almost entirely in the large service 
sector, which saw growth slow to 3.7% from 5.3%. Within services, 
markedly weaker growth in transportation and general government 
services substantially outweighed faster growth of financial services and 
wholesale and retail trade. Performance in other sectors was broadly 
consistent with FY2012. Agriculture expanded by 3.3%, slightly less than 
the 3.5% gain posted a year earlier. Robust 5.2% growth in construction, 
reflecting flood rehabilitation, helped to boost industry growth to 3.5%. 
Despite severe power load shedding, large-scale manufacturing edged 
upward by 2.8%, following several years of near stagnation. Electricity 
and gas fell by 3.2%. Unpredictable and severe power load shedding 
continued, knocking an estimated 2 percentage points from GDP. Fixed 
investment deteriorated again, declining to 12.6% of GDP, as private 
investment slipped further to only 8.7% of GDP, a drop of 4.1 percentage 
points in the past 5 years. 
Headline inflation in FY2013 averaged 7.4%, down from 11.0% a year 
earlier, as food and other prices eased and higher administered prices for 
electricity were delayed until after national elections. Bank lending to the 
government continued to increase rapidly, raising broad money growth 
to 15.9% even as net foreign assets declined markedly. Fiscal performance 
in FY2013 continued the pattern of recent years as expenditure continued 
to outstrip revenue by a wide margin, substantially reflecting the 
continuation of excessive subsidies and low tax effort. Overruns on 
subsidy outlays—largely reflecting failure to adjust electricity tariffs and 
the settlement in June of much of the power sector’s arrears—pushed the 
fiscal deficit again to 8.8% of GDP. The current account deficit narrowed 
to $2.3 billion in FY2013 (equal to 0.9% of GDP). Despite an improved 
current account deficit, official foreign exchange reserves fell sharply 
under the burden of external debt repayments and intervention in the 
foreign exchange market, dropping from $10.8 billion at the end of June 
2012 to $6.0 billion a year later. Reserves equaled less than 1.5 months of 
projected imports of goods and services next year.
The new government that took office in June 2013 quickly signaled 
restoring economic sustainability and rapid growth as high priorities 
for its 5-year term. It emphasized dealing with the energy crisis, 
boosting investment and trade, upgrading infrastructure, and ceding 
most economic functions to the private sector. To address low foreign 
exchange reserves, fiscal and external imbalances, and low growth, the 
government agreed on a wide ranging economic reform program with 
the International Monetary Fund, supported by a 3-year loan worth 
$6.7 billion.
The program aims to eliminate power subsidies in fiscal consolidation 
that includes strengthening the country’s notorious weak revenue 
base and ending the drain from loss-making public enterprises. Other 
structural reforms hope to strengthen the financial system and improve 
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the business climate. Fiscal consolidation is expected to limit GDP 
growth in FY2014 to 3.0%. The current account deficit forecast remains at 
0.8% of GDP, as the foreign reserve position strengthens. The monetary 
program is likely to limit average inflation to 8.0% for the year.
Sri Lanka 
Growth in Sri Lanka started to recover in 2013 from a dip in 2012. 
Power generation, which can constrain economic activity, picked up in 
May to grow by 9.2% but dropped slightly in June. Imports recorded 
positive growth in April and June. The deceleration in credit to the 
private sector shows signs of abating. GDP growth rebounded to 6.8% 
in the second quarter of 2013 from 6.0% in the previous quarter, driven 
by service sector recovery. Industry maintained high growth, while 
agriculture suffered under bad weather from late 2012. 
Inflation eased to 6.3% year on year in August from close to 10% in 
early 2013. Nonfood inflation dropped below 4% in March–April 2013 but 
accelerated again to 6% in May as power tariffs rose. 
The central bank eased policy rates in December 2012 and again 
by 50 basis points in May, subsequently reducing in June the statutory 
reserve requirement by 2%. Bank lending rates decreased from 14.4% in 
February 2013 to 12.1% in June, easing the deceleration of credit to the 
private sector.
Both exports and imports showed signs of recovery in the first 
half as the pace of decrease eased. The trade deficit shrank by 7.1% 
from the second half of 2012. Workers’ remittances and earnings from 
tourism partly offset the trade deficit, with remittances growing by 9% 
in the first half. Financial inflows have been strong, with foreign direct 
investment amounting to $540.0 million. 
The rupee has been under pressure since June from greater import 
demand. Foreign holdings of government securities dipped in late August, 
which further weakened the rupee by 5% against the US dollar from the 
end of May to the end of August. Sri Lanka’s gross official reserves equaled 
4.1 months of imports in June 2013, down from 4.5 months in March. 
Looking forward, eased monetary policy, continued recovery in 
services, and improvements in agriculture assuming normal weather 
will support stronger performance in the second half. External trade is 
expected to remain weak. This Update retains the April projection for 
GDP growth in 2013 at 6.8% and in 2014 at 7.2%. As inflation is likely 
to be contained for the rest of the year as food prices remain stable, the 
inflation projection for 2013 is revised down to 7.0%. The 6.5% forecast for 
inflation in 2014 is maintained, as are current account deficit forecasts for 
both years.
Southeast Asia 
Subregional assessment and prospects
Economic growth in this subregion has slowed more sharply than 
anticipated in ADO 2013, owing to unexpectedly sluggish performances 
by the three biggest economies: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Aggregate GDP for the 10 Southeast Asian economies is now forecast to 
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grow by 4.9% in 2013, down from 5.6% in 2012 (Figure 3.1.10). The forecast 
is revised down by a half percentage point from April’s projections.
Sizeable reductions are made to 2013 growth forecasts for Indonesia 
(to 5.7%), Malaysia (4.3%), and Thailand (3.8%). Projections for Brunei 
Darussalam (1.5%) and the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (7.6%) 
are clipped slightly. By contrast, the Philippines is performing more 
vigorously than expected and now is seen expanding by 7.0% this year. 
Cambodia (7.2%), Myanmar (6.5%), Singapore (2.6%), and Viet Nam (5.2%) 
appear on track to grow at rates anticipated in ADO 2013. 
Weak export markets and a moderation in investment accounted for 
much of the slowdown in the three biggest economies in the first half of 
2013. Sluggish global demand for commodities including palm oil and 
natural rubber hurt these economies. Exports were subdued as well for 
coal and copper from Indonesia, rice from Thailand, and electronics from 
Malaysia and Thailand. 
Lackluster electronics exports contributed to a sharp deceleration in 
manufacturing in Malaysia and Thailand.  
After surging in 2012, growth in fixed investment has pulled back in 
these economies. In Malaysia, it moderated from almost 21% in 2012, the 
strongest performance in 12 years, to a still robust 9.3% in January–June 
of this year. Indonesia recorded deceleration in fixed investment from an 
average of 9.0% over the past 3 years to 5.2%. Thailand’s fixed investment 
growth slowed from 13.3% in 2012 to 5.1% in the first half of this year.
Weak exports and global economic and financial uncertainties 
contributed to the investment slowdown. In Thailand, investment 
was elevated in 2012 by the rebuilding of factories, houses, and other 
infrastructure damaged by the 2011 floods. In Singapore, fixed investment 
shrank in the first half of 2013 from a year earlier.
Going against the trend, fixed investment in the Philippines rose by a 
strong 12.7% in the first half. This reflected mainly increased government 
outlays on infrastructure and buoyant private investment in home and 
office construction. Improvements in the domestic economy and its 
investment environment have helped to revive investment in the Philippines. 
The country achieved its first investment-grade credit ratings this year. 
Nevertheless, the Philippine fixed investment-to-GDP ratio, at 21.5%, still 
trails others in the region, and foreign direct investment remains low. 
Robust labor markets supported growth in private consumption 
in the first half. Private consumption rose by 7.4% in Malaysia, where 
generous cash transfers from the government and public sector wage 
increases boosted spending. Indonesia’s household consumption increased 
by 5.1%. Remittances from overseas Filipinos fuelled a 5.3% increase in 
private consumption in the Philippines, despite a slack labor market. In 
Thailand, the labor market was tight, but consumption still decelerated to 
3.4% as the impact of post-flood replacement purchases and government 
payments and rebates in 2012 faded. 
Growth in Southeast Asia is still expected to pick up in 2014 but to 
5.3% rather than 5.7% foreseen in ADO 2013. Growth is forecast to quicken 
gradually from this year in all subregional economies, with the likely 
exception of the Philippines, where the pace may ease after this year’s 
stellar performance. 
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3.1.22  Selected economic indicators, 
Brunei Darussalam (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  1.8  1.5  2.0  1.9
Inﬂation  1.0  1.0  1.2  1.2
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
45.0 47.5 47.0 50.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
The subregion will benefit from stronger growth expected in the US 
and Europe and in world trade. The recent depreciation of Southeast 
Asian currencies will help exports. Growth in Thailand will get an 
additional fillip from a boost in infrastructure spending scheduled to 
get under way next year. Viet Nam is expected to make gradual progress 
toward resolving banking problems that have curbed growth in credit and 
hurt investment. Indonesia, the Philippines, and Myanmar should gain 
from recent improvements in their investment environments.
However, a number of factors suggest that recovery next year in 
Southeast Asia will be moderate. First, growth in the People’s Republic 
of China, an important trading partner, is forecast to ease. Global 
liquidity is expected to tighten, and some subregional economies will 
need to increase interest rates from current lows. Indonesia, facing higher 
inflation and a weakening rupiah, lifted its policy rate three times from 
June to September this year. 
Fiscal consolidation is on the cards for economies that widened fiscal 
deficits over several years to stimulate growth. The Malaysian government 
has committed to reining in its budget deficit, and governments in 
Indonesia and the Philippines have indicated they will keep a firm grip 
on fiscal policy. Indonesia and Malaysia have cut fuel subsidies this year, 
which has squeezed consumers, and could pare other subsidies in 2014. 
Finally, countries with deteriorating external current accounts might need 
to contain domestic demand to check growth in imports.
Southeast Asia’s aggregate current account surplus declined steadily 
from 7.1% of GDP in 2009 to a projected 2.0% in 2013 (revised down from 
2.9% in ADO 2013). This largely reflects subdued demand for exports, 
lower prices for export commodities, and growth in imports of consumer 
goods and capital equipment. A slump in export receipts caused 
Indonesia’s current account deficit to widen to 3.5% of GDP in the first 
half. Thailand’s current account fell into deficit, and Malaysia’s surplus 
shrank markedly in that period. 
Next year, the subregional current account surplus is seen rising 
to 2.3% of GDP (Figure 3.1.11). Thailand is expected to edge back into 
surplus, and Indonesia’s current account deficit is forecast to narrow. 
Indonesia’s decision in June to hike the price of gasoline by 44% and 
of diesel by 22% succeeded in easing the burden that subsidies place on 
public finances, but it also pushed up inflation, now forecast to jump to 
an average of 7.2% in 2013. This revision lifts the subregional inflation 
forecast by about half a percentage point to 4.7% (Figure 3.1.12). 
While inflation forecasts are raised as well for the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic and Myanmar, inflation elsewhere is subdued 
this year, a result of generally mild food price increases and soft global 
commodity prices. Inflation forecasts are maintained, at low levels, for 
Brunei Darussalam and Malaysia and are revised down for Cambodia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam. 
Inflation in Indonesia is seen decelerating next year to 5.5%, and the 
subregional aggregate subsides to 4.3%. Inflation forecasts for 2014 are 
trimmed for the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
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Country highlights
Brunei Darussalam
GDP grew by 0.9% year on year in the first quarter of 2013, maintaining 
the modest pace recorded in 2012. Production in the oil and gas sector, 
which dominates this economy, turned up in late 2012, after contracting 
for 4 quarters, and the sector grew by 0.8% in the first quarter of 2013. 
Growth in the rest of the economy, largely comprising services, slowed to 
0.9% in the first quarter. 
From the demand side, private consumption spending was soft, while 
government consumption fell in the first quarter. Investment continued 
to increase, and net exports accelerated following the upturn in oil and 
gas. In light of the modest first-quarter GDP outcome and the outlook for 
sluggish growth in major trading partners, forecasts for economic growth 
are trimmed from ADO 2013.
As anticipated, inflation has remained low due to soft global 
commodity prices, subdued domestic demand, and government subsidies 
and price controls. The average inflation rate for the first 5 months was 
just 0.9% year on year. Inflation forecasts are retained from April.  In 
March, the monetary authority introduced interest rate controls, setting 
maximum rates on lending and minimum rates on Brunei dollar deposits, 
with the intention of spurring growth in credit.
The government reported a trade surplus equal to $4.5 billion for the 
first half of 2013, down 5.5% from a year earlier. This reflected a fall of 5.1% 
in the value of merchandise exports, mainly oil and liquefied natural gas, 
and a 4.2% decline in imports. Trade surplus and income from overseas 
investments will generate large current account surpluses during the 
forecast period. External and fiscal surpluses, together with substantial 
international reserves, provide solid buffers for the economy.    
Cambodia
The ADO 2013 growth forecast for 2013 is retained at 7.2%, as is its 
forecast for 2014, when the pace is expected to pick up to 7.5% as recovery 
gains traction in Europe and the United States. So far this year, most 
sectors have performed as projected in April.  Exports of garments and 
footwear to the US and the European Union rose by 11.3% year on year 
to $2.3 billion in the first 6 months, and exports of milled rice doubled to 
$122 million in that period. 
Construction has been buoyant, with bank credit for construction 
rising by 46% in June from a year earlier and construction project 
approvals up sharply to $1.9 billion in the first half. 
Tourist arrivals reached 2.1 million in the first 6 months, up by 19.1% 
from the year-earlier period. The service sector as a whole is projected to 
grow by about 7% in 2013. Weather was generally favorable for agriculture 
in the first half and, assuming no severe droughts or floods over the rest 
of 2013, agricultural output is expected to increase by about 4%.
Inflation averaged 1.8% year on year in January-June, reflecting slight 
increases in food and fuel prices. Growth in credit to the private sector 
eased to 29.0% in June, from 34.1% in 2012. In light of unexpectedly low 
inflation so far, the year-average forecast for 2013 is trimmed to 2.5%. 
3.1.23  Selected economic indicators, 
Cambodia (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth    7.2    7.2    7.5    7.5
Inﬂation    3.0    2.5    3.5    3.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–11.1 –11.1 –10.1 –10.1
Source: ADB estimates. 
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Forecasts for current account deficits are retained from April. Gross 
official reserves rose by 9.9% to $3.6 billion in the first half, enough to 
cover 4.1 months of imports of goods and services. 
Indonesia
The economy was buffeted as inflation accelerated, the current account 
deficit widened, and the rupiah depreciated. GDP growth slowed to 
5.9% in January–June. Growth in investment moderated, but private 
consumption remained buoyant. Even as economic growth slowed, the 
economy generated 1.2 million new jobs, outnumbering new entrants into 
the labor force. 
Inflation surged to 8.8% year on year in August after the government 
sharply raised administered fuel prices in June to reduce the cost of 
subsidies. The prices of some food items also rose, owing to restrictions 
on imports. Weak export markets and declining prices for export 
commodities cut the value of exports by 5.2% in the first half. Imports fell 
only slightly. Consequently, the current account deficit widened to $15.7 
billion, or 3.5% of GDP. 
Domestic financial markets were rattled by the global pullback in 
portfolio investment from emerging markets, coupled with the spike in 
domestic inflation and deterioration in external accounts. Stock and bond 
markets weakened, and the rupiah depreciated by 11% against the US 
dollar through late September. 
Bank Indonesia raised its policy interest rate three times from June to 
September, and the government unveiled a package of measures in August 
aimed at curbing inflation and containing the current account deficit. 
Fiscal and monetary policies being implemented to support stability will 
dampen economic growth in the short term. 
Forecasts of GDP growth are revised down from ADO 2013 for 2013 
and 2014, with slightly higher growth expected next year on expectations 
that inflation will ease and global trade strengthen. Inflation will be 
higher than previously expected through the forecast period, owing 
mainly to the hike in fuel prices. The forecast for the current account 
deficit in 2013 is widened to 3.4%, with the gap expected to narrow again 
in 2014 on stronger world trade, the rupiah’s depreciation, and measures 
being taken to dampen imports and support exports. 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Mining and hydropower development and private consumption spending 
continue to underpin economic growth. Eight new hydropower projects 
and the $3.7 billion Hongsa lignite thermal power project are under 
construction. Mining output increased in the first half of 2013 from a year 
earlier. Tourism continued to grow, with tourist arrivals increasing by 15% 
to 998,000 in the first quarter.
However, bad weather has hurt agriculture, particularly rice 
production, and some property developments funded by investors 
from the People’s Republic of China and Viet Nam have been delayed, 
apparently by slowdowns in those economies. 
The government sharply increased its budget deficit projection 
for FY2013 (ended 30 September 2013) from 3% of GDP to 6% to cover 
domestic debt repayment and salary increases for government employees. 
3.1.24  Selected economic indicators, 
Indonesia (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  6.4  5.7  6.6  6.0
Inﬂation  5.2  7.2  4.7  5.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–2.3 –3.4 –1.8 –2.7
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.1.25  Selected economic indicators, 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep. (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth    7.7    7.6    7.7    7.7
Inﬂation    5.5    6.5    5.0    6.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–21.5 –24.0 –23.6 –21.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
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Also, revenue has been below target. Taking these factors into account, 
the forecast for GDP growth in 2013 is pared to 7.6%. The forecast for 2014 
is retained at 7.7%.  
Rising prices for meat, poultry, fruit, and vegetables have driven inflation 
higher. The average inflation rate for the first 8 months was 6.2% year on 
year. Consequently, inflation forecasts are revised up from ADO 2013.
Exports rose by 4% to $1.54 billion and imports by 6% to $2.99 
billion in the first half, widening the trade deficit and contributing to a 
significant decline in gross international reserves to an estimated $530 
million at midyear. The Lao kip weakened against the US dollar and 
the Thai baht, and a parallel foreign exchange market has re-emerged. 
In August, the authorities introduced restrictions on the sale of foreign 
currency to the public and tightened some import regulations, which 
should help to dampen imports and contain a deteriorating external 
deficit. The current account deficit is now expected to widen to 24.0% of 
GDP in 2013 before narrowing slightly in 2014. 
Malaysia
Unexpectedly low GDP growth of 4.2% in the first half stemmed from 
a fall in net exports and moderation in investment. Exports fell and 
imports rose, dragging down GDP growth. Fixed capital investment 
decelerated from almost 21% in the first half of 2012 to a still robust 9.3% 
in this year’s first half. Private consumption held up well owing to a 
strong labor market and generous government cash transfers and wage 
increases. 
Growth will undershoot the forecasts in ADO 2013. Its pace is still 
expected to quicken in 2014 on the back of better performance in the 
US and Europe and a gradual acceleration in global trade, but be partly 
offset by the dampening impact fiscal consolidation will have on domestic 
demand. The government will trim subsidies and is expected to introduce 
a new consumption tax and take other measures to rein in the budget 
deficit. It will also delay some public investment projects, a move that 
eases pressure on fiscal and external accounts. 
The weakness in exports, coupled with the rise in imports, shrank 
the current account surplus in the first half. The ringgit depreciated by 
7% against the US dollar. Current account surpluses are still projected for 
2013 and 2014, but smaller than forecast in April. 
In a first step to reduce the cost of subsidies, the government raised 
administered fuel prices in September. This will lift inflation from low 
rates seen through the first 8 months of 2013. Next year, inflation is 
expected to gradually trend up as subsidies are trimmed and economic 
activity picks up. This Update retains the ADO 2013 inflation forecasts.
Myanmar
This economy is on track to grow by 6.5% in FY2013 (ending 31 March 
2014) and is seen  expanding by 6.8% in FY2014. Growth is supported 
by investor optimism following policy reforms, the reinstatement of 
Myanmar in the European Union’s Generalized System of Preferences 
for duty-free and quota-free market access, and a gradual easing of 
restrictions on financial institutions that facilitates credit to the private 
sector. 
3.1.27  Selected economic indicators, 
Myanmar (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  6.5  6.5  6.7  6.8
Inﬂation  5.1  5.8  5.1  5.7
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–4.2 –4.4 –4.4 –4.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.1.26  Selected economic indicators, 
Malaysia (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 5.3 4.3 5.5 5.0
Inﬂation 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
5.8 3.0 5.6 3.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
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3.1.28  Selected economic indicators, 
Philippines (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 6.0 7.0 5.9 6.1
Inﬂation 3.6 3.0 3.8 3.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
3.0 3.4 3.2 3.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
Tourist arrivals rose by 36% in the first 2 months of FY2013, and 
exports of natural gas will increase from the second half of 2013 as 
production from the Shwe and Zawtika gas fields comes on line. The 
government awarded telecommunications licenses to two international 
companies in June and has selected mainly international firms as 
preferred bidders to develop airports in Yangon and Mandalay. Investor 
confidence and economic activity will also get fillips from Myanmar 
hosting the Southeast Asia Games in December 2013 and from its 
chairing the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 2014.  
Inflation rose to 5.7% year on year in April and May 2013, from 
around 5% in January–March, largely because of higher food prices. 
Forecasts in ADO 2013 for average inflation are revised up, reflecting 
higher domestic food prices and some pass-through to domestic prices 
of a 10% depreciation of the kyat against the US dollar that occurred 
from March to August this year. Reduced credit to the government from 
the central bank should help to contain inflationary pressure over the 
medium term, supported by a law enacted in July 2013 to grant the central 
bank more operational autonomy.
Robust growth in exports and tourism earnings are expected to be 
more than offset by increased imports stemming from higher investment 
and an easing of foreign exchange restrictions. Forecasts of current 
account deficits are widened slightly from April. Stepped-up foreign 
direct investment and official development assistance are expected to keep 
the overall balance of payments in surplus. Foreign exchange reserves 
rose to an estimated $4.6 billion at March 2013, equivalent to 3.7 months 
of imports, and are projected to move higher.
Philippines
Buoyant investment, particularly in construction, and robust 
consumption propelled growth to 7.6% in the first half, a stronger 
outcome than anticipated in ADO 2013. Spending related to elections in 
May contributed to growth. Fixed investment growth accelerated to 12.7%, 
outpacing a 5.3% rise in private consumption. The country achieved its 
first investment-grade credit ratings this year and a higher ranking in the 
global competitiveness survey. 
Although growth is expected to lose some momentum, the forecast 
for this year is raised to 7.0% and for 2014 is nudged up to 6.1%. 
Disappointingly, vigorous GDP growth has not translated into strong 
growth in jobs. Full-time employment rose by just 0.5% in the 12 months 
to July. The unemployment rate rose to 7.3%, and underemployment was 
high at 19.2%.
Forecasts for inflation are trimmed from ADO 2013. A good harvest 
early in the year and soft global commodity prices contained inflation 
at 2.8% on average in the first 8 months. Peso depreciation and robust 
domestic demand are expected to exert modest upward pressure on prices 
in 2014.  
In contrast with other subregional economies, the Philippines’ current 
account strengthened in the first half, producing a larger surplus, equal 
to 4.2% of GDP. Supporting the surplus are remittances from overseas 
workers totaling $11.8 billion in the first 6 months and steady expansion 
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in business process outsourcing services. Current account forecasts for 
this year and next are raised slightly. 
Singapore
Economic growth quickened from a sluggish 0.2% year on year in the 
first quarter of 2013 to 3.8% in the second, putting growth for the first 
half at 2.0%. Manufacturing picked up in the second quarter, spurred 
by increased output in the biomedical and electronics subsectors. 
Construction increased in the first half, and the service sector continued 
to grow, led by double-digit expansion in finance and insurance. 
From the demand side, private consumption rose by about 2%, while 
public consumption jumped by 13%. However, fixed investment fell by 
almost 5%. External demand turned up in the second quarter, and the 
composite leading index edged up through June, suggesting a better 
economic performance in the second half. April’s forecast of GDP growth 
for 2013 is retained. Growth is still seen accelerating in 2014 on the back 
of stronger global trade, but the forecast is trimmed owing to downward 
revisions in prospects for some regional trading partners. 
Inflation decelerated sharply from 4.0% in the first quarter to 1.6% in 
the second as housing and transportation costs moderated in response to 
government policies. This deceleration and soft global commodity prices 
prompt downward revision of the ADO 2013 forecast for inflation in 2013. 
The Monetary Authority of Singapore is expected to maintain support 
for a gradual appreciation of the Singapore dollar’s nominal effective 
exchange rate to counteract inflationary pressure from the tight labor 
market. Employment picked up in the first half from a year earlier, and 
the unemployment rate averaged a low 2%. 
Domestic exports, excluding oil, fell in the first 6 months, though the 
decline moderated from 12.5% in the first quarter to 4.9% in the second. 
Imports also fell. The current account surplus for January–June eased 
by 5.5% to $25.8 billion. Expressed as a share of GDP, current account 
surpluses are expected to decline in 2013 and 2014, but by less than was 
anticipated in April.
Thailand
Sluggish domestic and external demand in the first half weighed 
on economic growth, which was unexpectedly low at 4.1%. Private 
consumption decelerated after rising rapidly in 2012. Consumption last 
year was fueled by government payments and rebates and by household 
replacement purchases after severe flooding, but the stimulus from 
these outlays tapered off early this year. Fixed investment also pulled 
back from strong growth in 2012, when it was propelled by post-flood 
reconstruction.
Growth this year will be well below the ADO 2013 forecast. 
Prospects for next year depend in large part on the government’s plans 
to raise public investment in water management projects and transport 
infrastructure. This Update assumes that public investment accelerates in 
2014, stimulating private investment. GDP growth is projected to increase 
slightly more than 1 percentage point next year from this year’s 3.8%.
Lackluster domestic demand helped to keep inflation to a lower-than-
expected 2.5% in the first 8 months. Inflation forecasts are revised down 
3.1.30  Selected economic indicators, 
Thailand (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 4.9 3.8 5.0 4.9
Inﬂation 3.2 2.6 3.1 2.9
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
0.8 0.0 0.1 0.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.1.29  Selected economic indicators, 
Singapore (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  2.6  2.6  3.7  3.5
Inﬂation  3.8  3.2  3.0  3.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
16.1 16.9 14.7 16.4
Source: ADB estimates. 
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from April. Low inflation and sluggish growth prompted the Bank of 
Thailand to reduce its policy interest rate in May, the fourth cut since late 
2011.
Exports weakened in the first half, with declines seen in important 
categories including electronics, shrimp, and rice, the drop in rice exports 
stemming in part from high prices buoyed by the government’s rice-
support program. Although the trade and current account balances were 
in deficit, the balance of payments recorded a small surplus. The current 
account is seen moving back into a small surplus in 2014 on the back of a 
modest recovery in exports.
Viet Nam
Problems in the banking system continued to dampen economic growth 
in the first half by curbing credit and investment. Subdued private 
consumption and fixed investment held GDP growth to 4.9% in January-
June. Growth picked up to 5.5% in the third quarter and is expected to 
maintain this pace through year end. The central bank has reduced policy 
interest rates by 800 basis points since early 2012, including cuts amounting 
to 200 basis points this year, with slight  impact on credit so far.
The government has taken some important steps to address banking 
sector weaknesses. Notably, it formed an asset-management company to 
acquire banks’ nonperforming loans and established a steering committee 
to improve coordination between agencies in implementing bank 
restructuring. Gradual progress on improving the health of banks is seen 
paving the way for slightly higher economic growth in 2014. 
Inflation has decelerated sharply from over 20% in October 2011 to an 
average of 6.8% in the first 9 months of 2013, largely because of declining 
food price inflation. Sluggish domestic economic activity and soft global 
commodity prices have also helped. Forecasts for inflation are revised 
down from ADO 2013.
Exports have benefited from the expansion of foreign-invested 
manufacturing companies that produce mobile phones, electronics, and 
computers. Rising exports of these technology products have strengthened 
the trade balance and contributed to current account surpluses since 2011. 
Surpluses are still projected this year and next, but smaller than forecast 
in April as growth in imports has started to quicken.
3.1.31  Selected economic indicators, 
Viet Nam (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.5
Inﬂation 7.5 6.5 8.2 7.2
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
6.9 5.2 5.6 4.1
Source: ADB estimates. 
The Paciﬁc 
Subregional assessment and prospects 
The 2013 growth forecast for the Pacific subregion is retained at 
5.2%, as modestly higher growth in the Cook Islands and Fiji offsets 
projected declines in Kiribati, Nauru, Solomon Islands, and Timor-
Leste. Unexpectedly high tourist arrivals have boosted growth in Cook 
Islands, while in Fiji consumption and investment indicators suggest 
that this economy is improving. Leading the countries with downward 
revisions to growth forecasts are Timor-Leste, where public expenditure 
is significantly lower than budgeted, and Solomon Islands, where 
production from gold mining, logging, and agriculture is falling short of 
earlier expectations. Growth forecasts for 2013 for most of the subregion’s 
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3.1.13 GDP growth, the Pacific
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economies remain unchanged. Growth is expected to pick up to 5.5% in 
2014, also unchanged from the ADO 2013 forecast in April, as adjustments 
to individual country forecasts balance one another.
Papua New Guinea (PNG), the largest developing economy in the 
Pacific, remains broadly on track with ADO 2013 growth projections. The 
government has been implementing stimulus measures to mitigate the 
slowdown caused by the completion of work on the 850 kilometer liquefied 
natural gas pipeline. However, lower export commodity prices present 
risks for this strategy and could endanger future growth prospects.
In the South Pacific, growth in the economies of Samoa, Tonga, 
and Vanuatu is in line with ADO 2013 forecasts. Private remittances are 
still seen as boosting growth in the Samoan economy, while in Tonga 
declining remittances and the completion of a large infrastructure project 
funded by development partners have slowed growth. Vanuatu’s growth 
projections remains unchanged, reflecting increased tourist arrivals 
and expected increases in construction spending. Tourist arrivals in the 
Cook Islands have been higher than expected, prompting higher growth 
forecasts for 2013 and 2014. 
Growth prospects for the North Pacific economies—the Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, and 
Palau—remain in line with projections made earlier in the year. The 
outlook continues to be driven by public expenditure on infrastructure 
development projects, specifically the recommencement of airport 
rehabilitation in the Marshall Islands and the completion of airport 
improvement projects in all four of the Federated States of Micronesia. 
Despite lower arrivals of tourists to Palau from Taipei,China, total arrivals 
continue to grow—albeit at a substantially slower rate than in recent years.
Growth forecasts are lower for two of the three small island economies 
of the Pacific. In Kiribati, growth prospects for 2013 have been hampered 
by delays in implementing infrastructure projects, which are expected 
to carry over into 2014. In Nauru, political uncertainty and a decline in 
phosphate exports call for a more subdued outlook. Although forecasts for 
Tuvalu are maintained, unmet revenue targets and overspending present 
downside risks to future growth. 
Inflation in 2013 is still expected to be higher than in 2012 because 
of rising public expenditures and weakening subregional currencies, but 
the forecast is revised downward to 5.7% from 6.1% in ADO 2013. This is 
primarily because upward price pressures following Cyclone Evan, which 
struck Fiji and Samoa in December 2012, were lower than anticipated in 
both economies. The inflation forecast for 2014 is lowered to 6.0% from 
6.3% in ADO 2013.
The very high income Timor-Leste earns from offshore petroleum 
operations lifts the Pacific subregion’s average current account position 
into surplus, despite current account deficits in nearly all other Pacific 
countries. This surplus is projected to decline to 4.8% of GDP in 2013 
and 4.4% in 2014, as forecast in ADO 2013, as international prices for key 
exports—including petroleum and selected agricultural commodities—
are seen trending lower in both years.
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Country highlights
Fiji
Fiji’s economic outlook has improved from earlier forecasts, and 
a growth rate of around 3% is likely in 2013. Consumption and 
investment indicators have improved, and confidence appears to be 
building in the run-up to the 2014 elections. The accumulated value of 
commercial bank lending was 5.5% higher at the end of May 2013 than 
at the end of 2012. Imports excluding aircraft increased by 10.4% year on 
year in the first 5 months of 2013, while construction increased by 10.1% 
year on year in the first quarter. Personal remittances were up by 8.6% 
year on year in the first 7 months of 2013, according to the Reserve Bank 
of Fiji. The International Monetary Fund reports buoyant collection of 
value-added taxes in 2013 but notes that contributions are being driven by 
such one-off factors as increased efforts to collect arrears on these taxes. 
Cuts in personal and corporate income tax in 2012, pensioners’ 
one-time withdrawals from the Fiji National Provident Fund, and fiscal 
stimulus are seen to contribute to rising consumption and investment in 
2013. These factors relied on increasing debt and liquidation of savings, 
and thus are expected to have only a short-term impact. Sustaining 
growth momentum in 2014 and beyond will require raising productivity 
in key sectors of the economy, such as tourism, mining, and agriculture.
Tourist arrivals in the first quarter of 2013 were down by 2.8% 
from the same period of last year—partly due to the lingering impact 
of Cyclone Evan, but also reflecting economic weakness in Fiji’s two 
largest tourist markets. During the first half of 2013, the number of 
visitors from Australia (which provides 51.0% of all arrivals to Fiji) 
increased only marginally, while arrivals from New Zealand (15.3% of 
the market) fell by 2.4%. Gold production declined by 26.6% year on year 
during the first half of 2013. However, there are plans to boost production 
following the purchase of a 19.2% stake in the Vatukoula gold mine by 
an international mining service company. The government projects that 
sugar production will pick up in 2013 despite the industry’s having been 
hard hit by Cyclone Evan. Concerns persist about the industry’s waning 
productivity and competitiveness, and about its structural decline over 
the long term. 
The short-term factors stimulating growth this year will likely fade 
in 2014, prompting this Update to revise its growth outlook only slightly, 
up to 2.4%, which is close to the Reserve Bank of Fiji forecast. 
Government efforts to reduce inflation appear to be succeeding. In the 
first 8 months of 2013, the inflation rate was 2.7% year on year, well below 
the ADO 2013 forecast of 4.5% for the whole year. The inflation forecast is 
therefore lowered to 2.7% for 2013 and further to 2.5% for 2014.
The delivery of the first of three new Airbus A330 aircraft for 
Fiji Airways pushed total imports into Fiji up by 28%, while exports fell 
by 22% in the first quarter of 2013. As a result, Fiji’s current account deficit 
is expected to widen to 22.5% of GDP this year, as forecast in ADO 2013, 
before narrowing to 7.0% in 2014 as imports revert to a normal level.
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Papua New Guinea
Signs of the expected slowdown in economic growth from 9.8% in 2012 
to 5.5% in 2013 are appearing, but the economy remains broadly robust 
and businesses upbeat. As construction on the liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) project tapers from its peak, activity in wholesale trade, transport, 
and logistics is moderating. Construction growth is also easing but is 
supported by a large increase in government spending on infrastructure 
and by private investment in property. Fiscal stimulus may add 
as much as 2% to real output growth in 2013, according to Bank of Papua 
New Guinea estimates. 
The inflation forecast for 2013 is lowered from 6.5% to 6.0%. This 
revision takes into account the low final 2012 inflation outcome of 2.2%, 
continued weakness in global demand, falling prices for many of PNG’s 
export products, and low inflation in major source countries for imports 
such as Australia. PNG’s trade-weighted exchange rate index remained 
fairly stable in the first half of 2013, but the lagged pass-through of the 
28% appreciation of the index during the previous 2 years continues to 
help hold down domestic prices.
The current account deficit is projected to narrow to 15.1% of GDP 
in 2013, unchanged from the ADO 2013 forecast, mainly due to reduced 
imports of equipment for the LNG project. A rebound in production 
at existing mines and the ramping up of nickel production at the new 
Ramu facility are expected to boost export earnings. Further narrowing 
of the current account deficit, to 8.4% of GDP, is expected in 2014 as 
LNG exports begin and the government’s budget deficit moderates to an 
expected 5.9% of GDP. The smaller budget deficit is seen helping to ease 
import demand.
PNG’s medium term outlook remains broadly positive, with growth 
of 6.0% expected in 2014. However, fiscal challenges are growing. Revenue 
collection is being dampened by falls in international prices for some of 
PNG’s major exports. Since the start of 2013, the price of gold has fallen 
by 20%, copper by 12%, and oil by 6%. These prices are now below 2013 
budget projections, indicating that if current prices persist, authorities 
will have to either cut spending or find additional sources of revenue to 
meet their deficit target of 7.2% of GDP. 
The expenditure side of the budget also presents challenges to the 
government. By mid-2013, budget expenditures were just 29.5% of yearly 
allocations. Weak systems of public finance and project management 
make it difficult for government administrators to implement ambitious 
public sector investment plans. Exacerbating challenges to budget 
execution, the 2013 budget significantly increased funding to subnational 
government authorities, which exhibit weaker implementation capacity 
than do central government agencies. 
LNG exports remain on track to commence in late 2014 and are 
expected to significantly boost growth. If commodity prices trend lower, as 
expected over the medium term, this would adversely affect investment into 
new mining and hydrocarbon facilities and dampen the growth outlook. 
The outcome of the recently announced taxation policy review also has 
potential to adversely affect future investment in mining. Policy makers 
will need to carefully balance the goals of maximizing public revenues from 
natural resources and of encouraging new investments.
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Solomon Islands
The growth forecast for 2013 is lowered to 2.5% from the ADO 2013 
forecast of 4.0%, largely reflecting slowdowns in gold, logging, and 
agricultural production. In the first 7 months of 2013, gold exports were 
down by 22.9% and log exports by 11.6% compared with the same period 
in 2012. The Gold Ridge mine operator has cut its forecast for gold 
production in 2013 by 10%. Agricultural and fishery production were also 
down in the first 7 months of the year, with production of cocoa declining 
by 23.5%, and of copra by 63.0%, year on year. The fishing catch was 28.5% 
lower due to poor weather and fewer fishing vessels. 
Outside these sectors, recurrent government spending increased 
in the first quarter by 24.5% year on year. The continued growth in 
manufacturing output, up in the first quarter by 45.0% year on year, 
reflected both increased purchases of locally manufactured goods and 
higher exports of canned tuna. Construction related to the expansion of 
the telecommunication network is expected to boost growth this year and 
to spill over into 2014 as the submarine cable project commences. 
The outlook for 2014 remains positive. Strong construction activity 
and a rebound in gold and agricultural production are expected to 
contribute to higher growth. The forecast of 4.0% for 2014 is maintained 
as these developments were foreseen in ADO 2013.
Inflation in 2013 is now expected to rise to 5.5%, up from the ADO 2013 
forecast of 4.5%, as inflation in the first half of the year was 6.2%, which 
was higher than expected. This reflected higher prices across all major 
expenditure categories: food and beverage, tobacco, housing, and utilities. 
Inflation is expected to slow to 4.0% in 2014, as the lagged effects of higher 
fuel and food prices dissipate.
The country posted a current account deficit equal to 1.8% of GDP in 
the first quarter of 2013, largely due to lower export earnings. Forecasts 
of current account deficits are maintained from ADO 2013, at 10% of GDP 
in 2013 and 2014, in line with expectations of continued weakness in 
exports, a moderate rise in import payments, and sustained aid flows.
Timor-Leste
The economy continues to perform well. Bank deposits grew by 10.5% 
year on year in the first half of 2013. Private sector credit was 10.3% higher 
in June 2013 than a year earlier, reaching a new high of $165.6 million. 
Bank lending grew strongly as well in the first half of 2013, as credit 
to individuals rose by 13.1% and credit to commercial and financial 
companies grew by 25.2%. Lending to agricultural producers also 
registered double-digit growth, which suggests expanded investment in 
coffee farms.
The value of merchandise imports was almost three times higher in 
the first quarter of the year than in the first quarter of 2012. The value of 
nonpetroleum exports posted very high growth, albeit starting from a low 
base. Vehicle registrations in the first half of 2013 were 25.8% higher than 
a year earlier. Sales of electricity were 7.8% higher over the same period, 
following the completion of the national electrification program. However, 
government expenditures, which are largely funded from offshore 
petroleum production revenues and are a main driver of nonpetroleum 
GDP growth, fell by 45.3% year on year in the first half of 2013. The decline 
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was particularly pronounced in public capital expenditures, which were 
down by 80.7%. Recurrent expenditure fell by about 15.1%, with spending 
on income transfer programs falling by 25.3%. This declining expenditure 
casts doubt on whether the ambitious infrastructure development program 
budgeted for 2013 can be carried out. In view of this, growth for 2013 is 
now projected at 9.5%—half a percentage point lower than in ADO 2013. 
The forecast of 10% is maintained for 2014.
Annual inflation in the first half of 2013 was 13.0%. Food costs rose 
by 16.3% and transport prices by 11.3%, considerably higher than the 2013 
projections in ADO 2013. Although inflationary pressures are likely to 
moderate with public expenditure running below budget and declining 
international food prices, the forecast for 2013 is increased from 9.0% in 
ADO 2013 to 10.5%. 
Income from petroleum operations will drive large current account 
surpluses in 2013 and 2014. In 2013, a surplus equivalent to 102.8% of 
nonpetroleum GDP is forecast. This surplus is expected to fall to 66.0% 
of nonpetroleum GDP in 2014, as projected in ADO 2013. These forecasts 
are significantly lower than those of earlier years because world oil prices 
have fallen.
North Pacific economies
Growth prospects for the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI), the 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), and Palau remain broadly in line 
with projections made in ADO 2013. The pace of construction on ongoing 
public infrastructure projects continues to drive changes to the economic 
outlook in the North Pacific. Because of the dominant role of the public 
sector in these economies, fluctuations in public capital expenditures 
heavily influence short-term GDP growth trends, and infrastructure 
development also plays a key role in developing these economies’ growth 
potential over the long run.
The RMI economy is estimated to have grown by 2.3% in FY2013 
(ended 30 September 2013), as projected in ADO 2013, on the back of 
recommenced public spending on airport rehabilitation. Growth is still 
expected to moderate to 1.5% in FY2014 as work on the project winds 
down. Downside risks to this economic projection include delays in 
implementing infrastructure projects and impacts from severe drought 
in northern RMI. Despite mitigation measures undertaken by the 
government and development partners, the ongoing drought has caused 
severe shortages of freshwater, affecting over 10,000 people on several 
islands, and sharply reduced the production of food and copra. 
Growth in the FSM is estimated at 1.0% in FY2013 (ended 30 September 
2013), also unchanged from ADO 2013. The execution of airport 
improvement projects across the FSM’s four states is wrapping up, with 
associated declines in economic stimulus. Growth is still expected to pick 
up to 1.5% in FY2014 with the start of new public infrastructure projects. 
In Palau, GDP growth for FY2013 (ended 30 September 2013) is 
estimated at 3.0%—unchanged from ADO 2013—but uncertainty 
regarding growth in tourism arrivals from East Asia clouds the outlook 
for FY2014. Estimated growth for FY2012 was raised to 6.3% following 
revisions to national accounts. The revised numbers show that the 
impact of the 2008–2009 global financial and economic crisis on Palau’s 
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economy was deeper and longer lasting than previously thought, and 
that the recovery was stronger. In the first half of FY2013, visitor arrivals 
grew by only 3.6%, a marked slowdown from last year but consistent 
with expectations of market saturation discussed in ADO 2013. Growth 
in arrivals was particularly weak in the second quarter, with arrivals 
from Taipei,China falling by 28.1% year on year. This was caused, at 
least in part, by the temporary suspension of Palau Airways operations 
in late April related to aircraft leasing issues. Continued slower growth 
in tourist arrivals from Palau’s main markets in East Asia, in line with 
economic prospects in these source countries, prompts a downward 
revision of the growth projection for FY2014, from 3.5% to 3.0%. 
The inflation outlook for all three of the economies in the North 
Pacific remains unchanged from ADO 2013. Inflation in both the RMI and 
the FSM is still projected to trend downward, slowing to 4.5% in FY2013, 
compared with FY2012 inflation rates of 5.7% in the RMI and 5.6% in the 
FSM. In FY2014, inflation in these two economies is expected to slow to 
3.5% in line with projected declines in international food and fuel prices. 
Inflation in Palau is still projected to moderate to 5.5% in FY2013 and 
FY2014 as tourism-led growth slows.
The RMI’s imports from the US, the primary trading partner of all 
three North Pacific economies, increased by 22.2% year on year over the 
first 3 quarters of FY2013. This was driven mainly by the resumption of 
fuel imports from the US. Over the same period, FSM imports from the 
US grew by 9.8%, led by purchases of machinery, transport equipment, 
and manufactured goods in the early months of the fiscal year. However, 
the FSM’s food imports from the US fell by 5.7%, possibly indicating 
either weakness in consumer spending or substitution with imports 
from other markets. Palau’s non-food imports from the US over the first 
3 quarters of FY2013 rose by 15.3%.
Declining international prices of food and fuel, combined with the 
completion of some infrastructure projects, are nonetheless expected 
to reduce import bills in the North Pacific. As projected in ADO 2013, 
the RMI’s current account deficit is still expected to fall to 2.5% of 
GDP in FY2013 and FY2014. Gradual reductions in the FSM’s current 
account deficit to 14.3% of GDP in FY2013 and 14.0% in FY2014 are also 
unchanged. As in previous years, the FSM and the RMI are expected 
to finance their current account deficits through capital and trust fund 
grants, in particular from funds received under their respective compacts 
of free association with the US. Palau, in contrast, has enjoyed current 
account surpluses from relatively large tourism earnings. In FY2013 and 
FY2014, Palau’s current account surplus is projected to expand to 7.5% of 
GDP, up from 5.9% in FY2012.
South Pacific economies
Growth in the South Pacific economies in 2013 remains largely in line 
with ADO 2013 expectations. The Samoan economy is estimated to 
have grown by 0.9% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013), as projected in 
the ADO 2013. Although GDP contracted by 4.3% in the first half of 
the period, the start of reconstruction and rehabilitation of social and 
economic infrastructure damaged by Cyclone Evan helped to reverse 
this decline in the second half of the year. Remittances provided a 
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further boost to the economy, increasing by 7% over FY2012 as overseas 
Samoans apparently sought to assist family members and communities 
adversely affected by the cyclone. As in ADO 2013, economic growth in 
Samoa in FY2014 is forecast to reach 2.0% on the back of post-cyclone 
reconstruction and rehabilitation projects.
Preliminary estimates suggest that Tonga’s economy grew by only 
0.5% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013), also in line with the ADO 2013 
forecast. The slowdown from 0.8% growth in FY2012 is largely attributed 
to declines in private sector credit and stagnant remittances. Despite 
evidence of ample liquidity in the financial system and low interest rates, 
loans to households were down by 0.8% year on year, and business loans 
had fallen by 14.3% as of March 2013. The increase in nonperforming 
loans—which represented 14.9% of all loans in March 2013—appears to 
be constraining credit supply, while demand for credit remains weak 
amid limited opportunities for private investment. During the first 
half of FY2013, visitor arrivals declined, led by a 50% drop in arrivals 
aboard cruise ships and yachts, though arrivals by air increased by 
9%. Indicators nevertheless showed a 27% increase in tourism receipts, 
suggesting that expenditure per tourist visiting Tonga has increased. 
The forecast is for growth in Tonga to slow further to 0.3% in 2014 
(maintained from ADO 2013). Remittance prospects remain low, and only 
a few infrastructure projects financed by development partners have been 
confirmed for implementation in FY2014.
Vanuatu remains on track to grow by 3.2% in 2013, as projected 
in ADO 2013, as tourist arrivals and construction spending are both 
expected to continue to increase. The number of visitors from Australia—
Vanuatu’s largest source market—increased by 8.3% in the first quarter 
of 2013 from the same period in 2012. Similarly, the 2014 growth outlook 
remains at 3.4%, also supported by greater construction spending and 
continued growth in tourist arrivals.
Among the South Pacific economies, only the Cook Islands exceeded 
the ADO 2013 growth forecast of 3.0%, growing by 3.2% in FY2013 
(ended 30 June 2013). During the year, tourist arrivals from Australia 
grew by 6.7%, buoyed in part by Sydney–Rarotonga flights operated by 
Air New Zealand and underwritten by the Government of the Cook 
Islands. The latest estimates show that total tourist arrivals rose by 3.6% in 
FY2013. This was more than sufficient to offset reductions in public capital 
investments funded by development partners, which fell by an estimated 
24.8% from FY2012. The growth outlook for the Cook Islands in FY2014 
is revised up to 3.5% on the back of continued growth in tourist arrivals, 
which are projected to rise by 5.7% in the coming fiscal year.
The effect on inflation from declining international food and fuel 
prices has been greater than projected in ADO 2013. In the Cook Islands, 
inflation in FY2013 was 2.4%—below the 3.0% projected earlier in the year. 
In Vanuatu, inflation for 2013 is now projected to reach only 2.0%, down 
from 2.5% forecast in ADO 2013, as lower inflation was observed in the first 
quarter. Inflation in Samoa was close to zero in FY2013, well below the 
4.5% projected in ADO 2013. Although Cyclone Evan disrupted local supply 
networks midway through the period, causing food prices to spike in 
February and March 2013, inflation returned to its pre-cyclone downward 
trajectory as supply networks were restored and because the prices of 
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domestic agricultural produce remained stable. Inflation in Tonga was 
estimated at 2.7% in FY2013, in line with earlier projections. 
Inflation projections for the Cook Islands and Tonga in FY2014 
remain unchanged at 3.0% and 2.7%, respectively, amid continuing 
expectations of lower international food and fuel prices in the coming 
year. The inflation forecast for Samoa is reduced to 3.0%, in line with 
unexpectedly low price rises in recent months and the continued easing 
of domestic price pressures. The inflation forecast for Vanuatu is also 
revised down to 2.0% in light of projected declines in commodity prices.
The South Pacific economies continued to run current account deficits 
in FY2013. In Samoa, export earnings were estimated to be 6.8% lower in 
FY2013 than in FY2012. Coupled with declines in tourism receipts and 
increased imports of materials for post-cyclone reconstruction, Samoa’s 
current account deficit is estimated to have reached 13.4% of GDP in 
FY2013. It is expected to widen to 15.5% of GDP in FY2014, unchanged 
from the ADO 2013 forecast. 
Tonga’s current account deficit is estimated at 6.3% of GDP in FY2013 
and projected to stay at this level in FY2014, as in ADO 2013. Continued 
declines in remittances are offset by a narrowing trade deficit. The first 3 
quarters of FY2013 saw Tonga’s trade deficit narrow, as imports decreased 
by 12.6% with the winding down of infrastructure projects and as 
merchandise export earnings grew by 30.2%. However, the first 3 quarters 
of FY2013 saw Tonga’s trade deficit narrow, as imports decreased by 12.6% 
with the winding down of infrastructure projects and as merchandise 
export earnings grew by 30.2%.
The outlook for Vanuatu’s current account deficit remains at 10% of 
GDP in 2013 and 2014, in line with ADO 2013 forecasts. Rising domestic 
demand and new construction projects funded by development partners 
are expected to boost imports. At the same time, declines in export 
revenues are seen as likely to continue in 2013 as export volumes and 
prices for Vanuatu’s agricultural products remain weak. By March 2013, 
Vanuatu’s foreign reserves had declined to the equivalent of 6.7 months of 
import cover, down from 7.4 months in December 2012. Reduced inflows 
from development partners seem to have been the largest factor behind 
this decline.
Small island economies
Developments in the first half of 2013 justify lower growth forecasts for 
two of the three small island economies of the Pacific. In Kiribati and 
Nauru, growth prospects are dimming with the delayed implementation 
of infrastructure projects, political uncertainty, and rising fiscal 
imbalances. The governments of Kiribati and Tuvalu are taking steps to 
increase domestic revenues. In Tuvalu, taxes are being increased, and 
Kiribati is planning to introduce value-added and excise taxes in 2014. 
A fishing license agreement negotiated with companies based in the 
European Union is expected to boost revenues.
Kiribati’s economic growth is now expected to slow to 2.0% in 2013, 
revised down from the 3.5% predicted in ADO 2013. This primarily reflects 
delays in implementing planned road and airport projects financed by 
development partners. GDP growth is forecast to rise to 2.3% in 2014, as 
infrastructure construction projects begin in the fourth quarter of 2013. 
3.1.43  Selected economic indicators, 
Kiribati (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth   3.5   2.0   3.5   2.3
Inﬂation   3.0   1.5   3.0   3.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–23.9 –23.9 –20.0 –20.0
Source: ADB estimates. 
130  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
Nauru’s growth forecast for FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) is 
downgraded to 4.5% and for FY2014 to 6.0%. This reflects political 
upheaval early in the year, disruptions to phosphate exports, and troubles 
at the Regional Processing Centre (RPC) for asylum seekers attempting to 
enter Australia without authorization. Compared with FY2012, phosphate 
exports are estimated to have declined by around 15% in FY2013 because 
of the diversion of mining equipment for use in constructing the RPC, 
management changes in the Republic of Nauru Phosphate Corporation, 
and poor weather. Lower phosphate exports are expected to continue into 
FY2014 as phosphate reserves are exhausted.
Previous growth forecasts assumed that the RPC would expand 
capacity to 1,500 inmates this year, but political instability in Nauru 
from February to June 2013 delayed the construction of additional 
RPC facilities. A riot in July at the RPC destroyed most of the center’s 
infrastructure and will diminish the RPC’s contribution to economic 
growth in FY2013. Currently, 574 asylum seekers are housed on Nauru, 
and two additional RPC sites are under construction. 
The economy of Tuvalu is still expected to grow by 1.3% in 2013, as 
projected in ADO 2013, and by 1.5% in 2014 on the back of progress in 
upgrading the Tuvalu airport and continued growth in the retail sector. 
However, newly released data from a seafarer recruitment agency showed 
a substantial decline in remittances, which are a significant source of 
income to families in Tuvalu. These plunged to $0.3 million in 2012 from 
$1.2 million in 2001, a sizeable decline in an economy whose estimated 
GDP is $37 million. The number of ships contracting with the agency 
also declined.
The inflation outlook for Kiribati is revised down to 1.5% for 2013 from 
3.0% in ADO 2013. This follows deflation at 1.4% in the first quarter of the 
year—the fifth consecutive quarter of deflation—and continued declines 
in food and transport prices. However, the projection of 3.0% inflation in 
2014 is maintained. The outlook for prices in Nauru is unchanged from 
ADO 2013, with inflation projected at 0.5% in FY2013 and 2.5% in FY2014. 
In Tuvalu, inflation is likewise still projected to be 2.0% in 2013 and 2014. 
This reflects a 7.4% increase in transport costs and 2.9% rise in utilities 
prices in the first quarter of 2013, but with food prices remaining stable 
during the period. 
3.1.44  Selected economic indicators, 
Nauru (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 8.0 4.5 8.0 6.0
Inﬂation 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
 –  –  –  –
Source: ADB estimates. 
3.1.45  Selected economic indicators, 
Tuvalu (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth  1.3  1.3 1.5 1.5
Inﬂation  2.0  2.0 2.0 2.0
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
–3.3 –3.3  –  –
Source: ADB estimates. 
This chapter was written by Mohammad Zahid Hossain, Md. Golam Mortaza, Shamsur 
Rahman, and Barun K. Dey of the Bangladesh Resident Mission, ADB, Dhaka.
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Bangladesh
Growth was higher than expected, as exports and remittances exceeded projections and inflation 
and the current account met them. This Update forecasts in the coming year slightly lower growth, 
higher inflation, and a small deficit in the current account reversing this year’s surplus. The run-up to 
parliamentary elections challenges macroeconomic stability. The tragic garment building collapse in 
April  2013 spurred action to adopt important new protocols for worker safety and welfare that now 
require diligent implementation by all parties. 
Updated assessment 
As officially estimated, GDP in FY2013 (ended June 2013) grew by 6.0% 
(Figure 3.2.1), outperforming the projection of 5.7% in Asian Development 
Outlook 2013 (ADO 2013), released in April this year, but slipping from 
actual growth of 6.2% in FY2012. Growth in exports accelerated briskly, 
but imports were flat, such that net exports made a marked contribution 
to growth. Private consumption expanded on stronger remittance 
inflows. Meanwhile, investment edged up only slightly, trimming 
its contribution to growth, as private investment ebbed to 19.0% of 
GDP from 20.0% a year earlier, countering most of the rise of public 
investment to 7.9% of GDP from 6.5%. Foreign direct investment was 
only slightly higher.
Private investment was restrained by political uncertainty ahead of 
national elections expected by early 2014 and by continued shortages 
of power and gas, as demand continued to outpace supply. Public 
investment, though growing, remains low because of capacity constraints 
in line agencies. Despite the country’s advantageous geographical 
location and cheap labor, inflows of foreign direct investment are modest 
by cross-country comparison. 
On the supply side, falling rice prices and bad weather helped hold 
agricultural growth to only 2.2%, less than the 4.2% growth projected 
in ADO 2013 and 3.1% growth in FY2012 (Figure 3.2.2). Services slowed 
slightly to 5.7%, reflecting both stagnant imports and frequent politically 
inspired national strikes that disrupted supply chains and retail and 
wholesale trade. 
Industry growth accelerated to 9.0%, much stronger than the 6.5% 
projected in ADO 2013 and slightly up from 8.9% in FY2012, largely 
reflecting faster growth in construction and small-scale manufacturing. 
The pickup in public investment helped to boost construction, while 
easier credit under the policy of financial inclusion adopted by 
Bangladesh Bank, the central bank, benefitted small-scale manufacturing.
3.2.2 GDP growth by sector 
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Year-on-year inflation steadily slowed to 7.2% in October 2012 as 
both food and nonfood prices declined, the latter largely reflecting taka 
appreciation and slower credit growth (Figure 3.2.3). Inflation then edged 
up to reach 8.0% in June 2013, as food prices firmed following supply 
disruptions caused by national strikes and as increases in government-
administered domestic fuel prices pushed up production costs. Annual 
average inflation slowed to 7.7% in FY2013 from 10.6% a year earlier.
The money supply grew by 16.7% in FY2013, down from 17.4% 
growth a year earlier and lower than the annual program target of 
17.7% (Figure 3.2.4), even as the contribution to growth from net foreign 
assets improved markedly and net credit to the government expanded 
moderately. Notably, private credit growth slowed to 11.0% by June 
2013, well below the annual target of 18.5%, as political unrest weakened 
business and investment demand. As part of their effort to strengthen 
banking soundness under an economic program supported by the 
International Monetary Fund’s Extended Credit Facility, the authorities 
adopted tighter loan sanctioning procedures to counter major banking 
irregularities.
In response to deepening downside risks to growth, the central bank 
cut its main policy rates by 50 basis points, lowering the repo rate to 7.25% 
and the reverse repo to 5.25%, effective in February 2013. Call money market 
rates declined from 9.3% in December 2012 to 7.2% in June, indicating an 
easing of liquidity pressures in the banking system. Lending rates fell only 
slightly to 13.7% in June 2013 from 13.9% a year earlier, despite the lower 
cost of funds and weak demand for credit. However, deposit rates rose, 
narrowing interest rate spreads from 5.8 percentage points in June 2012 to 
5.1 a year later, as bank competition appears to have improved.
Revenue collection rose more slowly than the budget’s target of 21.6% 
expansion, as weak imports held the rise in import-based taxes below 
expectations. Domestic indirect taxes also recorded moderate growth, 
while income taxes grew strongly. As a share of GDP, revenue collection 
rose to 13.5% in FY2013 from 12.5% the previous year, while total spending 
was held to 18.2%, limiting the budget deficit to 4.8% of GDP, which was 
within the target of 5.0%. Domestic sources financed two-thirds of the 
deficit, and net foreign financing the balance. 
The net losses of the 48 nonfinancial state-owned enterprises had 
contracted slightly from $1.2 billion in FY2012 to $910.8 million as of 
22 April 2013. The performance largely reflects Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation’s loss of $861.1 million and the Bangladesh Power Development 
Board’s loss of $713.3 million, which together equal 1.2% of GDP 
(Figure 3.2.5). A sizable profit of $627.0 million earned by the Bangladesh 
Telecommunications Regulatory Commission narrowed the loss. 
To cut losses and reduce subsidies, the government raised electricity 
tariffs in September 2012 by 17.0% for bulk consumers and by 8.0% for 
retail consumers (Box 3.2.1). It also raised prices for diesel, kerosene, and 
gasoline by 5.3%–11.5% in January 2013 but not the price of furnace oil, 
which is used mostly for power generation. 
Exports grew by 10.7% in FY2013, up from 6.2% growth the previous 
year (Figure 3.2.6). They picked up steadily as the year progressed and 
demand rose for the low-end garments made in Bangladesh. Garment 
exports, which provide close to four-fifths of earnings, grew by 12.7%, 
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3.2.1 Managing subsidy costs
Containing rising subsidies is a major policy challenge for the 
government (box figure). Subsidy-related spending increased 
to $4.7 billion in FY2013 (3.6% of GDP) from $3.6 billion in 
FY2012 (3.1%). The fuel subsidy is the major component of 
subsidy-related spending, as oil is increasingly being used for 
power generation to compensate for natural gas shortages. 
The FY2013 fuel subsidy rose to $1.9 billion (1.5% of GDP) 
from $1.1 billion the previous year (0.9%), partly because 
the government settled some old Bangladesh Petroleum 
Corporation (BPC) liabilities to banks and other creditors. 
Power tariff adjustments curtailed the power subsidy to 
$646.9 million in FY2013 (0.5% of GDP) from $803.5 million 
the previous year (0.7%).
Despite adjustments to administered domestic fuel prices 
and the power tariff, subsidies remain high because costs are 
inadequately passed through to end users. The agriculture 
subsidy rose to $1.5 billion in FY2013 (1.2% of GDP) 
from $885.0 million in FY2012 (0.8%), as the government 
distributed free seed and fertilizer to rehabilitate agriculture 
under a program that subsidized other inputs as well. The 
total bill for subsidies is expected to decline to $4.0 billion 
in FY2014 (2.7% of GDP) as fuel and electricity prices are 
adjusted upward.
The authorities are undertaking several measures to contain 
subsidy costs. Fuel prices will be adjusted, if necessary, to limit 
the wedge with international prices to Tk10 per liter, as agreed 
in the economic program, at the same time safeguarding the 
vulnerable poor through larger transfers. Greater scrutiny of 
agreements with small petroleum-fueled power plants will 
aim to reduce excessive payments to these contractors. The 
completion of efficiency audits of state-owned enterprises 
dealing with fuel, power, and fertilizer is expected to generate 
savings by identifying resource misuse and ways to improve 
operating efficiency. A plan has been formalized that sets 
a schedule of disbursements from the government to BPC 
with a view to bringing subsidy costs fully on budget. All 
earlier subsidy-related nonperforming loans from state-owned 
commercial banks will be capitalized, and external borrowing 
by BPC through oil-related suppliers’ credit will be phased out.
doubling the 6.6% growth recorded in the previous year and reflecting 
higher demand in the European Union and the US and faster expansion 
into new markets. Other exports grew by only 5.6%; high growth for 
footwear, leather, agricultural products, and jute goods was offset 
by declines in exports of frozen food, raw jute, home textiles, and 
chemical products. 
Imports grew by only 0.8% in FY2013, braking from 9.9% a year earlier 
(Figure 3.2.7). Imports of food grains, consumer goods (mainly sugar, 
spices, and edible oil), petroleum, and capital goods all fell, reflecting 
large domestic food stocks and weak consumer and investment demand. 
However, with the pickup in garment sales, imports of materials such as 
raw cotton, yarn, and textiles were buoyant. 
Worker remittances, a major source of foreign exchange, grew by 
12.6% in FY2013 owing to large placements of Bangladeshi workers 
overseas in FY2012. Remittances rose sharply from Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, Oman, and Malaysia. After rising strongly by 
22.0% in the first half of FY2013, remittance growth slowed to only 
4.2% in the second half, reflecting a marked falloff in new overseas 
job placements compared with a year earlier. Much of the drought in 
new jobs overseas stems from a sizeable decline in recruitment to the 
United Arab Emirates and Oman after they previously absorbed large 
numbers of Bangladeshi workers.
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The trade deficit markedly narrowed to $7.0 billion in FY2013 from 
$9.3 billion a year earlier because of higher export growth and negligible 
import expansion. Higher remittances and the lower trade deficit pushed 
the current account into a surplus of $2.5 billion, a notable swing from the 
$447.0 million deficit in FY2012. 
The combined capital and financial accounts recorded a surplus of 
$3.4 billion in FY2013, up from a surplus of $1.9 billion in FY2012 because 
of higher net disbursements in medium- and long-term loans and net 
inflows of trade finance.
The balance of payments moved to a large surplus of $5.1 billion in 
FY2013, a tenfold leap from the $494.0 million recorded a year earlier. Gross 
foreign exchange reserves amounted by the end of June 2013 to $15.3 billion, 
sufficient to cover 4.6 months of projected imports (Figure 3.2.8).
The taka has strengthened against the US dollar since early 2013, 
reflecting the favorable current account and balance of payments. The 
central bank intervened in the foreign exchange market to forestall 
excessive appreciation, but the taka nevertheless strengthened in nominal 
terms by 5.2% in FY2013. Because inflation is higher in Bangladesh than 
in its trading partners, the real effective exchange rate rose by 11.4% in the 
year to June 2013, suggesting a significant loss in export competitiveness 
(Figure 3.2.9). 
Prospects 
Forecasts for FY2014 rest on several assumptions: In line with the 
monetary policy statement issued in late July, the central bank will 
adopt measures to contain inflation while ensuring that credit growth 
is adequate to maintain steady economic expansion. Fuel and electricity 
prices will be hiked further to ease subsidy costs and expand fiscal space 
for boosting investment in social and physical infrastructure. Budget 
revenue and foreign financing targets will be attained, thus limiting the 
government’s borrowing from banks. Political tension will not precipitate 
a general breakdown of law and order. Finally, the weather will hold good. 
GDP growth in FY2014 is projected at 5.8%, slightly lower than the 
ADO 2013 forecast, as exports and consumer and investment demand will 
not be as buoyant as expected earlier. Political tensions in the run-up to 
elections appear to be escalating, along with frequent strikes disrupting 
economic activity. Political uncertainty prompts consumers and investors 
to adopt a more cautious approach to spending. 
Industry growth is expected to slow to 8.2% because of weaker 
domestic demand and slower export growth. The expected rise in 
electricity prices will push up costs and retard production. Agricultural 
growth should edge up to 3.3% if the weather cooperates. Street agitation 
is again likely to take its toll on services, with growth slowing to 5.5% as 
domestic demand weakens.
The FY2014 budget seeks to scale up revenue collection by deepening 
tax policy and administration reform, while raising fuel and electricity 
prices to curb subsidies with a view to expanding fiscal space. The budget’s 
main thrust is to channel more resources into projects that support 
growth and focus more on improving project implementation. Under the 
Extended Credit Facility, an indicative floor on tax revenue continues to 
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apply in FY2014, highlighting the need to boost revenue. A ceiling on the 
banking system’s net credit to the government is also applicable, aiming to 
underpin the country’s monetary policy objectives. 
The FY2014 budget targets 19.9% growth in tax revenue to raise the 
revenue-to-GDP ratio by 0.6 percentage points. With nominal GDP forecast 
to grow by 14.5%, the higher revenue growth target could be difficult to 
reach unless discretionary measures are adopted. A possible complication is 
tax collection suffering under disruption caused by political unrest. 
The authorities seek to boost revenue collection by further 
strengthening tax administration. More taxpayers are being identified 
through nationwide surveys and by opening new tax offices, and tax 
compliance is expected to improve as better taxpayer services and a 
simplified tax return make compliance easier. An online process has 
been introduced for registering taxpayer identification numbers using 
information from national identity cards. 
In a major policy reform, the recent passage of a new value-added tax 
law to be implemented in 2015 will introduce a modern, computerized, 
business-friendly, and revenue-productive tax system. Moreover, in 
customs administration, ASYCUDA World software, generated by the 
United Nations-sponsored Automated System for Customs Data, is being 
introduced to upgrade procedures and augment revenue. 
Fiscal policy will be moderately expansionary, with public spending 
growing by 17.5%. Caution will need to be exercised in utilizing the 
large unallocated item equaling 7.0% of revenues, to ensure that it is not 
misspent on low-priority projects and activities. The fiscal deficit target 
is set at 4.6% of GDP, slightly tighter than the 4.8% recorded in FY2013, 
and entails trimming domestic borrowing to three-fifths of the deficit 
(Figure 3.2.10). 
To attain monetary policy objectives, the central bank will continue 
to use a ceiling on the banking system’s net domestic assets as a key 
operating target. A 16.5% increase in credit to the private sector provided 
for in the monetary program is seen as fully accommodating the sector’s 
requirements. To contain growing inflationary pressures, the central bank 
retained its policy rates from February 2013. 
This Update raises the average inflation projection to 7.5% for FY2014 
(Figure 3.2.11), higher than the 7.0% projected in both ADO 2013 and 
the government’s monetary policy statement. Price pressures stem from 
expected increases in domestic fuel and electricity prices, likely supply 
disruptions because of national strikes, budget provision for higher public 
sector wages, and an expected wage increase in the garment industry 
once wage board recommendations are made. 
Imports are expected to revive and grow by 10.0% in FY2014, albeit 
on this year’s low base. Key factors are a rise in food imports because of 
the drawdown of public food stocks and an increase in fuel imports as the 
government seeks to limit power outages before the elections by spurring 
the growing number of contracted diesel power plants to generate more 
electricity. Export growth is projected to slow to 7.0% on an expected 
weaker expansion in garment exports because of some unfavorable buyer 
reaction in the aftermath of fatal factory fires last November and January 
and the horrific factory collapse in April (Box 3.2.2). The US suspension 
of the Generalized System of Preferences over inadequate worker rights 
3.2.1 Selected economic indicators (%)
2013 2014
ADO 
2013
Update ADO 
2013
Update
GDP growth 5.7 6.0 6.0  5.8
Inﬂation 7.8 7.7 7.0  7.5
Current acct. bal. 
(share of GDP)
2.0 1.9 1.0 –0.5
Source: ADB estimates. 
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3.2.2  Actions to Address Safety Issues in Bangladesh Garment Factories
Following the Rana Plaza factory collapse in April 2013, in 
which more than 1,100 garment workers lost their lives, the 
government moved in coordination with the international 
business community and development partners to address 
safety issues in the country’s garment factories. A cabinet 
committee was set up to scrutinize safety measures, initiating 
a revision of building codes. The scope of the National 
Tripartite Plan of Action on Fire Safety—drawn up after 
the November 2012 Tazreen garment fire, in which 112 
workers died, and the January 2013 factory fire at Smart 
Export Garments, in which 8 workers died—was expanded to 
include the structural integrity of buildings, as agreed by the 
tripartite partners: the government, employers, and workers.
The tripartite partners and the International Labour 
Organization agreed on 4 May 2013 on an action plan for 
steps in the short and medium term: (i) Submit to Parliament 
a labor law reform package to improve protection for the 
fundamental rights of freedom of association and collective 
bargaining and to stiffen occupational safety and health 
standards. (ii) Assess by the end of 2013 the structural and 
fire safety of all active export-oriented garment factories 
and initiate remedial action, including the closure of unsafe 
premises. (iii) Recruit within 6 months 200 additional 
inspectors. (iv) Fully implement the tripartite plan of action.
Parliament passed on 15 July 2013 an amended labor law 
that provides workers greater freedom to form trade unions. 
The law also requires that sector-specific central welfare funds 
be set up for workers, with the involvement of buyers and 
company owners. The government announced on 11 May 2013 
the creation of a wage board for fixing a new minimum wage 
for garment workers.
The European Union, International Labour Organization, 
and government adopted on 8 July the Global Sustainability 
Compact, committing to several time-bound actions to 
improve labor, health, and safety conditions for workers and 
encourage responsible business conduct in the Bangladesh 
garment industry. Subsequently, the US declared association 
with the compact.
Earlier, on 13 May, the legally binding Accord on Fire 
and Building Safety in Bangladesh was signed by more 
than 70 European retailers engaged in the Bangladesh 
garment industry, as well as international labor federations 
and nongovernment organizations. The 5-year accord 
requires rigorous safety inspections within 9 months of the 
1,200 factories in Bangladesh connected with the retailers. The 
reports will be public, and retailers will ensure financing for 
whatever renovations and other safety upgrades are required.
Separately, a group of about 20 North American 
apparel retailers founded, on 10 July 2013, the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety. It requires some 500 Bangladeshi 
factories to be inspected within a year for compliance 
with commonly agreed safety standards, with inspection 
results shared transparently. The retailers agreed to provide 
$42 million in grants and $100 million in low-interest loans 
to upgrade factory safety. Unlike the European-sponsored 
accord, the alliance is legally binding only as far as the 
fulfillment of initial financial pledges, allowing members to 
opt out at any time thereafter.
On 19 July 2013, the US government outlined its action 
plan to address worker rights and safety issues toward 
reinstating the Generalized System of Preferences.
The Bangladesh garment industry now has a 
comprehensive institutional structure to ensure worker 
safety, but the global track record of factory inspections 
by companies hired to make these assessments reveals the 
extraordinary pressures that can compromise this crucial 
function. A wide-ranging, diligent, sustained, and transparent 
inspection process is thus essential for success.
is also likely to suppress exports, though garments are not covered by 
the scheme. Labor unrest and a less competitive exchange rate may also 
curtail sales.
Remittance growth is expected to decelerate to 8.0% in FY2014, 
following the trend of slow growth witnessed in the second half of 
FY2013. A bilateral arrangement between Bangladesh and Malaysia 
may boost labor placements, however, and mitigate the slowdown. As 
remittance growth will be insufficient to offset the larger trade deficit, the 
current account balance is projected to return to a small deficit in FY2014, 
equal to 0.5% of GDP (Figure 3.2.12). 
These forecasts are subject to a number of downside risks. Revenue 
collection and foreign financing could fall short, and political pressures 
might scuttle planned increases in fuel and electricity prices. Such 
shortfalls could undermine fiscal management and induce higher bank 
borrowing that would break monetary discipline. Moreover, frequent 
strikes could seriously disrupt economic activity. 
3.2.12  Current account balance
–1
0
1
2
3
4
2014201320122011201020092008
% of GDP
Forecast
5-year moving average
Sources: Bangladesh Bank. Annual Report 2011–2012.  
http://www.bangladesh-bank.org; ADB estimates.
This chapter was written by Jurgen Conrad and Jian Zhuang of the People’s Republic 
of China Resident Mission, ADB, Beijing.
People’s Republic of China
Weaker domestic demand diverted the economy along a decelerating path in the first half of 2013, 
prompting the government to initiate a limited fiscal stimulus. With GDP growth expected to stay below its 
potential, inflation will remain below target. Moderating growth is the consequence of long-term structural 
reform and signals a welcome and challenging transition to a more sustainable growth path. 
Updated assessment
After weak GDP growth of 7.7% year on year in the first quarter of 2013, 
growth moderated further to 7.5% in the second quarter, for growth at 
7.6% in the first half. With year on year quarterly growth below 8.0% 
since the second quarter of 2012 (Figure 3.3.1), the PRC economy seems to 
be following a lower growth trajectory than was generally assumed until 
early 2013, mainly because domestic demand has waned.
On the supply side, industry (including manufacturing, mining, and 
construction) grew by 7.6% year on year in the first half of 2013, a bit 
more slowly than the rate of 7.8% reported for the first quarter of 2013 
or of 8.1% for the full year of 2012. The industrial rebound that started 
in September 2012, driven by strong credit growth, was not maintained. 
Monthly data indicate that momentum dissipated further during the 
second quarter, as the purchasing managers’ indices for output and 
new orders fell to 8-month lows in June 2013. However, data for July 
and August 2013 suggest that the situation has stabilized. Growth in 
services reached 8.3% year on year in the first half, the same rate as in 
the first quarter. Services thus continued to be the main driver of growth 
(Figure 3.3.2). Agriculture disappointed again with 3.0% growth year on 
year in the first half of 2013, after recording 3.4% in the first quarter, both 
well below the average of 4.5% from 2008 to 2012. Bad weather compounded 
weakening demand for animal husbandry and poultry products.
On the demand side, consumption contributed 3.4 percentage points 
to GDP growth in the first half of 2013, and investment contributed 4.1 
(Figure 3.3.3). Thus, in contrast with 2012, when consumption outpaced 
investment as a contributor to expansion, limited progress was made 
with replacing investment-driven growth with growth triggered by 
consumption. However, investment growth has moderated somewhat 
since early 2013 reflecting the government’s focus on the quality of 
growth. A pickup in infrastructure investment, driven mainly by large 
projects earmarked in the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, 2011–2015, and by 
persistently strong investment in real estate, could not fully offset a 
slowdown in manufacturing investment triggered by weak external 
demand and excess capacity in some industries. Consumption is still 
supported by growing household income, as the income of migrant 
3.3.1 Real economic growth
0
5
10
15
20
25
Retail sales
Value added of industry
GDP 
Aug2013201220112010200920082007
%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
3.3.2 Supply-side contributions to growth
0
4
8
12
16
GDP
Agriculture
Industry
Services
Construction
2012201020082006200420022000
%
Source: National Bureau of Statistics.
138  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
workers rose by 12.6% year on year in the first half of 2013, rural 
households by 9.2%, and urban households by 6.5% (Figure 3.3.4). Because 
labor-intensive services have expanded and construction has enjoyed 
sustained growth, moderating GDP growth has not come at the expense 
of employment, which is important for social stability. Net exports made 
a marginal contribution of 0.1 percentage points to GDP growth.
Growth in foreign trade decelerated significantly in the second 
quarter of 2013, mainly because of weakening global demand, frictions 
with major trade partners, and rising export prices. Trade with Japan and 
the European Union dropped in the first half of 2013, while trade with 
the US and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations recorded robust 
increases. Export growth declined from 18.3% in the first quarter to 3.7% 
in the second quarter, following correction of over-invoicing with Hong 
Kong, China, adding up to an increase of 10.3% in the first half of 2013. 
A stronger growth momentum resulted in accelerated growth of exports 
in July and August 2013 triggered by improved demand from major global 
trade partners, pointing to a trade rebound in the third quarter of 2013.
Import growth decelerated from 8.5% in the first quarter to 5.0% in 
the second quarter, bringing the rate for the first half to 6.7%. However, 
increased domestic demand and exports resulted in higher import 
growth further up to 9% in July and August. As a result, the trade 
surplus widened in the first half of 2013 by 39.5% year over year, reaching 
$157.4 billion. Combining this with a widening deficit in the service and 
income accounts yields an increase in the current account surplus by 
23.9% to $95.8 billion, or 2.4% of GDP (Figure 3.3.5). Regarding the capital 
account, foreign direct investment increased by 4.9% in the first half, 
reversing a 3% drop in the same period of 2012. 
After fluctuating at around 2.0% since June 2012, consumer price 
inflation jumped to 2.7% year on year in June and July 2013, and to 2.6% 
in August, as prices for vegetables and pork rose (Figure 3.3.6). However, 
nonfood inflation edged down to 1.5% year on year because of weak 
domestic demand and falling commodity prices—as did core inflation, 
which excludes energy as well as food. Producer price inflation is still 
negative, mainly tracking broadly lower global prices for fuel and raw 
materials and reflecting weaker domestic demand. 
After periods of tightening in 2011 and easing in 2012, monetary 
policy returned to tightening mode in May 2013. This was in response 
to accelerated growth of the M2 money supply to 16.1% year on year in 
April 2013, up from 13.8% in December 2012. The monetary growth target 
of the People’s Bank of China, the central bank, for 2013 is 13.0%. The main 
drivers of monetary growth were poorly regulated financial transactions 
associated with shadow banking, such as entrusted loans, trust loans, and 
bankers’ acceptances. By the end of August, monetary growth had eased to 
14.7% year on year. This was achieved mainly by tightening financial sector 
regulation and reducing liquidity injections into the interbank market.
Since mid-May 2013, interbank interest rates have risen significantly 
on tight liquidity. The 7-day Shanghai interbank offered rate surged 
from about 3% in early May to 11% on 20 June (Figure 3.3.7), its highest 
in a decade. The overnight rate averaged 13.4%. Stock prices slid, with the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange composite index falling by 15% in June. The 
liquidity squeeze partly reflected such seasonal factors as rising demand for 
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cash before a long holiday and banks’ buildup of liquidity to meet end-of-
quarter regulatory requirements. Also contributing to tight liquidity were 
reduced foreign exchange inflows and the explosive growth of shadow 
banking. Some shadow banking activities transform short-term funding 
into long-term investment and can do this efficiently only through the 
interbank market. Policy statements from the central bank and targeted 
liquidity injections at the end of June tamped interest rates back down but 
not as low as they were before the turbulence. If this type of central bank 
intervention is sustained, it can indicate progress in shifting monetary 
policy implementation from quantity-based to price-based tools.
The appreciation of the renminbi against the US dollar continued 
during the second quarter of 2013 but slowed toward the end of the quarter 
as foreign currency inflows ebbed. The renminbi appreciated by 1.9% 
against the US dollar in the first 8 months. In nominal effective terms, the 
appreciation was greater, at 6.5% as of July 2013, mainly because of Japanese 
yen depreciation since early 2013. In real effective terms, the renminbi 
appreciated by 6.8% against the currencies of its trade partners (Figure 3.3.8). 
This may have contributed to export growth being lower than expected.
On the fiscal front, the central government surplus and local 
government deficits—a combination characteristic of the PRC’s fiscal 
system—both narrowed in the first half of 2013 in line with fiscal reform 
objectives. Central government revenue rose by a paltry 1.5%, reflecting 
decelerating economic activity. This was far below the 8.1% growth in 
expenditure. Local government finances, by contrast, saw revenues 
rise by 13.5%, exceeding expenditure growth of 11.3%. As a result, the 
growth of consolidated budget revenues over the first 6 months of 2013 
decelerated to 7.5% year on year from 12.2% over the same period in 2012. 
Consolidated budget expenditure growth in the first half was, at 10.8% 
year on year, lower than the 21.3% reported in the first 6 months of 2012 
but continued to outpace revenue growth, despite expenditure typically 
being back-loaded toward the end of each year. The fiscal surplus was 
still substantial, amounting to 3.6% of GDP in the first half of 2013, albeit 
lower than the 4.3% recorded a year earlier.
Central government revenue growth slowed more markedly than 
GDP growth because of its heavy dependence on indirect taxes, among 
which only those on property sales increased strongly. The value-added 
tax (VAT), business tax, and consumption tax—together accounting for 
over 60% of tax revenues—underperformed expectations owing to weak 
demand for refined oil, liquor, and tobacco, as well as decelerating import 
growth, which suppressed growth in import duties and taxes. 
With regard to fiscal reform, the countrywide rollout of pilot programs 
to replace tax on turnover with VAT in selected industries started in August 
2013. It will affect some transport services; the radio, film, and television 
industries; and selected high-tech services. Railway transportation, postal 
services, and telecommunications may be included later. Ongoing pilot 
programs introducing property tax in Shanghai and Chongqing will likely 
be extended to other localities later this year to boost their revenues.
Local government debt including contingent liability increased 
to 26.7% of GDP by the end of 2010 (the latest year available), as local 
governments sharply accelerated their debt-financed investment under 
the government’s stimulus package. Many projects were undertaken off 
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budget. Since then, high nominal GDP growth might have improved 
ratios of debt to GDP, revenue, and debt-servicing, but the relatively short 
maturity of existing debt requires many local governments to acquire 
new loans to settle maturing liabilities, reportedly forcing some into 
arrears. In August 2013, the government launched a countrywide audit to 
make local government debt more transparent. Meanwhile, the provincial 
governments of Shandong and Jiangsu have been allowed to issue 
bonds directly to meet their financing needs. This raised the number of 
eligible governments to six from the four originally approved in 2011: 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Zhejiang. Such bond issuance 
opens a transparent avenue for the on-budget financing of deficits of local 
governments that are seen as financially strong. 
Prospects
In light of investment growth falling short of expectations and of 
persistently weak external demand, the growth forecast for 2013 is lowered 
to 7.6%, substantially below the ADO 2013 forecast of 8.2% but still above 
the government’s target of 7.5%. Growth is expected to slow further to 
7.4% in 2014 (Figure 3.3.9), down from the ADO forecast of 8.0%, as time 
is required for ongoing structural reforms to gain traction, and for local 
governments and some financial institutions to improve their balance 
sheets, which were more seriously damaged during the global financial 
crisis than previously assumed.
In July 2013, the government announced limited stimulus to prevent 
growth from decelerating below 7.5%. The stimulus includes temporary 
exemption from business tax and VAT for small enterprises from 
1 August 2013, simplified export procedures, and accelerated railway 
investment. It is expected to be sufficient to mitigate the impact of 
interbank market turbulence in late June, which increased funding costs 
and intensified financial institutions’ risk aversion, as evidenced by 
strengthened underwriting standards. Tighter credit will likely discourage 
investment, particularly by small and medium-sized enterprises and more 
generally in the private sector. Tighter regulation of local governments’ 
borrowing off the balance sheet, and of some activities associated with 
shadow banking, are likely to affect investment, though investment 
projects financed by the central government could serve as stabilizers. 
Consumption is projected to continue growing at current rates. Whether 
external trade will continue its net contribution to growth is uncertain. 
External demand is expected to remain weak, and a stronger renminbi 
may weigh on exports. On the other hand, weaker demand for imported 
capital goods and high-end consumer goods may weigh on imports.
The GDP growth outlook for the fourth quarter of 2013 and beyond 
depends to a large degree on the willingness of the authorities to support 
growth and the speed at which structural reforms are implemented. 
Recent policy statements suggest that the PRC leadership has become more 
tolerant of slow growth. Nevertheless, as the stimulus announced in July 
2013 demonstrates, the government will likely respond if the downward 
trend outpaces expectations or starts to undermine social stability. 
The consolidated budget deficit is not expected to exceed the 
government target of 2.0% of GDP for 2013 (Figure 3.3.10). Social 
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expenditure and investment programs are unlikely to be curtailed in light 
of pressing social and infrastructure needs, but the 2013 fiscal revenue 
target of CNY6 trillion can still be reached, amounting to year-on-year 
growth of 7%. The base effect of relatively low tax revenues in the second 
half of 2012 will likely permit revenue growth to accelerate for the rest 
of 2013, despite recently announced tax breaks for businesses and the 
planned rollout of VAT reforms, which are expected to lighten some 
companies’ 2013 tax burden by CNY120 billion. To achieve the revenue 
target, efforts to improve tax collection are expected. Also expected are 
the rollout of property tax pilots in the second half of 2013 and details on 
reforms to resource taxation and toward income redistribution. 
The inflation forecast for 2013 is revised down to 2.5% from 3.2%, and 
to 2.7% from 3.5% for 2014 (Figure 3.3.11), in line with current trends and 
unexpectedly weak domestic demand. Inflationary pressures are limited, 
as credit growth started to decelerate in the second quarter of 2013 after a 
strong first half, wage growth has remained moderate, and producer price 
inflation is negative. Slightly higher inflation expected in 2014 reflects the 
fading deflationary effect of currency appreciation. Volatile food prices 
and possible increases of administered prices harbor risks for the inflation 
forecasts. With GDP growth short of its potential and inflation forecast to 
be below the government target of 3.5% at the end of 2013, the authorities 
have some scope to apply monetary stimulus, if needed.
Monetary policy needs to strike a balance that mitigates risks in the 
financial and property sectors while supporting economic growth by 
accommodating the funding needs of financial institutions and their 
clients. As long as the labor market and other sensitive indicators do not 
deteriorate sharply, monetary policy will likely remain tight to further 
slow monetary growth. If economic growth plummets, the central 
government will likely prioritize fiscal stimulus as it did in July 2013, 
though scope exists for monetary stimulus such as easing reserve 
requirements. Further steps to liberalize interest rates are possible, as 
they would align with declared policy objectives and undercut demand 
for shadow banking products. By removing the floor for bank lending 
rates in July 2013, the authorities sent a positive signal in this policy 
area. However, a more substantive step would be to abolish the ceiling 
on deposit rates or at least raise it. The authorities have confirmed that 
deposit rate liberalization will be coordinated with the introduction of 
deposit insurance, with plans likely announced by the end of 2013.
The trend of renminbi appreciation is expected to continue but at 
a more moderate pace. Periods of depreciation cannot be ruled out, as 
the currency is believed to be near equilibrium and foreign trade and 
capital flows are both more volatile than in the past. The authorities 
may take advantage of this situation to widen the floating exchange rate 
band. The government has endorsed Shanghai’s transformation into 
an international financial center by 2020 to further promote renminbi-
denominated trade financing and bond issuance. These initiatives are 
important intermediate steps toward full convertibility, which is another 
policy objective of the government.
Export and import growth rates are both expected to stay in the 
single digits in 2013. Demand from Europe will likely remain suppressed 
and, excepting Japan, may weaken from trade partners in Asia. Import 
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growth is projected to decelerate more quickly than that of exports as 
domestic demand weakens. The merchandise trade surplus is thus likely 
to widen in 2013 but not enough to offset higher deficits in the service and 
income accounts. As this trend is likely to continue into 2014, the current 
account surplus is likely to shrink from a revised 2.3% of GDP in 2012 to 
2.2% in 2013 and 2.1% in 2014 (Figure 3.3.12).
The main domestic risks to the projections stem from monetary and 
financial developments. Earlier turbulences in the interbank market 
have left some uncertainty as to whether the government can slow credit 
growth without causing significant economic dislocation. This uncertainty 
could affect lending and investment behavior and slow investment growth. 
Potentially less brisk investment could be compounded by strict measures 
to curb shadow banking and local governments’ off-budget borrowing that 
end up stifling the investments these activities support.
Debts incurred by local governments, the property sector, and some 
state-owned enterprises have risen substantially in recent years, posing 
risks that could finally be realized in an environment of decelerating 
growth. Shadow banking has also risen rapidly, perhaps obscuring 
that nonperforming loan proliferation has already begun. Although 
most of the debt is public—held by local governments and state-owned 
enterprises—managing the situation is a challenge, as financial flows are 
not always transparent, undermining the careful liquidity management 
needed when loan maturities mismatch. Faltering management could 
spark a crisis in the financial sector that would badly affect the economy. 
Warning signs would be continued strong growth in shadow banking, 
sharply falling property prices, or rising numbers of local governments 
failing to meet their debt service obligations.
A downturn in the property market could further decelerate revenue 
growth, given the importance of taxes levied on property transactions. 
Lower property prices could also harm local government finances 
through lower prices for long-term land leases, which have long been 
important to local government financing. If fiscal revenues fall below 
expectations, the government will likely accept a higher budget deficit to 
be financed by central government borrowing. Tax increases or reduced 
expenditure would be unnecessary, as the central government has 
sufficient fiscal space for higher borrowing. 
The main international risk to this forecast is unexpectedly severe 
financial volatility in emerging economies if the US Federal Reserve 
tapers quantitative easing. This entails the risk that some economies may 
suffer difficulties because capital flows suddenly dry up. Were this to 
occur, the PRC economy might also suffer from excessive risk aversion 
and faltering business confidence. 
Japan’s new quantitative easing could pose a risk to the forecast, either 
upside or down. On the one hand, Japan’s monetary easing may lend an 
unexpectedly big boost to Japan’s economy. A better-performing Japanese 
economy should, if sustained, buoy the PRC economy. On the other hand, 
if Japan’s current quantitative easing fails to revive its economy, the PRC 
economy will suffer as well. Parallel risks to the forecast flow from growth 
in the European Union being lower than expected. Should any downside 
risk materialize, the PRC still enjoys adequate fiscal and monetary space 
to mitigate its impact.
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India
Growth in domestic demand decelerated further as macroeconomic imbalances and structural constraints 
depressed growth for a third year. Volatility in global capital markets at midyear pressed on the exchange 
rate and prompted monetary tightening. Policy measures over the past year have been insufficient to 
revive depressed investment or fully strengthen fiscal footings. This Update trims earlier growth projections 
and forecasts curtailment of the current account deficit. Accelerating structural, pricing, and fiscal reforms 
is necessary to move the economy back to a higher growth path. 
Updated assessment
Macroeconomic challenges have intensified since the release of ADO 2013 
in April. New headwinds arise as slack economic activity spreads to all 
sectors, the rupee weakens as global investors flee emerging markets, 
monetary policy tightens to stem capital outflows and support the 
currency, fiscal pressures intensify from lower revenue and higher 
expenditure than originally targeted, and the quality of assets held by 
banks deteriorates.
Economic activity in the first quarter of FY2013 (ending 31 March 2014) 
was disappointing, as GDP growth decelerated to 4.4% from a year earlier, 
the lowest rate since the global financial crisis (Figure 3.4.1). Moreover, 
growth has now remained below 5% for 3 consecutive quarters. The 
weakness reflected mainly private consumption growth slowing sharply 
to 1.6%, the lowest on record. A weak currency, persistent food inflation, 
rising fuel prices, and sluggish employment prospects have dented 
consumer confidence. Notably, government consumption picked up to 
10.5%, making it a key contributor to GDP growth. This masked somewhat 
the underlying weakness in the economy, since meeting  budget targets 
would prevent such a rapid expansion throughout the rest of FY2013.
Investment remained depressed, with gross fixed capital formation 
contracting by 1.2% in the first quarter of FY2013 as industrial production 
and exports stagnated (Figure 3.4.2). Fixed investment is estimated 
to have fallen to 28.6% of GDP. As structural and procedural delays 
continued to hamper investment, new hurdles appeared in the form 
of delayed interest rate cuts and higher service payments for foreign 
currency debt as the rupee weakened.
The revival of the 2012 monsoon in its second half helped the 
winter crop, boosting agriculture growth to 2.7% in the first quarter of 
FY2013. A normal monsoon from June to September foreshadows a good 
performance in agriculture in FY2013. 
Industry growth slowed to only 0.2% in the first quarter of FY2013 as 
performance weakened in all sectors, thus making a negligible contribution 
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to GDP growth. The mining sector has been in the red for nearly 2 years, 
reflecting little resolution of policy bottlenecks for production and pricing 
that plague coal and natural gas. The 1.2% contraction in manufacturing 
reflected continued shrinkage in the output of capital goods and consumer 
durables, indicating weak investment and consumer discretionary demand. 
Supply-side bottlenecks related to fuel availability hampered electricity 
generation, which slowed to just over 3%. Meanwhile, construction growth 
was, at 2.8% in the quarter, half that of a year earlier. 
The industrial slowdown and weak recovery in the advanced 
economies have dragged on the service sector, with growth stagnating at 
just over 6% in the past 3 quarters. Expansion in trade, hotels, transport, 
and communication services, which account for more than a quarter of 
GDP, slumped to 3.9% in the first quarter of FY2013 as industry weakened 
and consumer spending dried up. Community, social, and personal 
services grew by a robust 9.4%, and was a key driver of the expansion—
without it GDP growth  would have slipped below 4%. 
A declining trend in wholesale price index inflation continued in 
the first quarter of FY2013 but was reversed in June as food and fuel 
prices began a climb that continued through August, when inflation 
reached 6.1% (Figure 3.4.3). Food prices came under pressure in large 
part because weather had disrupted vegetable supplies. Core inflation in 
the index, however, continued to moderate to 2.1% in August, reflecting 
weak demand and pricing power that forced firms to absorb higher input 
costs caused by currency depreciation. While consumer price inflation 
has edged below 10%, its persists at elevated levels mainly because a much 
higher weight is accorded to food. 
After reducing key policy interest rates by 125 basis points between 
April 2012 and May 2013, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the central 
bank, was unable to lower rates further. Indeed, in July 2013, the RBI had 
to implement exceptional temporary tightening to discourage currency 
speculation after a marked weakening of the exchange rate. It tightened 
by sharply raising its marginal standing facility rate by 300 basis points 
to 10.25% and restricting bank access to its liquidly adjustment facility, 
from which banks borrow at the RBI’s main policy rate of 7.25%, the 
repo rate (Figure 3.4.4). These steps pushed short-term money market 
rates up toward 10.25%, thus raising banks’ lending rates and tightening 
credit conditions. In its September policy review, the RBI partly rolled 
back some of the tightening introduced in July by cutting the marginal 
standing facility rate to 9.5% and easing reserve requirement modalities. 
It raised the repo rate, however, to 7.5%, signaling its commitment to 
containing inflation and inflation expectations.
Banks’ asset quality indicators have deteriorated over the past 2 years 
as the economy has slowed. Nonperforming loans and restructured assets 
had more than doubled to around 10% of all loans by March 2013, from 
just over 4% in March 2009 (Figure 3.4.5). The banking system has come 
under stress from tighter liquidity, shrinking margins, and the worsening 
risk of corporate loan defaults. After nearly 3 years of credit growth 
outpacing that of deposits, the gap between the two has closed. Loan 
growth has moderated on weak credit demand and banks have become 
more risk-averse in their lending as their balance sheets deteriorate.
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Revised data indicate that the central government’s fiscal deficit 
was 4.9% of GDP in FY2012, lower than the 5.2% reported in ADO 2013. 
The deficit is targeted to narrow further to 4.8% of GDP in FY2013, 
mainly on account of lower subsidies and higher tax and disinvestment 
revenue. However, trends for the first 4 months of FY2013 suggest rising 
fiscal pressures, with the deficit reaching 62.8% of the annual target by the 
end of July, significantly above the 4-year average of 42.5%. Corporate tax, 
customs, and excise duty collections weakened by decelerating economic 
activity have, combined with higher refunds, caused revenue growth to 
trail expectations. A volatile stock market and weak investment sentiment 
have forced a delay in planned sales of public corporation stocks, slashing 
disinvestment receipts to less than 5% of the original target. Government 
expenditure, on the other hand, has grown at a faster clip than originally 
planned, even as a weakening currency has raised obligations for fuel and 
fertilizer subsidies.
The rupee depreciated by nearly 20% from the start of the year 
through the end of August, somewhat deeper than the depreciation 
endured in several other large emerging markets (Figure 3.4.6). External 
and domestic factors both contributed to the loss in the currency’s value. 
While investors’ fears of an imminent tapering by the US Federal Reserve 
of its quantitative easing triggered a sell-off of emerging market assets, 
the outsized impact in India was driven not only by its large current 
account deficit but also by domestic factors, including large budget 
subsidies, inflation, and the perception that the revival of growth needed 
to win back foreign and domestic investors will be delayed. 
The current account deficit has steadily worsened to reach a historic 
high of $88 billion, or 4.8% of GDP in FY2012, driven by the merchandise 
trade deficit increasing to $196 billion and some plateauing of remittances 
and information technology exports that in the past substantially offset it. 
Large gold imports, higher imports of coal and scrap iron, and dwindling 
iron ore exports due to stalled mining projects have exacerbated the 
country’s trade deficit, which was already under strain from large oil 
imports. Gold imports jumped to about 2.5% of GDP in the past 2 years, 
doubling their share in just a few years as the current account deficit 
soared.
In a bid to rein in the current account deficit in FY2013 to a targeted 
$70 billion, or 3.8% of GDP, the government has introduced additional 
taxes and duties to curb imports of gold and gold jewelry and other 
luxury goods. It has also introduced incentives to encourage exports. 
While these measures have had little time to work, merchandise exports 
expanded by 3.9% during April–August while imports grew by 1.7%, 
limiting the trade deficit in the first 5 months of FY2013 to $73.4 billion—a 
$1.3 billion improvement over the same period in FY2012 (Figure 3.4.7). 
Financing the large current account deficit was a major challenge in 
FY2012 and the first half of FY2013. While net direct investment inflows 
in the first 4 months of FY2013 were at $8.7 billion, higher than in FY2012, 
net portfolio inflows were depressed by global investors’ midyear pullback 
from emerging markets. Foreign institutional investors took $5.8 billion 
out of the country from April to August 2013, as a $7.1 billion bond selloff 
overwhelmed only $1.3 billion in net inflow into equities (Figure 3.4.8). 
Outflows ebbed markedly after June, and data for the first 3 weeks of 
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September show a net inflow of $1.6 billion. Official foreign currency 
assets in the first 5.5 months of FY2013 fell by $12.5 billion to $247.2 billion, 
while total international reserves including gold amounted $275.4 billion 
(Figure 3.4.9). 
To attract additional foreign capital inflows, the government 
has raised caps for foreign investors in the debt market and reduced 
withholding taxes on interest, further liberalized foreign direct 
investment norms, raised caps in external commercial borrowing 
guidelines, allowed public sector units to issue bonds, and permitted oil 
companies to borrow from overseas. In addition, the RBI has encouraged 
banks to mobilize new nonresident Indian bank deposits and to borrow 
from abroad for funding by creating favorable swap facilities. These 
measures attempt to apply additional debt inflows from new sources as 
a quick fix to a volatile international capital market. However, it will 
be necessary to accelerate efforts to eliminate fiscal imbalances and 
structural reforms to sustainably reduce the current account deficit, while 
encouraging greater foreign direct investment to obtain more durable 
sources of foreign savings.
Foreign portfolio outflows, exchange rate depreciation, and monetary 
tightening pushed stock prices down by nearly 15% from late May to their 
low in August, with some banking stocks particularly affected (Figure 
3.4.10). Prices strengthened in September in response to a broad set of 
policy initiatives announced by the RBI and the government and to the 
decision by the US Federal Reserve on 18 September to defer its tapering 
of quantitative easing.
India’s external debt stood at $390 billion in March 2013, up from 
$345 billion in March 2012. Several vulnerability indicators such as the 
ratio of short-term debt to total debt, and of international reserves to total 
debt, have deteriorated but remain above accepted norms.
Prospects
Prospects for FY2013 and FY2014 outlined in ADO 2013 were based on an 
improved outlook for the global economy, a normal monsoon, further 
fiscal consolidation, continued monetary easing, and the resolution 
of some structural bottlenecks. This Update takes into consideration 
somewhat slower growth in some advanced markets and important 
emerging ones, limited progress on fiscal consolidation, the reversal of 
monetary easing to tackle a depreciating currency, and limited progress 
on advancing structural policy reform. 
Economic recovery will have to be led by improved investment and 
consumption. Announcements of new investment projects have fallen 
from a high of Rs5.4 trillion in the first quarter of FY2010 to below 
Rs1 trillion in the first quarter of FY2013 (Figure 3.4.11). Moreover, 
deterioration in asset quality could make banks more risk-averse in 
project lending, thereby tightening financing constraints for future 
investments. On the positive side, regulatory clearances from the Cabinet 
Committee on Investment for several very large infrastructure projects 
in power supply, roads, and railways should help the investment cycle to 
begin to turn around in the second half of FY2013.
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A weak currency, mounting inflationary pressures, and diminished 
employment prospects will continue to impinge on growth in consumer 
demand. Various surveys point to households becoming gloomier and 
consumer confidence continuing to sag in urban areas. However, strong 
growth in agriculture expected in FY2013 may boost rural consumption.
Policy headroom to stimulate investment and consumption continues 
to be limited in the short term. The buildup of fiscal pressures will force 
the government to stop spending at the pace witnessed in the first quarter 
of FY2013 to avoid risking significant fiscal slippage. Public consumption 
is thus likely to be curtailed during the rest of the year. At the same 
time, the monetary tightening introduced in July and slightly eased 
in September is unlikely to be eliminated in the remaining months of 
FY2013, as inflationary pressures are likely to build with the pass-through 
of higher costs from a depreciating currency, fuel prices raised to curtail 
subsidies, and elevated food prices.
The RBI’s industrial outlook survey points to continued deterioration 
of sentiment related to production, capacity utilization, and exports. The 
crucial business expectation index dropped by 3.5% in the first quarter of 
FY2013, touching its lowest point in the past 3 years (Figure 3.4.12). Other 
surveys similarly point to weakening sentiment. The manufacturing and 
services purchasing managers’ indexes reported by HSBC Markit slipped 
into contraction during July–August 2013, their lowest readings since 
2009, indicating further weakening of demand growth and a likely GDP 
growth slowdown in the second quarter of  FY2013 (Figure 3.4.13). 
Services oriented toward exports, such as software and business 
services, are likely to benefit from a depreciated currency and could witness 
a pick up in business growth in the second half of FY2013 and in FY2014.
A favorable monsoon and a low base should help agriculture grow at 
a robust rate. Total sown area under cereals, pulses, oilseeds, and cotton 
in mid-September was higher than in the previous year. However, robust 
agricultural growth will be unable to offset the slowdown in industry, so 
the GDP growth forecast for FY2013 is revised down to 4.7% from 6.0% 
in ADO 2013. Growth in FY2014 is expected to strengthen moderately 
to 5.7% on improved global prospects and monetary easing as currency 
pressures abate. Elections and a new government coming into power 
in early FY2014 could resolve uncertainty related to the direction of 
economic policies and provide a basis for movement toward dealing with 
major structural issues that hold back investment and growth. 
Wholesale price inflation will continue under pressure for the 
remainder of the fiscal year with some currency depreciation pass-
through, food production issues, and hikes in administered prices, 
especially for fuel. Nevertheless, prices will be held in check by tighter 
monetary policies already in place. Inflation in FY2013 is expected to 
be 6.5%, somewhat lower than the ADO 2013 forecast of 7.2%, owing 
to much weaker growth that has eliminated pricing power and forced 
businesses to absorb higher costs by trimming profit margins. In FY2014, 
inflation is likely to edge higher to 6.8% with the continued need to adjust 
administered prices and somewhat higher growth. A good harvest on the 
back of a healthy monsoon and a more moderate increase in procurement 
prices this year augur well for the prospects of food inflation and should 
help contain consumer price inflation. 
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Reining in the fiscal deficit to the targeted 4.8% of GDP will be 
challenging, with success depending critically on buoyant tax and nontax 
revenue and significant reductions in fuel subsidies. Tepid industrial 
activity will make it challenging for customs and excise duty collections to 
meet their targets, while slow growth will hurt corporate tax collections. 
Adverse market conditions are likely to push disinvestment receipts 
lower than originally targeted. While easing crude oil prices and periodic 
increases in domestic fuel prices will help keep fuel subsidies in check, 
a weaker currency has significantly raised the extent of losses on diesel, 
kerosene, and cooking gas, posing a major risk to meeting the subsidy-
reduction target. Accordingly, there is concern that capital spending could 
be cut back to avoid overrunning the targeted fiscal deficit.
The recently passed National Food Security Bill, which entitles around 
two-thirds of the population to subsidized food grain, will put additional 
strain on fiscal expenditure in FY2014 (states are being given 6 months to 
identify eligible households in a fair and transparent manner). This strain 
could be mitigated by reducing other, weakly targeted subsidies. Passing 
the long-delayed legislation on income tax reform and the national value-
added tax on goods and services (the Direct Tax Code and Goods and 
Services Tax bills) would substantially strengthen fiscal fundamentals.
The prospects for global growth remain uneven, as recovery in the 
US and Japan contrasts with sluggish growth in European Union and a 
moderation in the People’s Republic of China. Given the multispeed global 
cycle, a swift pickup in exports looks unlikely. However, a depreciated 
currency and a pickup in growth in some major markets should help 
exports grow at a faster clip than in FY2012, likely at 4% in FY2013 to 
reach $319 billion. A slowing economy, a depreciated currency, and curbs 
on imports of gold and other luxuries will allow imports to contract by 
2.4% to $490 billion. The trend of moderating growth in invisibles over 
the past couple of years poses a risk, but a depreciated currency should 
provide some fillip to software exports and remittances. The introduction 
of an inflation-indexed saving scheme is likely to temper demand for 
gold, which has emerged as an inflation hedge in recent years. The current 
account deficit is likely to moderate to 3.8% of GDP in FY2013, better than 
the 4.4% forecast in ADO 2013.
Improved prospects in advanced economies are expected to help exports 
grow by 8% in FY2014. At the same time an uptick in domestic growth and 
the removal of some of the curbs introduced in 2013 will boost imports by 
6%. The current account deficit is expected to improve to 3.5% in FY2014.  
The measures introduced to curb the current account deficit and 
attract capital flows are likely to ensure adequate financing of the current 
account with little drawdown of foreign exchange reserves. India has 
expanded its bilateral swap agreement with Japan to $50 billion to 
strengthen its backstops. 
The decision by the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee in 
September not to immediately taper its quantitative easing program bodes 
well for stability in international capital markets in the near term. But the 
recent lesson should not be lost: India needs to accelerate fundamental 
structural and fiscal reforms both to avoid risk when the advanced 
countries phase out their easy monetary policies and to realize the 
country’s full economic potential and resume the Indian success story.
This chapter was written by Edimon Ginting and Priasto Aji of the Indonesia Resident 
Mission, ADB, Jakarta. 
Indonesia
Economic growth is slower than anticipated, but inflation has spiked on sharp rise in fuel prices. External 
accounts deteriorated in the first half, contributing to a fall in the rupiah. As steps taken to address 
inflation and the external deficit will restrain growth in the near term, the economy will undershoot 
earlier forecasts. Improvements are seen next year in growth, inflation, and the current account. 
Updated assessment
A moderation in investment slowed GDP growth to 5.9% year on year in 
the first half of 2013 (Figure 3.5.1). Fixed investment, after expanding by 
a robust 9% on average over the past 3 years, decelerated to 5.2% in the 
first half. Gross fixed investment as a share of GDP edged down to 32.3% 
(Figure 3.5.2).
Private consumption held up well in the first half, expanding by 5.1% 
and contributing almost half the growth in GDP. Increases in employment 
and wages, together with tax reductions for lower-income earners from 
January 2013, offset the impact of rising inflation and tighter consumer 
credit. Sales of automobiles rose by 12%, but this was half the pace of the 
same period in 2012.
Government consumption grew by just 1.4%, reflecting delays in 
budget projects and the government’s efforts to cut nonessential spending. 
Net exports made a significant contribution to GDP growth owing to a 
sharp deceleration in import volumes and a modest increase in export 
volumes.
From the supply side, services and manufacturing were the growth 
drivers. Services grew by 7.6% and contributed 3.5 percentage points to 
the increase in GDP. Transport and communications services continued 
to expand at a double-digit pace. Manufacturing grew by 5.9%, adding 
1.5 percentage points to GDP growth. Bad weather trimmed growth in 
agriculture to 3.4%, while a decline of almost 5% in oil and gas production 
caused mining output to contract.
The economy generated 1.2 million new jobs in the 12 months through 
February 2013, outnumbering the 774,000 new entrants into the labor 
force during that period. Most of the new jobs were in wholesale trading, 
construction, and manufacturing. The quality of employment improved, 
illustrated by an increase of 3.5 million jobs in the formal sector and 
2.3 million fewer jobs in the informal sector. Poverty incidence declined to 
11.4% in March 2013 from 12.0% in March 2012.
Inflation has been higher than anticipated, surging to 8.8% year on 
year in August (Figure 3.5.3) for an average of 6.3% over the first 8 months. 
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It was propelled by a steep increase in fuel prices in June, when the 
government reduced subsidies by raising the prices of gasoline by 44% and 
of diesel by 22%. Prices for garlic, onions, chili, and beef also increased 
in the first half owing to restrictions on imports. Core inflation was 4.5% 
in August.
In response to rising inflation and a weakening rupiah, Bank Indonesia, 
the central bank, raised its policy rate three times from June to September, 
adding 150 basis points to reach 7.25%, and its overnight deposit rate, also 
called the Fasbi rate, by 150 basis points to 5.50%. Growth in bank credit 
eased but remained buoyant at 20.6% in June. 
External accounts deteriorated sharply in the first half. A dwindling 
surplus in merchandise trade, coupled with deficits in income and 
services , widened the current account deficit to $15.7 billion, equal to 3.5% 
of GDP (Figure 3.5.4). The value of merchandise exports fell by 5.2% to 
$90.9 billion, mainly because prices dropped for export commodities such 
as coal, copper, and palm oil. The value of imports declined only slightly, 
by 1.5%, to $89.9 billion (Figure 3.5.5). 
Foreign direct investment rose to $7.2 billion in the first half. 
Portfolio investment recorded a net inflow of $5.3 billion, declining from 
a year earlier as global funds reduced holdings in emerging markets 
in expectation that the US would scale down its monetary stimulus. 
A surplus in the capital and financial account was more than offset by the 
large current account deficit, pushing the balance of payments into deficit 
by $9.1 billion. These development rattled domestic financial markets. 
The Jakarta Stock Exchange index fell by 19% from the end of May to 
early September, and yields on 5-year government bonds rose by 275 basis 
points (Figure 3.5.6). The rupiah depreciated by 11% against the US dollar 
through late September. Also, the cost of credit default swaps increased 
for Indonesia more sharply than for other Asian countries. 
Domestic factors—rising inflation, the current account deficit, and 
a drop in foreign reserves in June and July—contributed to weakness 
in financial markets. Indonesia’s relatively open capital account and the 
heavy foreign presence in its stock and bond markets (where foreign 
entities hold 55% of equities and 31% of sovereign bonds) make it 
vulnerable to swings in market sentiment. Further, the local currency 
bond market is shallow, equal to about 14% of GDP, much less than 37% 
in the Philippines and 75% in Thailand. 
Gross international reserves fell by 17.5% to $93.0 billion over the first 
8 months, a result of the current account deficit, capital flows, and central 
bank actions to defend the rupiah (Figure 3.5.7). Reserves in August still 
represented 5.2 months of imports of goods and services. Since late July, 
Bank Indonesia has allowed greater flexibility and scope for the rupiah to 
depreciate. 
Fiscal policy provided modest support for economic growth. 
The budget deficit in the first half was 0.6% of GDP, slightly above the 
deficit a year earlier. Subsidies on fuel still absorb a significant share of 
budget expenditure, despite the fuel price increases in June. 
Central government debt is projected to decline to 23.4% of GDP this 
year, maintaining a downward trend and helping to bolster the economy’s 
resilience to shocks. Nevertheless, Standard & Poor’s revised down its 
outlook on Indonesia’s credit rating to stable from positive in May 2013, 
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citing a stalling of reform momentum and weaker external accounts. 
Last year, Moody’s raised its rating on the country to investment grade 
Baa3, while Fitch reaffirmed its investment grade rating of BBB–.
Prospects
The government unveiled a package of measures in August 2013 to contain 
the current account deficit and curb inflation. Economic projections in 
this Update assume that these measures are implemented effectively. 
Fiscal and monetary policies being implemented to support 
macroeconomic stability are expected to take a toll on economic growth 
in the short term. 
In June, the parliament approved a revised 2013 budget, widening 
the budget deficit target from 1.6% of GDP to 2.4% to cover additional 
infrastructure investment and provide cash payments to 15.5 million 
low-income households to compensate for higher fuel costs. Next year, 
the government proposes to limit the budget deficit to 1.5% of GDP, 
with reduced spending on fuel subsidies and the end of the fuel-related 
compensation payments. Growth in capital spending will be reined back 
to 7% in 2014, from over 10% in the 2013 budget.
Bank Indonesia’s monetary tightening is expected to restrain domestic 
demand and gradually bring down inflation. Further increases in the 
policy rate remain an option if the measures taken so far are insufficient 
to maintain economic stability. 
Higher inflation will dampen private consumption in the months 
ahead, as flagged by a decline in consumer confidence (Figure 3.5.8). 
Prospects for growth in consumption will brighten when inflation 
subsides during 2014. With parliamentary elections scheduled for April 
2014 and a presidential election a few months later in July, election-related 
spending will contribute to consumption in the first half of next year. 
The increase in interest rates and uncertainties in domestic financial 
markets cloud the near-term outlook for investment, after its robust 
performance over the past 3 years. Private investment will benefit next 
year from expected improvements in the global economic environment 
and measures in the August policy package to simplify investment 
regulations and provide tax breaks for selected industries. However, 
the proposed 2014 budget indicates that public investment will be 
more subdued. 
Net exports are expected to contribute to GDP growth through 
the forecast period. Exports will get a lift next year from the projected 
pickup in major industrial countries and from the rupiah’s depreciation. 
Quotas on mineral exports were relaxed in the August policy changes. 
To curb imports, the government raised the luxury tax on imported cars 
and certain other luxury items and increased the mandatory minimum 
percentage in diesel of biofuel made from domestic palm oil. The hike in 
fuel prices will curtail oil imports and the rupiah’s depreciation should 
restrain imports generally.
Both domestic and foreign demand for manufactured goods 
weakened in August, according to a survey of purchasing managers. 
The manufacturing purchasing managers’ index fell to a 15-month low, 
with contractions in output, new orders, and exports. The surveyed 
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manufacturing firms reported that they reduced employment in August 
for the first time in 5 months. 
On the balance of these influences, GDP growth is seen easing to 5.5% 
in the second half of 2013, with the growth forecast for 2013 as a whole 
revised down to 5.7% (Figure 3.5.9). The better outlook for 2014 suggests a 
pickup to about 6%. 
This Update revises the forecast of the current account deficit in 2013 
to 3.4% of GDP in light of the first-half outcome (Figure 3.5.10). The deficit 
is projected to narrow to 2.7% in 2014, based on stronger world trade, the 
rupiah’s depreciation, and the measures being taken to dampen imports 
and support exports. The balance of payments is expected to fall into 
deficit this year, returning to surplus in 2014.
Inflation in 2013 is now likely to average 7.2%, this forecast raised to 
take account of the hike in fuel prices. Inflationary pressures are expected 
to ease as the effect of the fuel price increases subside, lowering average 
inflation in 2014 to 5.5%. The government’s August package removes 
import quotas on beef and some other food to ease inflation pressure. 
Downside risks to the projections center on the current account 
and turbulence in domestic financial markets. Policy measures taken, 
including the interest rate increases and greater exchange rate flexibility, 
helped to settle financial markets in September. In addition to those 
stabilization policies the authorities have established a swap facility with 
Bank Indonesia for commercial banks and allowed listed companies to 
buy back shares without the need for a stockholders meeting.
Indonesia is now in a better position to respond to financial market 
volatility than it was during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. 
International reserves have been bolstered, and the country has built 
additional buffers including a $12 billion reserves swap facility with 
the Bank of Japan and a $5 billion contingent funding facility with 
development partners. Bank Indonesia is negotiating swap facilities with 
the People’s Bank of China and the Bank of Korea to bring the size of 
swap facilities to $40 billion. A crisis management protocol improves how 
well government agencies coordinate response. Short-term foreign debt 
has increased to equal 56% of international reserves, from 40% in 2008, 
but a large part of the debt is hedged. The reduction in fuel subsidies 
has strengthened the fiscal position and freed up budget resources for 
economic and social programs.
While the August policy reforms should help address the external 
deficit in the near term, sustained improvements in the trade balance 
require the government to push ahead with building infrastructure to 
increase the country’s competitiveness in manufactured exports. Higher 
levels of infrastructure investment over recent years have started to 
pay off: Indonesia’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s 2013 Global 
Competitiveness Index jumped by 12 places to 38th out of 148 economies, 
and its ranking on infrastructure improved by 17 places to 61st. 
Concerted efforts are also required to improve the quality of 
education and boost labor productivity. Low productivity, combined with 
recent wage increases, put unit domestic labor costs above those in other 
Asian economies (Figure 3.5.11). 
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This chapter was written by Gary Krishnan of the Southeast Asia Department, ADB, Manila. 
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Malaysia
Subdued economic growth so far this year and prospects for a moderate pickup in 2014 prompt downward 
revisions to growth forecasts. Inflation, too, is below that projected in ADO 2013, though it has started to 
quicken. Weak export markets and relatively buoyant imports have eroded the current account surplus. 
Government plans for fiscal consolidation should address concerns over the fiscal and external accounts.
Updated assessment
A decline in net exports and moderation in investment slowed economic 
growth to 4.2% year on year in the first half of 2013, lower than projected 
in ADO 2013 (Figure 3.6.1).
Domestic demand remained buoyant. Private consumption expanded 
by 7.4% and contributed most of GDP growth in the first half. A robust 
labor market and government cash transfers continued to support 
consumption. Employment increased by 7.5% in the 12 months to June, 
and wages generally rose, particularly in domestic-oriented industries. 
The seasonally adjusted unemployment rate fell to 2.7% even as workforce 
participation rose to 67.8% in June, its highest in several years.
Consumption has been bolstered over the past 2 years by a series of 
government cash transfers, including one program that benefits more 
than 70% of households, as well as by significant increases in public sector 
wages, bonuses, and pensions.
Fixed capital investment decelerated from rapid 20.7% growth in 
the first 6 months of 2012 to a still strong 9.3% in this year’s first half 
(Figure 3.6.2). Private sector fixed investment grew by almost 12%, focused 
on real estate, consumer-related services, infrastructure, and oil and gas 
projects. Public sector investment increased by 4.7%, slowing from a year 
earlier due to reduced development outlays. 
However, weakness in major export markets caused a significant 
decline in real exports of goods and services, while imports of goods and 
services rose on the buoyant domestic demand. As a result, net exports 
dragged down GDP growth in the first half.
From the supply side, services expanded by 5.4% and contributed 
almost three-quarters of the increase in GDP (Figure 3.6.3). Solid growth 
was recorded in subsectors serving the domestic market, including 
retailing, communications, and real estate and business services.
Growth in manufacturing slowed sharply to just 1.9%, reflecting 
weakness in export industries such as semiconductors. By contrast, 
construction expanded by 12.0%, driven by demand for housing and the 
government’s Economic Transformation Programme to upgrade industry 
and infrastructure. Projects under construction include the Sabah–Sarawak 
gas pipeline and the mass rapid transit rail system in Kuala Lumpur.
3.6.2 Growth in fixed capital investment
–30
–15
0
15
30
Private
Public
Total
H1
2013
 H1
2012
 H1
2011
 H1
2010
 H1
2009
 H1
2008
%, year on year
Sources: Haver Analytics; Bank Negara Malaysia. 2013. 
Monthly Statistical Bulletin. July. http://www.bnm.gov.my 
(both accessed 13 September 2013).
154  Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update
Mining output rose by 1.0%, with increases in natural gas but 
declines in crude oil. Agriculture recovered from a contraction in the 
year-earlier period to record 3.1% growth in the latest half. A pickup in 
palm oil production largely accounted for the recovery. Lower global 
prices contributed to a fall in the production of natural rubber. 
Fiscal policy supported economic growth in the first half. Federal 
government spending rose by 3.6%, and revenue fell by 3.3%, eroded by 
weakness in prices for oil and commodities. The budget deficit widened to 
4.1% of GDP at June 2013, from 2.6% a year earlier. 
Inflation rose from 1.2% year on year in December 2012 to 1.9% in 
August 2013, edged up mainly by higher prices for food, which has a 30% 
weighting in the consumer price index (Figure 3.6.4). A weaker ringgit 
contributed to imported inflation, as it depreciated by 7% against the 
US dollar from January to late September. Inflation averaged a low 1.7% in 
the first 8 months of this year.
Bank Negara Malaysia, the central bank, has kept its policy interest 
rate steady at 3.0% since May 2011. Bank lending to households remained 
buoyant, growing by 12.0% over the first 7 months. Growth in lending to 
businesses decelerated from 12.0% to 8.1% over that period.
Sluggish global demand and declines in prices for Malaysia’s export 
commodities cut the value of merchandise exports in US dollars by 5.2% 
in the first half (Figure 3.6.5). Lower exports were recorded to major 
industrial countries as well as to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
and India compared with a year earlier. Small gains were recorded in 
shipments to Southeast Asian markets and to the Middle East. 
Merchandise imports rose by 1.4%, reflecting robust domestic demand. 
The deceleration in fixed investment during January–June started to cool 
demand for imported capital goods, which fell toward the end of the period. 
These developments reduced Malaysia’s trade surplus in the first half 
by almost 34% to $14.1 billion. That shrank the current account surplus to 
$3.6 billion, equal to 2.4% of GDP (Figure 3.6.6). 
The financial account posted a surplus of $2.0 billion, reversing a 
small net outflow in the year-earlier period. Net foreign direct investment 
recorded a larger outflow, and net portfolio investment a smaller inflow. 
The balance of payments was in surplus by $1.8 billion. International 
reserves, including gold, declined slightly over the first 8 months to 
$134.8 billion, equal to a healthy 9.3 months of imports and 3.7 times the 
short-term external debt.
Outflows of funds from emerging markets between May and August, 
after the US indicated it would wind down its monetary stimulus, caused 
volatility in Malaysia’s stock market and a rise in government bond yields 
during that period, before markets settled. 
Fitch lowered its credit rating outlook for the country from stable to 
negative in July, citing risks associated with slowing economic growth, 
rising household debt, a narrowing current account surplus, and the 
widening budget deficit. 
Federal government debt, estimated at 52% of GDP in June, has 
increased from 40.1% over the past 5 years. It is nearly all domestic 
debt. This measure of public debt does not include, however, all debt 
of government-controlled enterprises that the federal government 
guarantees.
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3.6.5 Merchandise trade indicators
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Prospects
Economic growth in 2013 will fall short of the forecast in ADO 2013 
in light of the lower-than-projected outcome in the first half and 
expectations of only a slight pickup in the current half. The leading index 
of economic activity fell in both June and July, suggesting subdued GDP 
growth in the months ahead. This Update revises the growth forecast for 
2013 down to 4.3% (Figure 3.6.7). 
The pace of growth is expected to quicken in 2014 on the back of 
improved economic performances in the US and Europe and a gradual 
acceleration in global trade, but partly offset by the dampening impact 
fiscal consolidation will have on domestic demand. GDP is now seen 
growing by 5.0% next year.
The robust labor market and wage increases, including minimum 
wages introduced earlier this year, will continue to support growth in 
private consumption. Lower prices for agricultural products have hurt 
incomes in rural areas, however. Consumer confidence has faltered: the 
index of consumer sentiment compiled by the Malaysian Institute of 
Economic Research fell in the second quarter of this year (Figure 3.6.8).
Consumers might well remain cautious as the federal government, 
which was returned to office in national elections in May, frames policies 
to rein in the fiscal deficit that will involve raising prices for consumers. 
A range of consumer goods and services are subsidized, including fuel, 
staple foods, and electricity. In September, the government increased 
administered fuel prices by 11% and flagged further price increases to 
ease the cost of subsidies on the budget. Low-income groups will be 
compensated for the higher prices. 
The government also plans to introduce a goods and services tax 
(GST). The timing of the GST, as well as its rate and exemptions, have 
not yet been disclosed. Some other taxes may be eliminated or reduced to 
cushion the impact of the GST on consumers and businesses. In addition, 
officials are considering a further increase in the tax on profits from the 
sale of property. Such a move would help to curb speculation in housing, 
which has pushed up housing prices, and bolster government revenue. 
The property gains tax was last increased in 2012. 
Fiscal policy generally is expected to tighten in 2014. The 
government has reaffirmed its commitment to narrow the budget deficit 
to 3.0% of GDP by the end of 2015, from 4.5% in December 2012. The 
2014 budget will be unveiled in late October. Longer term, a balanced 
budget is targeted by 2020. 
Private investment is expected to remain robust and pick up when 
the global trade environment improves. However, some public sector 
investment projects are being delayed. The government decided in 
September that the construction of public sector projects that require a 
lot of imported components will be rescheduled over a longer period to 
relieve the strain that imported capital goods place on fiscal and external 
accounts. Projects with a small import component and high spillover 
benefits to businesses will receive priority. 
On monetary policy, Bank Negara Malaysia forecast in September that 
rising domestic costs and reductions in subsidies will apply some upward 
pressure on inflation into 2014. This uptrend is unlikely in itself to require 
an increase in interest rates, but inflation could pick up if reductions in 
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subsidies are more extensive than anticipated, demanding in response 
gradual monetary tightening. 
Perhaps of greater concern to the central bank is the rise in household 
debt and speculation in property. Household debt has increased at an 
average annual rate of 12.0% over the past 5 years, to reach the equivalent 
of 80.5% of GDP (Figure 3.6.9). So far, the authorities have addressed these 
concerns by tightening macroprudential regulations, including steps in 
July to set the maximum tenor for personal loans at 10 years and loans 
for property at 35 years and to prohibit banks from offering households 
pre-approved personal financing such as unrequested credit cards.
From the supply side, the service sector will continue to carry the 
economy, with subsectors such as business services, communications, and 
real estate expected to perform well. Financial services may see less robust 
growth as global liquidity contracts. 
Construction is expected to remain buoyant, but manufacturing will 
be subdued until external demand revives. Investment under way to raise 
the output of oil and natural gas should show results soon. In agriculture, 
futures prices for palm oil and rubber suggest modest price rises over the 
next year, which will stimulate production.
September’s increase in fuel prices will lift inflation from recent low 
rates. The inflation forecast for 2013 is retained at 2.2%, though, in light 
of the lower-than-expected outcome in the first 8 months. Next year, 
inflation is seen trending up due to subsidy reductions and the pickup in 
economic activity (Figure 3.6.10). As noted above, there is a risk of higher 
inflation, largely depending on how subsidies are adjusted. 
External demand has been weaker than anticipated in ADO 2013, 
with downward revisions in projections for global trade in 2013 and in 
economic growth projections for major trading partners such as the PRC 
and India. Forecasts of the current account surplus are revised down to 
around 3% of GDP for this year and next. This represents a steep decline 
from average current accounts surpluses of 16% during 2005–2009. 
The depreciation of the ringgit against the US dollar this year will 
support exports and dampen imports. Exports will also benefit as 
momentum builds in the US and European economies in 2014. 
The government’s moves to reschedule public investment projects with a 
high import component will assist in curbing growth in imports. 
Longer-term economic policies are being reviewed ahead of the drafting 
in 2014 of the Eleventh Malaysia Plan, the next 5-year development plan, 
which will cover 2016–2020. One focus of the new plan is likely to be 
upgrading labor skills and labor flexibility. 
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Pakistan
Pakistan’s smooth political transition from one democratically elected government to the next after 
the May 2013 elections was the first in its history. The new government quickly signaled ambitious 
economic reform as a high priority. Recent trends to address are sustained low growth, extensive power 
outages, declining investment, a high fiscal deficit, and a significant drop in foreign exchange reserves. 
Implementing steps agreed with the International Monetary Fund, including structural reforms, will be 
critical to restoring stability and enhancing future growth prospects. 
Updated assessment 
GDP growth slowed to 3.6% in FY2013 (ended 30 June 2013) from 4.4% 
a year earlier. The falloff was almost entirely in the large service sector, 
which saw growth slow to 3.7% from 5.3% in the previous year (Figure 3.7.1). 
Within services, markedly weaker growth in transportation and general 
government services substantially outweighed faster growth of financial 
services and wholesale and retail trade. 
Performance outside services was broadly consistent with FY2012. 
Agriculture expanded by 3.3%, just slightly slower than the 3.5% gain 
posted in FY2012, as improved crop output was offset by a contraction 
in cotton ginning. Robust 5.2% growth in construction, reflecting 
rehabilitation from flooding, helped to boost industry growth to 3.5%. 
Despite severe power load shedding, large-scale manufacturing edged 
upward by 2.8%, following several years of near stagnation, as increases 
in food processing, petroleum products, and iron and steel products 
more than offset flat textile manufacturing and a sharp contraction in 
automobile production. Electricity and gas fell by 3.2%.
On the demand side, consumption growth eased, mirroring the 
sharp fall in remittance growth to 5.6% following rapid expansion in 
the 2 previous years. Fixed investment deteriorated again, declining to 
12.6% of GDP, as private investment slipped further to only 8.7% of GDP, 
4.1 percentage points less than in FY2008 (Figure 3.7.2). Investment in 
manufacturing also continued long-running contraction to equal a mere 
1.0% of GDP. 
Headline inflation fell in FY2013, nearly halving from 11.3% in June 
2012 to 5.9% a year later despite heavy government borrowing. Food and 
nonfood prices eased, and increases in administered electricity prices 
were delayed until after the election (Figure 3.7.3). Core inflation remained 
more stubborn, dropping from 11.4% to 7.8%. The State Bank of Pakistan 
(SBP), the central bank, responded to easing inflation with successive 
reductions in the policy rate during the first half of FY2013, notably 
cutting it by 250 basis points to 9.5% by December 2012, with a final 
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reduction to 9% in June 2013. In the current economic environment under 
pressure from power outages, security issues, and an uncertain economic 
environment, the impact of lower interest rates on investment is blunted. 
Inflation picked up again from June 2013, as food prices increased and 
some electricity tariffs were raised. In its September Monetary Policy 
Statement for FY2014, the SBP raised the policy rate to 9.5%.
Bank lending to the government continued to increase rapidly in 
FY2013, raising broad money growth to 15.9%, even as net foreign assets 
declined markedly. Government borrowing from banks amounted to 
PRs1.6 trillion, a 45.5% increase during the fiscal year (Figure 3.7.4). 
Government borrowing from the SBP was substantial, accounting for 
36% of its borrowing from the banking system. Provisions in the SBP 
Act requiring the government to clear lending from the SBP quarterly 
continued to be ignored. Implementing the highly accommodative 
monetary stance required large weekly injections of bank reserves 
throughout FY2013. 
Lending to private business in FY2013 again contracted in real terms 
on a negligible nominal increase of 0.7%, about the same rate as a year 
earlier. As a result, the government share of outstanding loans had 
increased to 60.1% by the end of FY2013, as the share for private business 
steadily declined. The government has been the main beneficiary of recent 
reductions in the policy rate, but the impact of lower rates on interest 
costs in the budget (more than one-quarter of current budget expenditure 
in FY2013) was more than offset by increased domestic borrowing. 
Fiscal performance in FY2013 continued the pattern of recent years 
(Figure 3.7.5). Overly ambitious targets, sluggish growth, and compressed 
imports conspired to hold both direct and indirect taxes short of their 
targets. In the absence of effective measures to broaden the tax base, 
Federal Board of Revenue receipts expanded by a scant 3.2%, meaning 
they declined in real terms. Total tax revenue was a low 9.5% of GDP.
Non-tax revenues performed well in FY2013, owing to the receipt 
of $1.8 billion from the Coalition Support Fund related to conflict in 
Afghanistan. Federal outlays for pensions, interest payments, subsidies, 
and defense continued to outstrip total revenues by a wide margin, 
leaving the government’s current operating costs substantially financed 
through debt. Overruns on subsidy outlays, largely reflecting the lack of 
adjustment to electricity tariffs combined with the settlement in June of 
part of power sector arrears (equivalent to 1.1% of GDP), pushed the fiscal 
deficit again to 8.8% of GDP. Remaining arrears were settled in the first 
month of FY2014.
Recent estimates found total public debt had reached 63.2 % of GDP 
by the end of FY2013, well above the 60% legal limit set under the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Debt Limitation Act, 2005. Public domestic debt 
has increased sharply in each of the past 2 years, from 32.9% of GDP at 
the end of FY2011 to 41.5% by the end of FY2013. Over the same period, 
limited new lending and net repayments reduced external debt to 21.7% of 
GDP at the end of June 2013. 
The current account deficit narrowed to $2.3 billion in FY2013 (equal 
to 1.0% of GDP) from $4.7 billion a year earlier (Figure 3.7.6). This mainly 
reflected large receipts from the Coalition Support Fund that lowered the 
services deficit and an increase in remittances, though the latter expanded 
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by a scant 5.6%. A 1.6% contraction in imports, mainly reflecting reduced 
outlays for oil and fertilizer, slightly narrowed the trade deficit. Exports 
expanded by only 0.2%, owing to slack demand in general and power 
outages that crimped textile exports.
Net inflow on the capital and financial accounts fell to $517 million, 
only 0.2% of GDP (Figure 3.7.7). Foreign direct investment nevertheless 
increased, for the first time in 5 years, to $1.4 billion—still only a quarter 
of the $5.4 billion posted in FY2008. 
Despite an improved current account deficit, official foreign exchange 
reserves fell sharply under the burden of external debt repayments and 
intervention in the foreign exchange market, dropping from $10.8 billion 
at the end of June 2012 to $6.0 billion a year later, even after drawing 
$815 million in a currency swap with the People’s Republic of China 
(Figure 3.7.8). June 2013 foreign exchange reserves equaled less than 
1.5 months of the next year’s projected imports of goods and services. 
The Pakistan rupee depreciated by only 4.5% during FY2013 because of 
intervention to support it, ending the fiscal year at PRs98.57 to the dollar. 
It depreciated moderately in annual average real effective terms. 
Prospects 
The new government that took office in June 2013 quickly signaled, in 
line with its election manifesto, that restoring economic sustainability 
and rapid growth was a high priority for its 5-year term. It emphasized 
dealing with the energy crisis, boosting investment and trade, upgrading 
infrastructure, and ceding most economic functions to the private sector. 
To address low foreign exchange reserves, fiscal and external 
imbalances, and low growth, the government opened discussions with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in June 2013 on a new program 
that would stabilize the economy and unblock structural barriers holding 
back rapid growth. Following the completion of prior actions, the IMF 
approved a SDR4.393 billion ($6.7 billion) 3-year arrangement under its 
Extended Financing Facility on 4 September 2013.
A number of initial policy actions were taken prior to program 
approval to kick-start reforms: The government implemented fiscal 
adjustment measures totaling 2% of GDP on an annualized basis. 
The authorities adjusted certain electricity tariffs to reduce expected 
tariff differential subsidies by 0.75% of GDP. The SBP purchased 
$125 million on the foreign exchange market to start rebuilding reserves. 
Provincial governments agreed to respect fiscal balances established for 
the FY2014 economic program. Finally, the government issued 10,000 tax 
notices to unregistered individuals identified as having potentially large 
income tax liabilities. 
The IMF’s baseline projections for FY2014 differed from those 
announced in the context of the FY2014 budget, as they projected lower 
growth at 3.3%, instead of 4.4% as in the budget; a larger deficit at 8.1% of 
GDP rather than at 6.3%; and a sharp reduction in reserves to well short 
of 1 month of import cover. Against this backdrop, the IMF forecasts 
growth at only 2.5% for FY2014, reflecting the impact of the substantial 
fiscal consolidation planned for the year. ADO projections, however, use 
a somewhat smaller multiplier for fiscal compression on growth, which 
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3.7.1  Key structural reform 
measures in the energy sector
The government issued in July 2013 
an energy policy covering all elements 
of the energy supply chain, along with 
demand management and pricing 
policies.
Pricing policies. The elimination of 
tariff subsidies is required for fiscal 
sustainability and sector efficiency. 
Electricity tariff subsidies will be 
eliminated for all but the smallest 
consumers. The first round of 
increases was implemented in August 
2013, eliminating subsidies for 
industrial consumers and reducing 
subsidies for commercial and bulk 
customers. A second round of 
increases planned for 1 October 2013 
will reduce or eliminate subsidies 
to a second group of consumers, 
including domestic consumers using 
more than 200 kilowatt-hours. Over 
the second and third years of the 
program, subsidies will be completely 
phased out for users of more than 
200 kilowatt-hours and reduced for all 
but the smallest consumers below that 
threshold. The impact on the most 
vulnerable will be cushioned through 
existing income support programs. 
Arrears. Arrears owed within the 
sector were cleared in June and July. 
To prevent the accumulation of new 
arrears, the government will hire 
professional teams to conduct technical 
and financial audits of the system 
toward designing and implementing a 
policy roadmap for reform. 
Monitoring and enforcement 
measures. The program will address 
the current inability to collect enough 
good information on available power 
supplies to curtail unscheduled load 
shedding. Distribution companies will 
be empowered to make commercial 
decisions on power allocation, 
including differential outages for 
neighborhoods with low payment 
rates. Measures to ensure compliance 
with usage restrictions will be put in 
place, and power theft will be made a 
crime.
Demand- and supply-side 
management. Demand and supply 
management, combined with 
projects GDP up by 3% in FY2014. The settlement of PRs408.1 billion 
(about $410 billion) in accumulated arrears in the power sector should 
provide a number of independent power contractors with sufficient 
working capital to purchase enough fuel to operate at full capacity, 
somewhat mitigating the need for load shedding in early FY2014. Official 
reserves under the program are targeted to increase to $9.6 billion in 
FY2014, which would provide 2.2 months of import cover. 
Fiscal policies under the 3-year program focus on eliminating power 
subsidies, strengthening Pakistan’s notoriously weak revenue base, 
ending the drain on the budget imposed by loss-making state-owned 
enterprises, and compressing other non-salary current expenditure. 
In the first year, FY2014, the deficit is to be reduced to 5.8% of GDP 
excluding grants. Major deficit reduction measures include increasing 
the goods and services tax from 16% to 17% for most goods as enacted 
in the original budget with some rates increasing to 19% in measures 
implemented at end-September 2013; reining in power subsidies 
by raising certain tariffs; and levying a new tax on natural gas. 
Contingency measures have been identified in the event that planned 
fiscal consolidation falls short. 
Further fiscal consolidation over the second and third years of the 
program is programmed at 1.5 percentage points of GDP in each year, 
drawing increasingly on the revenue side with steps that include targeting 
300,000 potential income tax taxpayers, eliminating most of the plethora 
of ad hoc exemptions that hold down tax revenues, and reforming the 
civil service. The government has already taken steps to prevent further 
ad hoc exemptions without parliamentary approval, and, by FY2015, all 
ad hoc exemptions granted under statutory regulatory orders will be 
either eliminated or codified. Over the program period, the fiscal deficit is 
expected to shrink to 3.6% of GDP.
Quantitative performance criteria under the program set a floor for 
net international reserves and limits on swap transactions, and they place 
ceilings on the net domestic assets of the SBP, net government borrowing 
from the SBP, and the overall budget deficit. The program’s monetary and 
exchange rate policies aim to rebuild foreign exchange reserves, including 
by the SBP making direct purchases. It envisions inflation averaging 8.0% 
in FY2014. Policy parameters do not target inflation, to avoid exacerbating 
the impact of fiscal consolidation on economic activity, and interest 
and exchange rates will adjust to economic conditions. Amendments to 
the SBP Act to enhance the central bank’s independence, particularly 
giving it operational independence in pursuit of price stability as its main 
objective, are planned for the end of March 2014. 
Lower growth in FY2014, the first year of the program, is expected 
to combine with some nominal exchange rate depreciation (by 8.7% by 
24 September) and expected inflows from remittances and the Coalition 
Support Fund to hold the current account deficit to 0.8% of GDP in 
FY2014, slightly larger than the IMF projections reflecting ADO’s smaller 
compression of growth from fiscal contraction. The program envisages 
improved capital and financial account net inflows stemming in part 
from higher program financing from official creditors mobilized by the 
IMF. Over the program period, gross official reserves are expected to 
strengthen to $18 billion, or more than 3 months of import cover. 
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3.7.1 continued
appropriate incentives to invest in 
lower-cost energy sources, is key 
to holding down costs. On the 
demand side, equipment standards 
set in the Pakistan Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Act will be 
approved and enforced. Supply-side 
management will address the 
increasingly unaffordable share of 
fuel oil in the energy mix, including 
by prioritizing the use of coal and 
gas. The continued rehabilitation of 
generating companies and upgrading 
of transmission and distribution 
facilities, and efficiency testing for 
all generating companies, will reduce 
currently large technical losses. 
Governance and regulatory 
improvement. The independence, 
accountability, and administrative 
capacity of the National Electric 
Power Regulatory Authority will be 
strengthened. Tariff determination 
will be shortened from 8–10 months 
to 90 days, with a new tariff 
determined by the end of October 
2013 and notified within the 
next 15 days. The Central Power 
Purchasing Agency will be separated 
from the National Transmission and 
Dispatch Company, taking over the 
payment and settlement system by the 
end of December 2013. 
Reform of state-owned enterprises 
in the power sector. The institutional 
capacity of these organizations needs to 
be strengthened if they eventually are 
to work as independent and efficient 
competitive entities. The governance 
of distribution companies and of the 
National Transmission and Dispatch 
Company are to be transferred to new 
boards of directors and management 
by the end of December 2013. The 
Water and Power Development 
Authority will be strengthened, and 
tariffs will be adjusted to include the 
cost for capital investment.
Oil and gas sector. Current gas supply 
meets only half of unconstrained 
demand, so supply will be augmented 
through imports of liquefied natural 
gas and increased exploration and 
development of domestic sources. 
Pricing will be adjusted semiannually 
to encourage new investment. 
Structural reform mandated under the program is critical to stabilizing 
the economy and improving its growth prospects. The unrelenting crisis 
in the power sector has taken an estimated 2 percentage points off growth 
annually, deepened the investment drought, caused exports to stagnate, 
and undermined business confidence. Energy reforms are at the core of 
the program, consistent with the government energy policy announced in 
July 2013. The reform package looks, first, to easing liquidity constraints 
in the power sector; then to managing demand and supply, including 
imports and the exploration of new fields (supported by appropriate 
pricing policies); and finally to changing management and governance to 
put sector entities on a competitive commercial footing that would ensure 
needed investment (Box 3.7.1). 
Beyond the energy sector, reform extends to restructuring 65 public 
enterprises, aiming to privatize many of them. The completion and 
implementation of restructuring plans for Pakistan Steel Mills, Pakistan 
International Airlines, and Pakistan Railways will eliminate the need 
for sustained support to these enterprises. Plans for the airline include 
stripping the unviable components into a separate public enterprise, 
which will be liquidated by the end of June 2014 as 26% of airline shares 
are to be privatized by the same date. New restructuring plans for the 
steel mills are expected by the end of September 2013 and for the railway 
by the end of March 2014. 
New legislation is needed to remedy gaps and inconsistencies in 
the regulatory and supervisory frameworks governing the financial 
sector, including a draft securities bill to strengthen the supervisory and 
enforcement powers of the regulator and amendments to the Security 
and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to act as an integrated regulator. 
Ongoing consultations on a new bankruptcy law aim to improve the 
legal framework for rehabilitating viable enterprises and liquidating 
those determined not to be viable. A draft law is expected by the end of 
September 2014, for enactment by the end of December 2015. The Ministry 
of Finance and the SBP plan to introduce deposit insurance to strengthen 
the long-term stability of the banking system. It would be managed by a 
deposit protection fund established as a subsidiary of the SBP. 
There are risks to the program. Most of the required reforms have 
political and governance dimensions that have posed formidable barriers 
in the past. These barriers stifle reform that would replace Pakistan’s 
woefully inadequate revenue base with one capable of meeting the 
country’s needs; limit the implementation of needed reform to the energy 
sector; and hinder the appropriate restructuring, corporatization, and 
privatization of state-owned enterprises. If these barriers remain, Pakistan 
will not have the active and vibrant private sector that it needs for growth 
and job generation. Pakistan is at a turning point where political will 
determines whether or not the future holds further deterioration or 
enhanced growth prospects.
This chapter was written by Norio Usui and Teresa Mendoza of the Philippines 
Country Oﬃce, ADB, Manila. 
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Philippines
Bucking the regional trend, this economy accelerated in the first half of the year and doubled its current 
account surplus. Growth in 2013 will be well above that anticipated in ADO 2013. It is seen moderating in 
2014 but still outperforming the earlier forecast. Inflation is modest and projected to remain so. However, 
vigorous growth has not generated adequate employment, allowing the unemployment rate to rise and 
underemployment to remain high.
Updated assessment
Buoyant investment, particularly in construction, and robust consumption 
propelled surprisingly stronger GDP growth of 7.6% in the first half of 2013 
(Figure 3.8.1). Spending related to local and national legislative elections in 
May contributed to growth. 
Fixed investment rose by 12.7%, double the pace of a year earlier, 
and it made a significant contribution to GDP growth (Figure 3.8.2). 
Investment was strong in both public and private construction. Increases 
were also recorded in outlays on commercial vehicles and industrial 
machinery. 
Although moderating from a year earlier, private consumption still 
increased by a robust 5.3%, assisted by higher remittance inflows and 
modest inflation. Remittances from overseas Filipinos rose by 6.2% to 
$11.8 billion in the first half (a 2.2% increase in pesos). By contrast, net 
exports of goods and services were a drag on growth. 
From the production side, services expanded by 7.1% and contributed 
half of GDP growth. Service subsectors that performed strongly 
included retailing, finance, real estate, and business services, including 
business process outsourcing. Manufacturing grew by 9.9%, well above 
its 4% average pace in 2007–2012 (Figure 3.8.3). Food processing, which 
comprises 40% of all manufacturing, is a key driver, though increases 
were seen as well in a range of industries such as chemicals, furniture and 
fixtures, and communication equipment. 
Buoyant construction in both the public and the private sectors 
generated rapid growth approaching 23% for this industry. Agriculture 
had a better first half than in 2012, but unfavorable weather toward 
mid-2013 held growth to 1.4%.
Notwithstanding strong domestic demand, inflation eased from 
February to August (Figure 3.8.4). The average inflation rate for the first 8 
months was a modest 2.8%, contained by a good harvest early in the year 
and by soft global commodity prices. 
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In this context, the monetary authorities kept policy interest rates 
at record lows: 3.5% for the overnight borrowing rate and 5.5% for the 
overnight lending rate. 
Low interest rates and buoyant economic growth, remittances, and 
capital inflows fueled rapid expansion of domestic liquidity. Action by 
the central bank to encourage a shift of funds out of its special deposit 
accounts into lending for productive purposes added to liquidity. The 
actions included limiting access to these accounts and cutting interest 
rates paid on them. Broad money supply growth accelerated to 30.1% 
year on year in July, the fastest pace since December 2002 (Figure 3.8.5). 
Credit to the private sector expanded by 14% in July.
Fiscal policy also supported economic growth. Government 
expenditure rose by 13.6% in the first 7 months, outpacing an 11.3% increase 
in revenue, and the fiscal deficit widened by 42% from a year earlier. About 
one-third of the increase in spending was directed to infrastructure. 
External accounts strengthened in the first half, as the trade 
deficit shrank and the current account surplus doubled. The value of 
merchandise exports rose by 4.2% in US dollar terms, with increases 
in agricultural and wood products, processed food, and minerals but 
declines in electronics. Imports fell by 4.4%, largely reflecting lower 
demand for electronic components for processing. Imports of industrial 
machinery, transport equipment, and consumer goods rose. 
Trade in services produced a larger surplus, benefitting from growth 
in business process outsourcing and inbound tourism. Higher remittances 
also contributed to the current account surplus, which jumped to $5.6 
billion, or 4.2% of GDP. The capital and financial accounts posted net 
inflows of $850 million. Net inflows of direct and portfolio investment 
rose, although net foreign direct investment remained low by subregional 
standards. The balance of payments surplus increased, and gross 
international reserves stood at $83.2 billion in August, equal to 12 months 
of imports and 8 times short-term external debt. The peso depreciated by 
a relatively moderate 5% against the US dollar through late September.
Growth in employment remained sluggish, despite the strong GDP 
performance. Full-time employment rose by a meager 0.5% and part-time 
jobs by 4% in the 12 months to July. Moreover, the unemployment rate 
rose to 7.3% in July 2013 from 7.0% in July 2012 and underemployment was 
19.2%. The poverty rate remained high at 27.9% in 2012, according to the 
latest survey, compared with 28.8% in 2006 and 28.6% in 2009.
Prospects
Signs are positive for continued growth in consumption and investment. 
While momentum is expected to moderate from the stellar first-half 
performance, the forecast for GDP growth in 2013 as a whole is raised to 
7.0%, and that for 2014 is edged up to 6.1% (Figure 3.8.6). 
Investment is likely to maintain solid growth, supported by positive 
business sentiment and expansion in credit. A survey of business 
expectations conducted in the third quarter showed near-term caution, 
but respondents were optimistic about the fourth quarter, citing 
low inflation and interest rates, buoyant remittance inflows, and the 
achievement this year of investment‐grade sovereign credit ratings. 
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Moreover, in its Global Competitiveness Report 2013–2014, the World 
Economic Forum raised the Philippines by a further 6 places to 59th of 
148 economies (though still behind Malaysia at 24, Thailand at 37, and 
Indonesia at 38). In the previous year’s report, the country’s ranking rose 
by 10 places. The ranking on infrastructure, however, languished at a low 
96 in the latest report.
The outlook for construction remains bright. Construction projects 
approved in the second quarter rose by almost 14% in value from a year 
earlier. Overseas Filipinos are channeling investment into housing, and 
the steady expansion of business process outsourcing underpins the 
market for offices. Increases in manufacturing capacity utilization bode 
well for investment as well. 
Private consumption is benefiting from the growth in remittances, 
which quickened in July, and from moderate inflation, but the impact of 
election-related spending has dissipated since May. The latest survey of 
consumers shows them generally upbeat about the fourth quarter of this 
year and about 2014. Sales of automobiles rose at a double-digit rate in the 
first 8 months. 
Exports showed some signs of improvement in June and July, helped 
by a pickup in some electronics (but not in semiconductors). Overall, 
the external sector is expected to drag on economic growth through the 
forecast period. 
Prospects for buoyant domestic demand and a gradual uptrend 
in inflation in 2014 suggest a firm grip should be kept on fiscal and 
monetary settings. The government aims to trim the budget deficit to 
2.0% of GDP in 2013 and 2014, from 2.3% in 2012. Its budget for 2014 
proposes an increase in spending by 13.1%, or 14.6% excluding interest 
payments. Allocations for infrastructure will be boosted to the equivalent 
of 3.1% of GDP, from 2.5% this year. On the revenue side, tax income is 
targeted to rise to 14.1% of GDP next year from 13.6% in the first half of 
this year.
Inflation is expected to edge up during the second half of 2013, 
reflecting buoyant domestic demand and peso depreciation, and to trend 
higher in 2014. Forecasts for inflation are revised down from ADO 2013 in 
light of the unexpectedly subdued outcome so far this year (Figure 3.8.7).
The expansionary monetary stance may be withdrawn gradually next 
year, depending on the impact of high liquidity on inflation and asset prices.
Current account surpluses of 3.4%–3.5% of GDP are projected for the 
forecast period. Weaker-than-expected merchandise exports in 2013 have 
been offset by growing remittances and service exports. While exports 
will benefit next year from the projected pickup in industrial economies, 
solid domestic demand and reliance on imported inputs for export-
oriented electronics production will drive imports higher. 
Risks to the outlook posed by global financial market volatility are 
mitigated by the country’s strengthening economic fundamentals. The 
current account is firmly in surplus (Figure 3.8.8) and foreign reserves 
are high. External debt as a share of GDP (21.8% in June) has been on a 
downtrend since 2003, and 84% of it is medium- to long-term. Inflation 
is low, and investor sentiment was bolstered by this year’s award of 
investment grade ratings. In the banking sector, capital adequacy ratios 
are well above 10% and nonperforming loans remain low at about 3%.
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The fiscal deficit has narrowed from 3.7% of GDP in 2009 to an 
expected 2.0% in 2013 (Figure 3.8.9). Government debt as a share of GDP 
had fallen to 48.9% as of March 2013, and the external portion has declined 
to 36% of the total (Figure 3.8.10). This year, the government is sourcing 
89% of its funding from domestic markets, where liquidity is abundant. 
Challenges now center on improving infrastructure and generating 
jobs, which require a determined push to lift investment. Fixed capital 
investment increased to 20.5% of GDP in the first half of 2013, but this still 
trails the investment performance of peer economies such as Indonesia 
and Thailand. Net foreign direct investment inflows to the Philippines are 
low, averaging $2 billion over the past 6 years, with modest investment in 
manufacturing. 
Employment generation has fallen short of the official goal of adding 
1 million jobs annually to beat down unemployment and the incidence of 
poverty. An average of 780,000 new jobs were created in each of the past 
2 years, and the latest labor surveys show that about 400,000 new jobs 
were generated in the first 7 months of this year. Still, over a quarter of 
Filipino workers are unemployed or underemployed. This understates the 
weakness in the labor market because large numbers of Filipino workers 
are deployed abroad. Moreover, 40% of the workforce is categorized as 
vulnerable—unpaid family workers and the self-employed, mostly in the 
informal sector. 
The country needs to generate about 800,000 jobs each year just to 
absorb new entrants into the labor force, which is growing by about 2% 
annually. Employment growth must exceed this figure if the 3 million 
people now unemployed are to find work and the 7.3 million who are 
underemployed are to expand their working hours and earnings.
To achieve this, it will be vital to broaden the sources and types of 
work. Economic growth has been heavily based on expansion in services, 
with over half the workforce now employed in this sector. Employment in 
manufacturing has declined over the past 2 decades to 8% of the workforce.
Services cannot absorb all the job seekers. Moreover, labor 
productivity in this sector has been well below that of industry. Well-paid 
services employment usually requires higher levels of education and 
skills, which does not offer much hope to the majority of job seekers. 
For example, business process outsourcing has created about 700,000 
jobs, but they are filled mostly by college graduates. 
A larger and broader manufacturing base could generate substantial 
and productive employment for skilled and moderately skilled workers, 
as it has done in regional economies with higher employment rates and 
incomes. In this regard, the decline in the share of manufacturing in 
the Philippine GDP to 22% in 2012 from 26% in 1990 helps to explain 
the weakness in the labor market. Sluggish employment growth under 
stagnant industrialization has contributed to continuing high poverty 
incidence. 
The development of manufacturing requires sustained efforts to 
improve the environment for direct investment, build on gains made in 
instituting good governance, and upgrade infrastructure. The government 
must press forward with initiatives to formulate, in coordination with the 
private sector, industry road maps that include development strategies for 
subsectors such as manufacturing and agribusiness. 
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This chapter was written by Luxmon Attapich of the Thailand Resident Mission, 
ADB, Bangkok.
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Thailand 
Growth slowed more than expected in the first half of 2013 and the full-year outcome will be considerably 
below that forecast in ADO 2013. The economy is seen regaining momentum in 2014, depending in large 
part on government efforts to accelerate public investment. Inflation forecasts are trimmed for this year and 
next. The external current account is expected to improve gradually in 2014 after falling into deficit this year.
Updated assessment
Sluggish domestic and external demand weighed on economic growth 
in the first half of 2013, leaving GDP growth at 4.1% year on year, which 
was lower than expected (Figure 3.9.1). In quarter-on-quarter terms, GDP 
contracted in the first and second quarters, in part reflecting a high base 
set in the fourth quarter of 2012 when reconstruction after severe floods 
in 2011 and stimulatory government policies pushed up GDP. 
Growth in private consumption decelerated to 3.4% in the first half, 
as the impact of post-flood replacement purchases and government relief 
payments in 2012 faded. The expiration at the end of last year of a tax rebate 
for first-time buyers of automobiles has led to lower car sales in 2013. 
The slowdown in private consumption was cushioned by high 
employment (the unemployment rate was just 0.5% at midyear), the 
extension of a minimum-wage rise throughout the country from 
January 2013, and the government’s program to buy rice above its market 
price, which supports rural incomes. Growth in private consumption 
contributed 1.8 percentage points to GDP growth in the first half. 
Private fixed investment rose by a slight 2.4%, dampened by weakness 
in exports and the modest growth in consumption (Figure 3.9.2). 
Investment on machinery and equipment pulled back from a year earlier, 
when many companies replaced flood-damaged equipment. 
Government fixed investment rebounded in the first half by 16.6% 
from a contraction a year earlier. State-owned enterprises led the 
recovery with such infrastructure projects as mass rapid transit rail 
lines in Bangkok and telecommunications facilities, power plants, and 
expressways. Public and private fixed investment combined grew by 5.1%, 
contributing 1.2 percentage points to GDP growth. 
From the supply side, services generated most of the GDP growth 
in the first half. A 20% surge in tourist arrivals to 12.7 million helped to 
drive 14.5% expansion in the hotels and restaurants subsector. Financial 
services and community and personal services also expanded at double-
digit rates. Transport, storage, and communications grew by 8.0%. 
Growth in wholesale and retail trading was relatively subdued at 4.1%, 
reflecting the slowdown in private consumption. 
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Manufacturing grew by a modest 2.0%, a result of soft domestic and 
external demand. Construction remained relatively buoyant, increasing 
by 7.6%. Agriculture and fisheries grew by only 0.4% because disease 
devastated shrimp production and rice output declined. 
Thailand incurred deficits in external trade and its current account 
in the first half of this year (Figures 3.9.3 and 3.9.4). Merchandise exports 
rose by a meager 1.2% to $111.7 billion, with shipments to the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) falling by 3.6%. Exports of electrical appliances, 
motor vehicles, and chemical products held up relatively well, but declines 
were recorded in electronics, shrimp (because of the disease), and rice 
(stemming in part from high prices buoyed by the rice-support program). 
Imports were subdued, increasing by 3.2% to $112.5 billion, owing to 
sluggish consumption, investment, and manufacturing. Going against 
this trend, imports of gold jumped by 23.0% to $9.5 billion, prompted in 
part by a decline in the price of gold and speculation of a price recovery. 
Gold imports were more than double the value of gold exports in 
January–June. 
The trade deficit of $768 million combined with deficits in services, 
income, and transfers to produce a current account deficit of $3.8 
billion, equivalent to 3.7% of GDP. A significant increase in payments 
of profits and dividends contributed to the deficit. Capital and financial 
accounts recorded a net inflow of $7.2 billion, bolstered by short-term 
foreign loans, and the overall balance of payments registered a surplus. 
International reserves fell by 7.1% to $168.8 billion in the first 8 months. 
At this level the reserves covered 7.2 months of imports of goods and 
services. 
Capital inflows, which caused the baht to appreciate against the 
US dollar in the first quarter, turned to outflows in the second quarter, 
when anticipation of the US winding down its monetary stimulus spurred 
capital outflows from emerging markets generally. The baht depreciated 
by 2.4% against the US dollar through late September. 
Inflation decelerated from 3.6% in late 2012 to 1.6% in August 2013, 
reflecting lackluster domestic demand and soft global commodity prices 
(Figure 3.9.5). Food, fuel, and housing costs decelerated. The average 
inflation rate for the first 8 months was a lower-than-expected 2.5%. 
Benign inflation and sagging economic growth prompted the Bank of 
Thailand to lower its policy interest rate in May by 25 basis points to 2.5%, 
the fourth rate cut since late 2011. None of the four main commercial 
banks reduced lending rates in response. Growth in consumer credit 
eased but was still buoyant at 13.8% in July, and growth in business 
lending slowed to 9.6% in July (Figure 3.9.6).
Fiscal policy has been less stimulatory than anticipated earlier in 
the year, largely because some off-budget capital spending was delayed. 
The government reported a fiscal deficit of B170.4 billion in the first 
10 months of FY2013 (ended 30 September 2013). The fiscal deficit, 
including budget and off-budget items, is estimated to have narrowed to 
3.2% of GDP from 4.1% in FY2012.
Public debt was at a manageable 44.3% of GDP at midyear, up from 
43.7% at the end of 2012. The government opened credit lines totaling 
$10 billion with financial institutions for planned water management 
investment projects.
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Prospects
Near-term prospects have deteriorated since the start of the year, and 
the outlook for 2014 is subject to heightened risks. Domestic demand 
is weaker than was anticipated in ADO 2013, and the economic 
performance of many regional trading partners has been more subdued 
than expected. Also, projected growth in world trade has been revised 
down for this year. GDP growth is forecast to slow further in the second 
half due to a high base set in the year-earlier period. Consequently, 
economic growth this year will be well below that forecast in April.
The outlook depends in large part on plans to boost public 
investment. The government has allocated $11.7 billion to be invested over 
several years on water management projects to mitigate the country’s 
vulnerability to floods. However, the Central Administrative Court 
delayed the projects when it ordered the government in June to conduct 
public hearings and environmental impact assessments. 
About B10 billion has been disbursed for water management projects 
this year, much less than originally expected. Delays in the projects 
are impeding growth and, if they drag into 2014, will erode next year’s 
performance.
This Update assumes that investment picks up on the water 
management projects in 2014, and that the government makes a start on 
another public investment program, this one involving very large outlays 
to upgrade transport infrastructure, including roads, railways, seaports, 
and airports. The government plans to invest $67 billion in transport 
infrastructure through 2020, to be funded off-budget by loans from 
domestic banks and later refinanced though long-term government bonds. 
The timely execution of the infrastructure program would contribute 
significantly to economic growth starting next year. More importantly, it 
would reverse a prolonged decline in public investment relative to GDP, 
which hurts long-term competitiveness. 
As for private investment, it is expected to remain lackluster 
through this year before lifting in 2014, as foreshadowed by an increase 
in applications for government investment incentives over the past 
18 months. The accommodative monetary policy, expected spillovers from 
government investment projects, and a better external outlook next year 
support higher investment. 
A decline in consumer confidence since April indicates that private 
consumption will remain sluggish for some time (Figure 3.9.7). High 
household debt is one factor constraining consumption. Household debt 
climbed from 55.5% of GDP in 2009 to 77.5% in the first quarter of 2013. 
Lower interest rates and government policies to stimulate consumption 
have contributed to demand for credit, and households turned to banks to 
finance repair and replacement after the 2011 floods. 
A national survey earlier this year found that Thai households spend 
on average one-third of their monthly income on loan repayments. 
Nevertheless, the prevalence of nonperforming loans in consumer debt 
has so far remained low. 
In light of unexpectedly low inflationary pressures, inflation forecasts 
are trimmed to 2.6% for this year and 2.9% for 2014 (Figure 3.9.8). 
Increases in charges for cooking gas, electricity, and road tolls from 
September 2013 put only slight upward pressure on inflation. 
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Subdued inflation and modest growth suggest that monetary 
policy will remain accommodative. On the fiscal side, the government 
approved in August 2013 a package of tax deductions for selected business 
investments, improved access to finance for small and medium-sized 
enterprises, and steps to accelerate budget disbursement. 
For FY2014, the government has reduced the budget deficit target, but 
at the same time off-budget public investment in the water management 
projects should pick up and the large transport infrastructure investments 
are scheduled to get underway. Taking into account planned spending on 
and off budget, fiscal policy in FY2014 is expected to be more stimulatory 
to economic growth than in FY2013. 
On the balance of these factors, GDP growth now is forecast at 
3.8% this year, quickening to 4.9% in 2014 because public investment is 
projected to accelerate, the global trade environment should improve, and 
fiscal policy will be more stimulatory (Figure 3.9.9). 
The current account this year will likely be close to balanced, or 
show a slight deficit, the forecast revised from a small surplus projected 
in ADO 2013. Trade data in July 2013 indicated some improvement in 
exports. Next year, exports are projected to pick up in line with world 
trade, assisted by recovery in agriculture and fisheries. The increase 
in public investment will add to imports in 2014, but the higher gold 
imports and remittances of profits and dividends seen in the first half 
of 2013 are not expected to recur. Consequently, the current account is 
expected to improve in 2014.
In response to criticism that the rice-support policy is not fiscally 
sustainable, the government has taken tentative steps to reduce the cost of 
the program. It will continue to pay B15,000 per ton for paddy from the 
main growing season in October 2013–February 2014 but will lower the 
support price to B13,000 for the March 2014–September 2014 crop and put 
a ceiling on payments for each farming household. 
Further, the government will limit its rice purchases to 16.5 million 
tons of paddy and its losses on the program to B100 billion for FY2014. 
Losses totaled an estimated B136 billion and B113 billion in the past 2 years. 
Government efforts to export rice from its inventories, estimated at more 
than 10 million tons in August, are proceeding slowly.
Risks to the economic outlook include delays affecting public 
infrastructure projects and the possibility of unexpectedly slow economic 
growth in the major industrial countries or the PRC. The central bank 
has warned that shortages of labor and a slowdown in labor productivity 
growth could increasingly constrain economic growth. Finally, domestic 
political tensions have reemerged over proposed government legislation.
Thailand is well placed to ride out volatility in international capital 
flows on the strength of its substantial international reserves and 
manageable public debt (Figure 3.9.10). International reserves amounted 
to 2.9 times the country’s short-term foreign debt at March 2013 
(Figure 3.9.11). 
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Viet Nam 
Economic growth remains sluggish as the government gradually addresses problems in the banking 
sector. A slightly faster pace of growth is still expected in 2014. Inflation forecasts are revised down in 
light of unexpectedly low outcomes so far this year. Current account surpluses are projected for this year 
and next. A return to stronger and sustained GDP growth depends on following through with plans to 
reform banks and state companies.
Updated assessment
Concerns over the health of banks continued to curb credit and 
investment in the first half of this year. GDP growth was also crimped by 
sluggish domestic demand and soft export markets, decelerating to 4.9% 
year on year in January–June 2013 (Figure 3.10.1). 
The industry sector grew by 5.2%, contributing 2.0 percentage points 
of GDP growth. High inventories weighed on manufacturing, and 
construction remained subdued despite government efforts to accelerate 
public investments and revive the property and construction businesses. 
Mining activity slowed in the first half from a year earlier. 
Growth in services eased to 5.9%, but this sector still made the largest 
contribution to GDP growth, at 2.5 percentage points. Transportation and 
real-estate services showed some improvement from 2012, but the retail 
and wholesale subsector softened. Agriculture recorded modest growth 
at 2.1%, constrained by lower prices for rice and bad weather in coffee-
growing areas. 
On the demand side, private consumption was lackluster as business 
closures and layoffs over the past 2 years took their toll on the labor 
market. Gross capital formation rose by 3.7%, supported by higher public 
investment, but the ratio of investment to GDP was, at 27%, still more than 
10 percentage points below the ratio in 2007. The contribution to GDP 
growth from net exports declined in the first half. 
Inflation averaged 6.8% in the first 9 months of this year, below last 
year’s average of 9.2% (Figure 3.10.2). With food price inflation under 
control, the government raised a range of administered prices, including 
for electricity, fuel, and medical services.
A steep downtrend in inflation since 2011 paved the way for the 
State Bank of Vietnam (SBV), the central bank, to lower key policy interest 
rates by 800 basis points from early in 2012, including cuts totaling 
200 basis points this year (Figure 3.10.3). The SBV also reduced the ceiling 
on lending rates for short-term loans in local currency to agriculture, small 
and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and other priority sectors, as well as 
the ceiling for interest rates paid on local and foreign currency deposits.
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Broad money supply expanded by an estimated 19% year on year in 
August, and credit grew by 12% on this basis, though the credit figure 
may be inflated by loan restructuring (Figure 3.10.4). Growth in lending 
was constrained by banks’ impaired balance sheets, concerns over the 
financial health of borrowers, a sagging property market, and weak 
demand for credit. 
Property prices trended lower, marking the third year of a deflating 
property market. However, the stock market rallied, with the VN Index of 
share prices up by 18% in the first 9 months. 
Increased domestic liquidity and a firmer US dollar put downward 
pressure on the exchange rate for the Viet Nam dong in the first half. The 
SBV devalued the dong by 1% against the US dollar in June and signaled 
that the currency will be devalued by 2%–3% over this year. The unofficial 
exchange rate, which had fallen out of the official trading band in April, 
moved back within the band in August (Figure 3.10.5).
Fiscal support to the economy was augmented in January 2013 by 
a package of measures to support business. They include deferment of 
corporate income tax and value-added tax for SMEs, as well as subsidies 
and tax breaks to stimulate the property market. From July, the corporate 
income tax rate was lowered to 20% for SMEs and to 10% for firms 
involved in providing low-income housing. The government joined with 
banks to offer housing finance at low rates of interest in an effort to spur 
demand and construction.
The fiscal deficit for 2013 is targeted at 4.8% of GDP. However, 
economic growth lower than the government expected could, coupled 
with new tax concessions, edge the deficit above the target.
Exports registered further gains in the first half, largely on expanded 
mobile phone and electronics manufacturing. Merchandise exports rose 
by an estimated 15% in US dollar terms and on a balance of payments 
basis. This reflected a surge in technology products from plants built by 
foreign companies in recent years. Exports of mobile phones, computers, 
and electronics comprised almost 23% of all exports. Increased shipments 
of manufactures more than offset lower export receipts from agricultural 
products and crude oil. 
Merchandise imports increased by 11%, driven by raw materials, 
inputs for manufacturing, and imported consumer goods. The trade 
surplus rose to an estimated $4.6 billion. After accounting for a small rise 
in remittances, steady tourism income, and higher payments abroad of 
interest and dividends, the current account surplus totaled $4.1 billion, 
slightly down from the first half of 2012. 
Preliminary estimates show that net foreign direct investment totaled 
$3.3 billion and portfolio inflows $1.2 billion, both little changed from a 
year earlier. A fall in other capital inflows narrowed the capital account 
surplus to $480 million. Foreign reserves declined in the second quarter 
(Figure 3.10.6).
The government took several important steps to address vulnerabilities 
in the banking sector, which center on high nonperforming loans (NPLs), 
insufficient bank capital, and inadequate prudential standards. Credit 
institutions reported that the NPL rate rose to 4.5% of total loans in the 
first half from 4.1% at the end of 2012. The SBV estimated NPLs at 6.0% in 
February 2013, based on its off-site surveillance of banks, but independent 
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analysts believe the figure would be 3–4 times higher if international 
accounting and provisioning standards were applied.
In May, the Prime Minister approved a program to deal with 
NPLs, which included the formation the Viet Nam Asset Management 
Company, which will acquire and later sell the bad debt. The government 
established an interministerial steering committee in March to improve 
coordination between government agencies and local authorities in 
implementing bank restructuring. The SBV pressed ahead with its efforts 
to restructure some of the smaller and weaker banks. 
Prospects
Unless structural reforms for banks and state-owned enterprises (SOE) 
are accelerated, the economy could face a prolonged period of lackluster 
growth languishing well below the 7%–8% pace set in 2002–2007. The 
following forecasts assume that the government makes gradual progress 
on these reforms and that it maintains macroeconomic stability.
Preliminary figures show that GDP growth picked up to 5.5% year 
on year in July–September from 4.9% in the first 6 months, driven by 
improvements in manufacturing and services. Also, fiscal disbursements 
usually accelerate toward the end of each year. This Update maintains the 
forecast for GDP growth at 5.2% for 2013 as a whole (Figure 3.10.7), using a 
new official data series with 2010 as its base year. (Under this new series, 
growth for 2012 is revised up to 5.2% from the 5.0% reported originally.) 
Growth is expected to strengthen slightly in 2014 compared with this 
year. Gradual progress in resolving NPLs will improve business sentiment. 
As this happens, policy stimulus, including the cuts in interest rates this 
year, could gain traction. Some additional fiscal stimulus appears likely. 
The Ministry of Finance is expected to raise the budget deficit target to 
over 5% of GDP next year in the face of low growth in revenue. Finally, a 
moderate strengthening in global trade is projected for 2014. 
Private consumption will remain subdued for some time, however, in 
light of sluggish job creation and continued weak consumer confidence 
(Figure 3.10.8). The measures to stimulate house building are expected 
to have limited impact on construction. In the service sector, stronger 
growth in financial services depends on making headway on bank 
restructuring, and a pickup in consumer-oriented services hinges on 
the health of the labor market. Steady increases in tourist arrivals will 
support growth in services, and manufacturing will benefit from the 
projected upturn in world trade. Agriculture should recover in 2014 after 
bad weather contributed to a slowdown this year. 
Progress on strengthening the banking system is expected to be fitful. 
Current capitalization for the Viet Nam Asset Management Company is 
unlikely to be sufficient to deal with large numbers of NPLs. It is unclear if 
the government will provide additional funding for the asset-management 
company or to recapitalize state-owned commercial banks. The success 
of the NPL program also depends on strengthening the bankruptcy law 
and the legal framework for dealing with secured asset transactions, and 
establishing mechanisms to price and auction bad debts. 
In a development that could prolong the process and worsen risks to 
the banking system, the SBV delayed until June 2014 the implementation 
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of a policy directing banks to raise standards on loan classification and 
provisioning. The new regulation, which originally was to take effect in 
June 2013, would require banks to classify more loans as nonperforming 
and to increase provisioning. It would also prevent enterprises with loans 
in arrears from accessing new credit.
Inflation is seen easing to 6.0% by the end of 2013, leaving the average 
for this year at 6.5% (Figure 3.10.9). The forecast is revised down from 
ADO 2013 because food price inflation has decelerated more quickly than 
expected. Monetary easing and increased liquidity have raised inflation 
expectations for 2014, when inflation is forecast to increase gradually to 7.2%.
While the prospect of relatively moderate inflation and continuing 
current account surpluses should support the dong, weakness in the 
unofficial exchange rate in June, coupled with volatility in domestic gold 
prices and a rise in errors and emissions in the balance of payments, 
indicate that confidence in the currency remains fragile. 
The current account is seen recording surpluses this year and next, 
though the forecasts are trimmed from ADO 2013 owing to expectations 
of stronger growth in imports. The rapid expansion of exports from 
foreign-invested manufacturing companies is starting to moderate. This 
trend may continue, as disbursed foreign investment as a share of GDP 
fell by half from 2008 to 2012. Exports from foreign-invested companies 
have contributed strongly to exports in the past 2 years, while exports 
from domestic firms have been flat (Figure 3.10.10). 
The government has approved restructuring plans for several SOEs, 
and implementation should be stepped up next year. Indicating the 
difficulties attached to SOE reform, state-owned Viet Nam Shipbuilding 
Industry Group, or Vinashin, reported in September that it intends to cut 
14,000 jobs as part of its restructuring. As SOEs are generally expected to 
generate employment, it is unclear if the Vinashin case sets a precedent 
that large-scale layoffs are now allowed as part of restructuring. 
Viet Nam is less vulnerable than some other regional economies 
to the asset sell-off in emerging markets seen this year. Foreign capital 
inflows that surged into regional markets over recent years largely 
bypassed Viet Nam. The VN Index of share prices is about where it was 
3 years ago. Yields on domestic bonds rose by 90 basis points from June 
to September 2013 (Figure 3.10.11), but foreign participation in the bond 
market is relatively low, and the bond market is small, at the equivalent 
of 20% of GDP. 
Most of the country’s public external debt, equal to 30% of GDP in 
2012, enjoys concessional terms and long maturities and is fairly well 
diversified over currencies.
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Statistical
appendix
Statistical notes and tables
The statistical appendix presents selected economic indicators for 45 
developing member economies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) in 
three tables: gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation, and current 
account balance as a percentage of GDP. The economies are grouped 
into five subregions: Central Asia, East Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, 
and the Pacific. The tables contain historical data for 2010 to 2012 and 
forecasts for 2013 and 2014.
The data were standardized to the degree possible in order to allow 
comparability over time and across economies, but differences in 
statistical methodology, definitions, coverage, and practices make full 
comparability impossible. The national income accounts section is based 
on the United Nations System of National Accounts, while the balance 
of-payments data are based on International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
accounting standards. Historical data were obtained from official sources, 
statistical publications, and databases, and documents of ADB, IMF, and 
World Bank. Projections for 2013 and 2014 are generally staff estimates 
made on the basis of available quarterly or monthly data, although some 
projections are from governments.
Most countries report on a calendar-year basis, while South Asian 
countries (except for the Maldives and Sri Lanka) report all variables on 
a fiscal year basis. Regional and subregional averages are provided for the 
three tables.
The averages are computed using weights derived from levels of gross 
national income (GNI) in current United States dollars (US$) following 
the World Bank Atlas method. The GNI data for 2010–2011 were obtained 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators Online. Weights 
for 2011 were carried over through 2014. The GNI data for Cook Islands 
and Tuvalu were estimated using the Atlas conversion factor. Myanmar 
and Nauru have no GNI data, and data for these two countries are 
excluded from the computation of all subregional averages and totals. The 
following paragraphs discuss the three tables in greater detail.
Table A1: Growth rate of GDP (% per year). The table shows annual 
growth rates of GDP valued at constant market prices, factor costs, or 
basic prices. GDP at market prices is the aggregation of the value added 
of all resident producers at producers’ prices including taxes less subsidies 
on imports plus all nondeductible value-added or similar taxes. Constant 
factor cost measures differ from market price measures in that they 
exclude taxes on production and include subsidies. Basic price valuation 
Statistical appendix  177
is the factor cost plus some taxes on production, such as property and 
payroll taxes, and less some subsidies, such as labor-related subsidies but 
not product-related subsidies. Most countries use constant market price 
valuation. Fiji, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka use constant factor costs, 
while the Maldives and Nepal use basic prices.  
Table A2: Inflation (% per year). Data on inflation rates represent 
period averages. Except for India, which reports the wholesale price 
index, inflation rates presented are based on consumer price indexes. 
The consumer price indexes of the following countries are for a given 
city or group of consumers only: Afghanistan is for Kabul until 2010, 
Cambodia is for Phnom Penh, theMaldives is for Male, Marshall Islands 
is for Majuro, Solomon Islands is for Honiara, and Nepal is for urban 
consumers. 
Table A3: Current account balance (% of GDP). The current account 
balance is the sum of the balance of trade for merchandise, net trade in 
services, factor or primary income, and transfers or secondary income. 
The values reported are divided by GDP at current prices in US dollars. 
In the case of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, and Viet Nam, official transfers 
are excluded from the current account balance.
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Table A1 Growth rate of GDP (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADO 2013 Update ADO 2013 Update
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific 
Cook Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
6.8 6.8 5.6 5.5 5.4 6.0 6.0
2.2 4.7 7.2 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6
5.0 0.1 2.1 3.1 4.0 4.8 4.8
6.3 7.2 6.1 5.5 3.0 6.0 5.5
7.3 7.5 5.0 5.2 4.8 5.6 5.6
–0.5 6.0 –0.9 5.5 7.5 4.5 4.5
6.5 7.4 7.5 6.5 7.0 6.0 6.0
9.2 14.7 11.1 9.0 9.0 8.0 8.0
8.5 8.3 8.2 7.5 7.5 8.0 8.0
9.8 8.2 6.5 7.1 6.6 7.1 6.6
10.4 9.3 7.7 8.2 7.6 8.0 7.4
6.8 4.9 1.5 3.5 3.2 3.8 3.8
6.3 3.7 2.0 2.8 2.8 3.7 3.5
6.4 17.5 12.3 16.5 12.0 14.0 13.0
10.8 4.1 1.3 3.5 2.3 3.9 3.3
8.4 6.0 5.1 5.7 4.7 6.2 5.5
8.4 7.2 11.9 3.3 3.7 5.1 5.3
6.1 6.7 6.2 5.7 6.0 6.0 5.8
9.3 10.0 7.5 8.6 8.4 8.5 8.5
9.3 6.2 5.0 6.0 4.7 6.5 5.7
7.1 7.0 3.4 4.3 4.3 5.5 5.5
4.3 3.8 4.5 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.5
2.6 3.7 4.4 3.6 3.6 3.5 3.0
8.0 8.2 6.4 6.8 6.8 7.2 7.2
7.9 4.7 5.6 5.4 4.9 5.7 5.3
2.6 3.4 0.9 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.9
6.0 7.1 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.5 7.5
6.2 6.5 6.2 6.4 5.7 6.6 6.0
7.5 7.8 7.9 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.7
7.4 5.1 5.6 5.3 4.3 5.5 5.0
5.3 5.9 6.4 6.5 6.5 6.7 6.8
7.6 3.6 6.8 6.0 7.0 5.9 6.1
14.8 5.2 1.3 2.6 2.6 3.7 3.5
7.8 0.1 6.5 4.9 3.8 5.0 4.9
6.4 6.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.6 5.5
5.5 8.3 7.5 5.2 5.2 5.5 5.5
–2.9 1.0 4.6 3.0 3.2 3.2 3.5
0.1 1.9 2.2 2.0 2.8 2.3 2.4
–0.5 3.3 2.5 3.5 2.0 3.5 2.3
5.6 0.8 1.9 2.3 2.3 1.5 1.5
2.5 2.1 1.4 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.5
–11.3 3.8 4.9 8.0 4.5 8.0 6.0
–0.4 6.9 6.3 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.0
7.4 11.1 9.8 5.5 5.5 6.0 6.0
0.1 2.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 2.0 2.0
6.9 10.6 4.8 4.0 2.5 4.0 4.0
9.5 10.8 10.6 10.0 9.5 10.0 10.0
3.3 2.9 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.3
–1.4 –0.6 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5
1.6 1.4 2.0 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.4
9.2 7.3 6.1 6.6 6.0 6.7 6.2
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Table A2 Inflation (% per year)
Subregion/Economy 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADO 2013 Update ADO 2013 Update
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific 
Cook Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
7.0 8.9 5.1 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8
8.2 7.7 2.6 3.6 5.0 3.2 4.5
5.7 7.9 1.1 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0
7.1 8.5 –0.9 3.0 1.5 4.0 4.0
7.1 8.3 5.1 6.7 6.7 6.5 6.5
7.8 16.6 2.8 7.5 7.5 5.5 5.5
6.5 12.5 5.8 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.0
4.4 5.3 4.9 6.0 6.0 6.5 6.5
9.4 12.8 12.1 9.5 9.5 9.0 9.0
3.1 5.0 2.6 3.1 2.4 3.3 2.7
3.3 5.4 2.6 3.2 2.5 3.5 2.7
2.3 5.3 4.1 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.0
3.0 4.0 2.2 2.5 2.0 2.8 2.6
10.1 9.1 14.3 13.0 9.5 10.0 10.0
1.0 1.4 1.9 1.6 0.9 1.8 1.4
9.4 9.3 7.9 7.4 6.7 7.1 7.0
7.7 11.8 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.8
7.3 8.8 10.6 7.8 7.7 7.0 7.5
4.8 8.6 10.2 9.3 8.4 7.4 7.4
9.6 8.9 7.4 7.2 6.5 6.8 6.8
6.1 11.3 10.9 9.3 5.5 8.5 5.0
9.6 9.6 8.3 10.5 9.9 9.0 10.5
10.1 13.7 11.0 9.0 7.4 9.5 8.0
6.2 6.7 7.6 7.5 7.0 6.5 6.5
4.1 5.5 3.9 4.2 4.7 4.1 4.3
0.4 2.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.2
4.0 5.5 2.9 3.0 2.5 3.5 3.5
5.1 5.4 4.3 5.2 7.2 4.7 5.5
6.0 7.6 4.3 5.5 6.5 5.0 6.0
1.7 3.2 1.7 2.2 2.2 3.0 3.0
8.2 2.8 2.8 5.1 5.8 5.1 5.7
3.9 4.6 3.2 3.6 3.0 3.8 3.5
2.8 5.3 4.5 3.8 3.2 3.0 3.0
3.3 3.8 3.0 3.2 2.6 3.1 2.9
9.2 18.6 9.2 7.5 6.5 8.2 7.2
5.1 8.4 4.3 6.1 5.7 6.3 6.0
1.8 0.6 2.8 3.0 2.4 3.0 3.0
5.5 8.7 4.3 4.5 2.7 4.0 2.5
–3.9 1.5 –3.0 3.0 1.5 3.0 3.0
1.8 5.4 5.7 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5
6.3 4.7 5.6 4.5 4.5 3.5 3.5
–0.6 –3.5 –0.5 0.5 0.5 2.5 2.5
1.1 2.6 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5
6.0 8.4 2.2 6.5 6.0 7.5 7.5
–0.2 3.0 6.5 4.5 –0.2 4.0 3.0
1.0 7.4 5.9 4.5 5.5 4.5 4.0
5.6 13.1 10.9 9.0 10.5 7.7 7.7
5.1 3.8 2.5 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7
–1.9 0.5 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
2.8 0.8 1.4 2.5 2.0 2.5 2.0
4.4 5.9 3.7 4.0 3.6 4.2 3.7
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Table A3 Current account balance (% of GDP)
Subregion/Economy 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
ADO 2013 Update ADO 2013 Update
Central Asia
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Uzbekistan
East Asia
China, People’s Rep. of
Hong Kong, China
Korea, Rep. of
Mongolia
Taipei,China
South Asia
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Southeast Asia
Brunei Darussalam
Cambodia
Indonesia
Lao People’s Dem. Rep.
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Viet Nam
The Pacific 
Cook Islands
Fiji
Kiribati
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Fed. States of
Nauru
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Average
... = data not available.
4.8 7.7 5.1 3.1 2.4 4.5 4.5
–14.8 –10.9 –11.2 –9.8 –10.4 –9.1 –9.6
28.4 25.7 22.6 13.0 10.0 17.0 17.0
–10.2 –12.7 –11.5 –11.9 –10.1 –10.7 –10.0
0.9 6.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 4.0
–7.2 –6.1 –20.9 –7.0 –8.0 –5.0 –5.0
2.1 –2.3 –3.5 –5.0 –4.5 –4.8 –4.0
–10.6 2.0 ... 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0
6.6 8.1 4.7 4.3 4.3 3.2 3.2
4.3 2.4 3.0 3.0 2.7 2.8 2.6
4.0 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.2 2.1 2.1
7.0 5.6 2.3 4.0 1.6 5.0 3.5
2.9 2.3 3.8 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.5
–14.3 –31.5 –31.3 –22.0 –25.0 –15.0 –18.0
9.3 8.9 10.5 11.0 10.0 12.0 10.0
–2.3 –3.6 –4.2 –3.7 –3.2 –3.2 –3.0
3.9 3.0 4.0 1.6 3.4 0.3 2.8
3.7 0.8 –0.4 2.0 1.9 1.0 –0.5
–9.9 –23.5 –18.9 –20.0 –20.0 –20.0 –20.0
–2.8 –4.2 –4.8 –4.4 –3.8 –3.7 –3.5
–9.2 –21.4 –27.0 –27.8 –27.9 –22.0 –22.0
–2.3 –0.9 4.9 –0.5 3.4 –1.8 1.8
–2.2 0.1 –1.6 –0.8 ... –0.9 –0.8
–2.2 –7.8 –5.8 –5.0 –5.0 –4.5 –4.5
6.3 5.4 3.0 2.9 2.0 2.7 2.3
48.5 52.4 47.0 45.0 47.5 47.0 50.0
–10.4 –8.8 –11.6 –11.1 –11.1 –10.1 –10.1
0.7 0.2 –2.8 –2.3 –3.4 –1.8 –2.7
–18.3 –21.4 –22.6 –21.5 –24.0 –23.6 –21.0
10.9 11.6 6.1 5.8 3.0 5.6 3.0
–1.9 –2.4 –4.4 –4.2 –4.4 –4.4 –4.5
4.5 3.1 2.8 3.0 3.4 3.2 3.5
28.4 23.8 19.0 16.1 16.9 14.7 16.4
3.1 1.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.5
–4.0 0.2 6.4 6.9 5.2 5.6 4.1
21.7 42.0 15.2 4.8 4.8 4.4 4.4
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
–7.5 –7.0 –6.1 –22.5 –22.5 –7.0 –7.0
–22.9 –27.2 –26.6 –23.9 –23.9 –20.0 –20.0
–28.1 –6.2 –6.3 –2.5 –2.5 –2.5 2.5
–16.5 –18.8 –15.0 –14.3 –14.3 –14.0 –14.0
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
2.0 4.1 5.9 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
–6.4 –1.3 –17.5 –15.1 –15.1 –8.4 –8.4
–7.5 –4.4 –10.1 –13.4 –13.4 –15.5 –15.5
–28.3 –7.8 –5.8 –10.0 –10.0 –10.0 –10.0
201.3 261.5 153.5 102.8 102.8 66.0 66.0
–4.9 –2.6 –6.8 –6.3 –6.3 –6.3 –6.3
–15.5 –39.8 –8.4 –3.3 –3.3 ... ...
–5.5 –6.3 –6.0 –10.0 –10.0 –10.0 –10.0
3.5 2.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.6
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Growth in developing Asia is hindered by moderation in the People’s Republic of China and 
India—the region’s two giants—and by steady but slow recovery in the major industrialized 
economies that has yet to revitalize exports from the region. 
As developing Asia has instituted macroeconomic and financial reforms in the decade 
and a half since the Asian financial crisis, and as many regional economies run current 
account surpluses and hold large foreign reserves, the region is in a strong position 
to weather financial markets shocks, in particular from the anticipated tapering of 
quantitative easing in the United States. 
This Asian Development Outlook 2013 Update looks at governance in developing Asia. 
Even as the region energetically closes its income gap with advanced economies, a wide 
gap in governance remains. Yet governance is key to sustaining development momentum, 
and improving public service delivery can be an entry point for better governance.
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